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ABSTRACT 
Legislation regarding Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) can legitimize its use as 
an alternative to a more formal, law- or court-centred dispute resolution process. 
However, recent studies warn that prescribing and concretizing this alternative 
process in legislation may paradoxically undermine, limit or prevent its use. The 
combination of robust theoretical and empirical research and investigation described 
in this dissertation seeks to advance the debate about ADR legislation - whether and 
what to legislate and why. Current legal theories of regulatory culture, legal 
consciousness and administrative discretion are presented and analyzed. These, in 
turn, inform the design of a case study that seeks to confirm or challenge the theory, 
based on in-depth, issue-focused, phenomenological interviews with key informants 
in the Ontario health professions self-regulatory field regarding recent ADR 
legislation governing their complaints resolution process. The case study data reveal a 
variety of individual and collective perceptions of the power of legislation, legality, 
non-law and alternatives-to-law, as reflected in comments about the requirements and 
expectations of the ADR legislation in a politically dynamic and evolving 
professional self-regulatory context. The empirical evidence both supports and 
challenges the ADR regulatory theory and demonstrates how legitimate 
administrative discretionary power to interpret and adapt the law permits regulatory 
practices to align with, contest, resist or escape the power of law, thus accomplishing 
or frustrating the increased efficiency, transparency, accountability, and consistency 
the ADR law was intended to achieve. 
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Overview of the Study 
Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation arises from the debate about whether, and, if so, how to legislate 
terms and conditions for the practice of alternative dispute resolution, particularly in 
the professional self-regulatory complaints resolution process. By examining and 
presenting both theoretical and empirical research into ADR legislation in the 
professional self-regulatory process, this study exposes the tensions and struggle 
reflected in the theoretical literature, as well as in the enactment of administrative 
discretionary policy and practices, between the role and power oflaw and of non-law 
- the hegemony of law and the resistance by areas of "non-law" or "alternative to 
law" to capture by law. By the choice ofregulatory field - professional self-
regulation - this study also reveals parallel tensions and struggle between 
increasingly centralized state control of professional regulation and professional self-
regulatory autonomy. This research is therefore also about the perceptions and 
exercise of power in certain aspects of the professional self-regulatory field. 
The original question that piqued my interest in this area of research is the extent to 
which social and political forces within societies that press for greater freedom from 
legislative constraints are opposed by forces that might use the law to limit the 
"alternativeness" of alternative dispute resolution and, as an interesting corollary, 
whether these forces might be related to the forces that seek to constrain professional 
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regulatory autonomy. Could qualitative research reveal whether the forces attempting 
to keep alternative dispute resolution free of cumbersome legal constraints are being 
challenged, weakened or defeated by the forces of "law and order," resulting in the 
"alternativeness" of ADR becoming "captured" and weakened by legislation 
governing its use? 
The dissertation first examines the theoretical debates behind these issues and then 
presents a robust, in-depth, qualitative case study of recent ADR legislation in the 
health profession self-regulatory system in Ontario. The case study enquires about 
and reports the responses of a significant sample of key informants in the regulatory 
field regarding the perceived reasons for the ADR legislation, the perceived 
appropriateness of the specific ADR legislative provisions and the perceived impact 
of the ADR legislation on actual regulator practice in carrying out regulatory policy. 
The purpose of conducting such a robust, in-depth case study was to determine 
whether the theoretical debate about alternative dispute resolution (ADR) legislation 
- whether and how much to legislate ADR and why - is clarified and enhanced by 
qualitative empirical research based on theories of regulatory culture, constitutive 
legalism and legal consciousness that expose individual and collective assumptions 
about law, legality and the requirements and expectations of ADR. The theories of 
the regulatory community and regulatory culture are explored as providing a 
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theoretical framework for the exercise of administrative discretion in regulatory 
administration. 
The concept of legal consciousness and the responses of before, with, or against the 
law (conformity or compliance with, contestation of and resistance to the law) are 
examined as suggesting possible explanations for the wide range of strategies and 
tactics employed by regulators in response to the ADR legislation and for the reasons 
they give for their actions. By studying a specific community of regulators 
(healthcare profession self-regulatory officials) under significant political, 
bureaucratic, managerial and ideological pressures either to adopt or avoid the 
legislated requirements, the theory about what constitutes regulatory culture and legal 
consciousness may be observed, robust qualitative data generated and presented, and 
important key questions regarding the relationship among ADR legislation, regulatory 
culture and administrative discretion addressed. For example, does the scholarship 
regarding legal consciousness and regulatory culture provide a useful theoretical 
framework with which to explore and understand attitudes toward ADR legislation 
and explain the consequences of legislating ADR in a professional self-regulatory 
environment? Can this research approach be usefully applied to other regulatory 
"communities" and can it help to explain why ADR law - or perhaps any new 
legislation - is accepted, adopted, "gamed," avoided or resisted by those whose 
regulatory and/or administrative responsibility it is to carry it out? 
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The subject of the case study research is the Ontario Health System Improvements Act 
2007 (HSIA), that amended the Regulated Health Professions Act 1991 (RHP A) to 
authorize, with certain conditions, the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to 
resolve certain types of complaints by the public against members of Ontario 
healthcare profession self-regulatory colleges. The HSIA received Royal Assent on 
June 4, 2007, with the ADR and related provisions taking effect on June 4, 2009. 
Focusing on the RHPA regulatory community and the internal and external trends and 
pressures that produced the ADR legislation, I examine stakeholder perceptions 
regarding the reasons for the legislation, the content and clarity of the legislation as 
direction, as well as the political and social context, regulatory culture and 
discretionary decision-making within a regulatory community confronting new ADR 
legislation. 
Put another way, the research attempts to address and answer the following questions: 
What was/were the "problem(s)" that the ADR legislation was intended to resolve? 
How effective is the legislation likely to be as a solution to the perceived problem(s)? 
Will well-established bureaucratic practices "subvert" the legislative intent? This 
study presents the empirical research needed to address these questions as well as the 
larger issue of whether the decision to legislate the use of ADR in healthcare 
profession complaints resolution processes is an effective or ineffective solution to 
the perceived problem(s). 
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The Government of the Province of Ontario and the officials of the Ministry of Health 
and Long-Term Care, particularly those in the Ministry Branch and Unit responsible 
for developing policy, regulatory and legislative proposals that support the regulation 
of health professionals in the public interest are the public officials most closely 
involved in monitoring and directing the health regulatory Colleges that apply the 
RHP A in day-to-day procedures. The 21 Colleges1 comprise a significant element of 
the RHP A regulatory community, as do the Health Professions Regulatory Advisory 
Council (HPRAC)2 and the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB).3 
The Colleges, HPRAC and HP ARB all derive their authority and jurisdiction from 
the RHP A and are accountable to the Government and the Minister of Health and 
Long-Term Care for the fulfillment of their responsibilities. For the purposes of this 
case study, it is assumed that the institutions referred to in the RHP A constitute an 
identifiable regulatory community, whose members may have similar or different 
1 At the time this study was conducted. Five new Colleges are to be proclaimed pursuant to the HSIA 
(2007) in 2013 or 2014. 
2 From the HPRAC website (http://www.hprac.org/en/): HPRAC advises the Minister on whether 
unregulated health professions should be regulated, whether regulated professions should no longer be 
regulated, amendments to the Regulated Health Professions Act, a health profession act or a regulation 
under those acts, quality assurance and patient relations programs of Ontario's health regulatory 
Colleges, and on other matters referred to it by the Minister. (retrieved March 2013) 
Members of the Council are appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council. In formulating its 
advice, HPRAC seeks knowledgeable information and comment from members of the public, 
community organizations, interest groups, health professional regulatory colleges and associations, and 
conducts extensive research. The Council aims to be accessible and open, and its consultative 
processes may include written submissions, public hearings, focus groups, research projects and 
community meetings in order to capture the experience and expertise of those with an interest in the 
matter. (retrieved March 2013) 
3 From the HPARB website (http://www.hparb.on.ca/): The Health Professions Appeal and Review 
Board is an independent adjudicative agency. On request, it: Reviews decisions made by the Inquiries, 
Complaints and Reports Committees of the self-regulating health professions Colleges in Ontario; 
Conducts reviews and hearings of orders of the Registration Committees of the Colleges; and Holds 
hearings concerning physicians' hospital privileges under the Public Hospitals Act. (retrieved March 
2013) 
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perspectives on the purpose of the community, its values, history, current and future 
states. My research included extensive, in-depth, open-ended key informant 
interviews with senior officials of the Ministry, the Chair of HP ARB, and 20 officials 
representing more than two-thirds of the health profession self-regulatory Colleges. 
This research is situated within an ongoing debate in the ADR community about the 
benefits and pitfalls of legislating ADR, what is appropriate ADR legislation and 
what is the optimal process for developing and implementing it. I am not the only 
legal scholar who has been intrigued by the underlying paradox in establishing laws 
that govern alternative dispute resolution processes - laws that mandate, prescribe or 
proscribe the circumstances and ways in which ADR may be practiced and the 
procedures to be followed in an activity that is characterized and championed by 
many as alternative to and significantly different from traditional law-based dispute 
resolution processes. This debate reflects a larger discussion about the dominance of a 
legalistic paradigm - constitutive legalism 4 - that influences thinking about rules and 
directives within the regulatory community and society at large. In other words, as 
the ADR legislation drama plays out within a specific community of RHP A 
regulators, the web of power dynamics that affect or limit the "alternativeness" of 
ADR in this or any other context may not, in fact, be directly or solely related to ADR 
4 The definition and properties of constitutive legalism used here derive principally from L. Edelman & 
R. Stryker, "A Sociological Approach to Law and the Economy" in N. Smelser & R. Swedberg, eds., 
The Handbook of Economic Sociology (Newbury Park, Ca.: Sage Publications, 2005) 530 [Edelman 
& Stryker] 
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itself, but may also involve other political, legal or practical issues within or 
impinging from outside the regulatory community. 
Previous research suggests that legislation recognizing and defining the use of ADR 
can legitimize its use as an authorized alternative to a more formal, traditional, law-
based, court-model dispute resolution process. There is significant debate about how 
far such legislation should go in detailing when and how ADR can or should be used 
or avoided. Recent theoretical studies5 warn that prescribing and/or concretizing this 
alternative process in legislation may paradoxically undermine, limit or even prevent 
its use by diminishing its "alternativeness," and hence its usefulness and benefits. 
These studies also emphasize the importance of involving the relevant stakeholders in 
the ADR legislation design and implementation process. 
One key question concerns the "ideal" balance between prescription and 
permissiveness in ADR legislation. How clear and prescriptive should the legislation 
be in order to ensure public policy goals for professional self-regulation are met and 
how flexible and permissive should the legislation be in order to achieve the optimum 
benefits of having ADR at all? How is the right balance or tension achieved between 
5 For example, J. Lande, "Principles for Policymaking About Collaborative Law and Other ADR 
Processes" (2007) 22 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, 619 [Lande 2007]; J. Lande, "Using 
Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation 
Programs" (2002) 50 UCLA Law Review 69 [Lande 2002]; C. Pou, Jr., "Legislating Flexibility: 
Things that ADR Legislation Can and Cannot Do Well" (2001) 8 Dispute Resolution Magazine 6 
[Pou] 
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flexibility, adaptability and discretion regarding administration of the complaints 
resolution and ADR processes on the one hand, and standardization, consistency and 
similar treatment of participants throughout the RHP A complaints resolution process 
on the other? This tension between flexibility and standardization has been a 
common theme throughout the life of the RHP A, which has served as a regulatory 
template for all the self-governing health professions in Ontario. The Government 
rhetoric at the time the ADR legislation was introduced referred to the need for 
standardization and streamlining of the complaints resolution process (consistency 
and efficiency). Because the current ADR legislation may, on balance, be a 
combination of permissive and prescriptive (although interpretations vary as to which 
dominates, or whether an appropriate balance is achieved), there would appear to be 
some scope for interpretation and application of the provisions, according to 
administrative discretion. 
The argument in the literature suggests that if the legislation is too prescriptive, it 
may undermine many of the benefits of having an ADR process. If the legislation is 
too open and flexible, it may leave too many decisions about how ADR can and will 
be implemented to the discretion of individual bureaucrats with greater or lesser 
experience and knowledge of ADR and with interests of their own to satisfy, 
including professional, organizational and managerial concerns. The dilemma of 
finding the right balance between prescription and flexibility was captured in the 
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College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO) submission to the Health 
Professions Regulatory Advisory Council (HPRAC) regarding the ADR legislation 
HPRAC proposed to the Government of Ontario in its report, New Directions 
(2006). CPSO expressed its concern that formalizing ADR would reduce ADR's 
flexibility and lead to inappropriate use. 
The College supports adding a definition in the legislation of alternate 
resolution process and views this as an important step forward. However, the 
College is concerned that the elaborate system of alternate resolution proposed 
[by HPRAC in New Directions] will make the use of such a system 
unworkable (much like the current "frivolous and vexatious" provisions for 
dealing with certain complaints, which the College has largely found 
unworkable and which are rarely used. It is simply easier and more efficient to 
process the complaint in the usual way). Again, the College stresses that it 
supports all of the goals listed by HPRAC in support of an informal resolution 
process: used properly, it is more efficient and expeditious, cheaper, and 
generates more positive outcomes than does the traditional model in many 
cases. These positive outcomes include broad system outcomes, which are in 
keeping with the vision expressed in the HPRAC Report of multidisciplinary 
co-operation and care. The College's concern is that these goals will not be 
achieved by the system envisioned, which is complex and cumbersome. We 
would support a truly informal process and certainly agree that in order to 
invoke that process, all involved should agree to participate in it. ... We wish 
to emphasize that any process must have flexibility in application if it is to be 
effective. 6 
According to several regulatory scholars, legislative development occurs within what 
is described as a "regulatory culture," whose power dynamics determine the form, 
substance, application and outcome of the legislation. My approach to this case study 
has been inspired by Meidinger' s 1987 landmark theoretical paper that explores the 
6 CPSO Response to HPRAC Report, June 29, 2006 
( cpsodocuments/po lici es/positions/submissions/Response_ HPRA C _Report_ June06. pdf at 
http://www.cpso.on.ca (retrieved March 2013) 
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relationship among regulatory culture, the indeterminacy of rules and administrative 
discretion.7 His paper addressed "the inability of scholars to comprehend large parts 
of regulatory activity without reference to [regulatory culture],"8 and was 
contemporaneous with the exploration of the concept and influence of culture in 
business, organizational and legal communities, building on and expanding the 
concept's original use in ethnographic research. The concepts Meidinger explores 
. reflected the increasingly influential discussions of the continuous, reflexive, 
· evolving, self-forming and self-correcting nature of organizational cultures9 and 
significantly expanded the second wave of law and society studies of legal culture 
and legal consciousness that followed on Friedman10 to embrace the regulatory 
community and stakeholder regulatory negotiation. 
Meidinger is especially skeptical about legal scholarship on regulation that is too 
general and theoretical and does not enquire deeply and specifically enough into the 
concrete issues faced by regulators in developing and implementing regulation. He 
calls for more empirical research in the area of regulatory culture and regulation. In 
particular, he describes the challenge thus: "the crucial task at present is to map 
ongoing relationships and describe forms of power in actual regulatory 
7 E. Meidinger, "Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline" ( 1987) 9 Law & Policy 355 [Meidinger 
1987] 
8 Ibid at 356 
9 See, for example, Schein (1985) Argyris & Schon (1978), Smircich (1983) 
10 L. M. Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
1975) [Friedman] 
10 
communities. "11 He asserts the important principle for research into the dynamics of 
culture and power in regulatory communities that "culture cannot always be revealed 
simply by asking people their attitudes regarding issues. It often must be read from 
their behaviors and products. In an important sense, then, culture is not really just 
what people 'carry around in their heads'; it is what they enact in their daily lives."12 
Meidinger theorizes that regulatory culture that organizes the daily activity of 
regulation is formed from the actual structural constraints within the system, the 
political pressures experienced consciously or unconsciously by the participants in the 
system, the general cultural assumptions that impinge on and influence attitudes and 
activities within the system, the legal requirements imposed, and the established and 
evolving bureaucratic procedures within the various parts of the system. 
Meidinger' s paper calls for more empirical research into specific, concrete situations 
and "problems" in the area of regulatory culture and regulation, in order to understand 
how regulation actually works in real life. He contends that much regulatory research 
avoids dealing with the actual experience of regulatory administration and therefore 
cannot provide relevant and accurate analyses of situations and useful 
recommendations for reform, since much of the reality that the regulator confronts in 
11 Meidinger 1987 supra note 7 at 368 
12 Ibid at 361 
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carrying out the regulatory role on a daily basis is missing from or only partially 
studied by experts in regulation. 
To give weight to the particular problems faced seems to be an eminently 
sensible approach, yet it is seldom taken in studies of regulation. Social 
scientists working from a cultural perspective tend to minimize the role of 
concrete experiences in structuring regulatory outlook. Similarly, legal 
scholars seem to assume that the particular nature of regulatory problems is 
not important. This assumption is manifested in the enormous potpourri of 
regulatory fields covered in most administrative law books, as well as the 
scholarly penchant for talking generally about regulation, administration, 
rationality, efficiency, expertise, etc. These tendencies may blind us to many 
possible insights about logical regulatory practices and also may prevent us 
from developing typologies of regulation that capture key.differences and 
similarities of work practice. 13 
The case study in this paper addresses the approaches taken by those who articulated 
ADR policy, by those who drafted the legislation, and by those who are charged with 
implementing it (regulatory College officials). It examines the role of the legal 
"gatekeepers" - those whose job it is (or who take it upon themselves) to interpret the 
law, according to their own values, beliefs, understanding and interests, seen as such, 
or as representative of what they perceive as the cultural norm within the community 
of professional self-regulation they serve, or the community of law of which they 
form part. 
ADR scholars and advocates have been concerned in recent years with the need to 
preserve the truly alternative, flexible nature of ADR from the "pull" of rules and 
13 Ibid at 375 
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legalism, even though legislation may be necessary to legitimize its use by the public 
and practitioners. Reflecting on the discussions of the paradox of using an instrument 
of force (legislation) in connection with an alternative, flexible process, some 
parallels emerged with the currently reported movement to limit or control 
professional self-regulation in several jurisdictions (e.g., U.K., Ontario, Australia, 
New Zealand). During the course of many intensive interviews, it became apparent 
from comments by College officials that a good deal of the rhetoric regarding 
professional self-regulation in Ontario is confusing and misleading to many -
members of the public, members of the Colleges and even some College staff - by 
suggesting greater regulatory autonomy than the statutorily delegated authority 
actually imparts and obfuscating the direct line of accountability to Government that 
forms the basis of the RHP A regulatory arrangement. The "self-regulatory" Colleges 
are, in the end, creatures of Government, created by statute, governed by statutes and 
accountable to the Minister. The reality is that the Government of Ontario has 
delegated its power to the Colleges and backs up the exercise of College delegated 
authority with the coercive power of the state. In daily self-regulatory practice, 
however, there appears to be a desire for and assumption of greater professional 
autonomy than the system actually supports, leading some in the system and many in 
the public to think of the arrangement as closer to the "co-regulation model."14 
14 For a discussion of the forms of self-regulation in Canada, see M. Priest, "The Privatization of 
Regulation: Five Models of Self-Regulation" (1997-1998) 29 Ottawa Law Review 233. Her five 
categories include "statutory self-regulation," which best describes the framework for the RHPA 
Colleges. See also L. Bohnen, Regulated Health Professions Act, a Practical Guide (Aurora: Canada 
Law Book Inc., 1994), the first guide to explain the Ontario Regulated Health Professions Act 1991. 
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A persistent self-regulatory aspiration appears to fuel the intensity with which many 
of the members of the RHP A regulatory community continue to assert and defend 
their power/right of self-regulation and bridle at what are sometimes experienced as 
unwarranted intrusions by Government into the exercise of their discretion. This 
situation has also given rise to a certain measure of frustration and disappointment 
among the Colleges regarding a perceived lack of trust between Government and 
regulators as partners in the regulatory process. These perceptions may also arise in 
part from the nature of the self- regulatory arrangement whereby the members of each 
profession pay (sometimes quite significant) annual fees to the Colleges to fund the 
(often very high) expenses of the Government-directed "self' -regulatory process, 
which is frequently experienced as not very self-regulatory at all. 15 
Reflecting the political dimension of Meidinger' s regulatory culture theory, this study 
therefore also considers whether the narrowing of administrative discretion within 
legally prescribed limits of the ADR legislation is a symptom of a larger political 
trend whereby professional self-regulation is being eroded as part of a continuing 
and companion health profession Acts. Bohnen worked on the development of the RHP A. Her book 
provides an interpretation of how the Act works, including references to the complaints resolution 
process.; J. Casey, The Regulation of Professions in Canada {Toronto: Carswell, ongoing) 2006; and 
R. Steinecke, A Complete Guide to the Regulated Health Professions Act. (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 
2007) contains a useful description of the legislative history of each provision in the RHP A, providing 
a legal interpretive perspective on the background and intent of the current and historical versions of 
the Code. 
15 For an additional and interesting perspective on the self-regulatory spectrum, as seen from another 
jurisdiction and dimension, see G. Banks, "The Good, The Bad and the Ugly: Economic Perspectives 
on Regulation in Australia" (2004) 23 Economic Papers: A Journal of Applied Economics and 
Policy 22 [Banks] at 36. The arrangement he describes as co-regulation (rather than self-regulation) 
might be inferred by someone observing (as many Colleges do) that the RHPA Colleges contribute 
almost the entire funding of the self-regulatory enterprise which the Government directs. 
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power shift between government and the professions. To what extent does the 
approach to this ADR legislation reflect political changes that enable or restrain the 
various legal actors in the professional self-regulatory community from exercising 
power through control of their administrative decision-making discretion? Does the 
research, viewed from a legal consciousness perspective, suggest ways by which a 
community organized around the concept of self-regulation in the public interest 
strives - through compliance or conformity with, negotiation/contestation of and/or 
resistance to law - to establish an appropriate balance in the tension between 
autonomy/self-determination and "external" control? The empirical evidence 
presented in this study dramatically demonstrates the wide variety of discretionary 
adaptive interpretations and flexible applications (whether or not intended or 
expressly permitted by the legislation) of new legal rules whose stated main purpose 
was to produce/create greater efficiency, transparency and standardization among the 
Colleges' complaints resolution processes. 
With the rise in interest in alternative dispute resolution, the subject of whether and 
how much regulation of its procedures is necessary or desirable is timely and 
important. I am not aware of any similar empirical or grounded research into existing 
ADR legislation and am confident that the results of this work, particularly the robust 
key informant commentary contained among the case study findings, will prove 
useful to those involved in ADR policy, ADR dispute system design, ADR legislation 
negotiation, the inclusion and drafting of specific ADR legislative provisions, and the 
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more general phenomenon of how self-regulatory communities view and respond to 
legislative initiatives. It is particularly timely and useful to learn from direct empirical 
evidence how regulatory officials respond and adapt their practices to conform to or 
comply with, avoid or resist any legislation which they view as restrictive or overly 
directive, especially during the current conditions of economic and political constraint 
and reaction. 
This study contributes to legal culture and legal consciousness studies by adding 
empirical evidence about whether the theories of legal consciousness, regulatory 
culture and administrative discretion explain the very different health regulatory 
College responses to the new ADR legislation. It evaluates the particular RHP A ADR 
provisions against the "ideal" ADR provisions described in the literature cited. It also 
answers the (frequently expressed) critical need/call for in-depth empirical research to 
understand how the perceptions held by key actors in the regulatory field determine 
the outcomes of legislation through the exercise of administrative discretion. 
However, this study does not attempt to determine whether alternative dispute 
resolution processes are appropriate in the College complaints resolution processes. 
The views of other College complaints system stakeholders, principally College 
members and the public as complainants, have not been canvassed or included in this 
study, but could well be the subject of future research. This study' s principal focus is 
on the regulator's response to legislation and the theoretical literature that examines 
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the context of regulatory policy- and decision-making - regulatory community, 
regulatory culture, legal consciousness and administrative discretion - and on 
whether and how that context influences the beliefs and attitudes of the principal legal 
actors within this regulatory community, which, in tum, determine their choices and 
behaviour in response to this ADR legislation, as compared with and demonstrated 
through a case study ofrecently enacted ADR legislation. Hopefully, however, by 
comparing the political rhetoric with practical reality, it will be possible for 
policymakers to draw useftil inferences from the data concerning the consequences of 
the legislative process and the particular legislative provisions about how to design 
and frame ADR legislation in a way that takes into account the possible obstacles that 
might arise in the implementation process and how to overcome them. 
Organization of the Dissertation 
Chapter Two briefly describes the historical background to the 2007 ADR legislation 
and highlights the stages of development, including the HPRAC reviews and reports, 
the introduction of the legislation in 2007 and proclamation of the legislation in 2009. 
Chapter Three provides a theoretical foundation and framework for the discussion of 
whether and how to legislate ADR and for the analysis of the findings from the key 
informant interviews. The first section deals with the concepts of regulatory culture 
and regulatory community, tracing their source in organizational culture and legal 
culture theory. This discussion leads to the literature on the constitutive legal 
17 
environment and the constitutive power of law as part of society, influencing myriad 
decisions within and beyond the field of law, and identifies this basic premise as a 
critical element of the work on regulatory culture as described and demonstrated in 
the writings of Friedman (1975), Meidinger (1987 & 1992), Edelman and Suchman 
(1997), Edelman and Stryker (2005) and Ewick and Silbey (1992 & 1998). The 
section focuses on Meidinger' s theory that regulatory culture comprises the impact of 
general cultural assumptions, political pressures, legal requirements, bureaucratic 
procedures and structural constraints on regulators' administrative decisions in 
response to law. These influences within the regulatory community determine how 
regulators respond to rules, regulation and legislation, given that these are always 
ambiguous, indeterminate and subject to interpretation (Meidinger; Lange16). The 
literature cited suggests that other influences, besides the legislation itself, including 
cultural norms, values, beliefs, meanings and expectations contribute to the individual 
regulator's choices of how and whether to act or not. Recent empirical research from 
the risk management regulatory culture literature bears out these observations and 
provides further insight into the responses to introducing new rules into the culture of 
an established regulatory community, particularly with respect to the intent and 
purpose of the rules and the relationship of trust between those establishing the rule 
and those with the responsibility to carry it out. 17 
16 B. Lange "What does Law Know? - Prescribing and Describing the Social World in the 
Enforcement of Legal Rules" (2002) 30:2 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 131 [Lange 
2002]; B. Lange, "Regulatory Spaces and Interactions: An Introduction", in: B. Lange (ed.) Regulatory 
Spaces and Interactions: Special Issue of (2003) Social and Legal Studies 411 [Lange 2003] 
17 See in particular, T. Reiman, & P. Oedewald, "The assessment of organisational culture. A 
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The following sections therefore focus on the relationship between the Government 
and the professional regulatory Colleges in the context of a changing economic and 
political environment. Loss of professional autonomy and greater control over 
agencies with delegated authority as reflected in the juridification of more aspects of 
"local" government, as well as the contemporaneous rise in the assertion of consumer 
rights, are the subjects of recent theoretical and empirical research on the professions, 
professional self-regulation and co-regulation. Recent empirical studies that enquire 
into the nature of the changing relationship between the Ontario Government and the 
health professions self-regulatory system encourage a comparison between the data in 
this study and a similar U.K. study on the juridification of local government 
discretionary decision-making, and provide evidence of the tension between 
authority, control and flexibility and the changing power dynamics in Ontario's 
professional sector. 
The theoretical studies of administrative discretion (e.g., Meidinger, Edelman and 
Suchman, 18 Black, 19 Rubin20) which support Pratt's landmark study of Canadian 
methodological study." VTT Tiedotteita - Research Notes 2140 (Espoo 2002) [Reiman & Oedewald 2002] 
and J.-E.Tharaldsen & K. Haukelid, "Culture and behavioural perspectives on safety- towards a 
balanced approach" (2009) 12:3-4 Journal of Risk Research 375 [Tharaldsen & Haukelid] 
18 L. Edelman & M. Suchman "The Legal Environments of Organizations" (1997) 23 Annual Review of 
Sociology 479 [Edelman & Suchman] 
19 J. Black, "Constitutionalizing Self-Regulation" ((1996) 59 Modern Law Review 24 [Black 1996]; J. 
Black, "Managing Discretion" (2001) Published as: ARLC Conference Papers - Penalties: Policy, 
Principles and Practice in Government Regulation 
www .lse.ac.uk/co llections/law /staff/black/alrc%20managing%20discretion.pdf [Black 200 I a] 
J. Black, "Decentring Regulation: The Role of Regulation and Self- Regulation in a 'Post-Regulatory' 
World" (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 103 [Black 2001b] 
20 E. Rubin, "Discretion and its Discontents" (1997) 72 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1299 [Rubin] 
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immigration officers' discretionary decision-making within a normative cultural 
context,21 emphasize the myriad individual and cultural influences on discretionary 
decision-making, which they show to be a natural and necessary part of the policy-
making process. Ewick and Sil bey's influential work on legal consciousness22 is 
discussed in order to portray the phenomenon of how individuals think about law and 
the ways that individual "street-level bureaucrats" continue to develop law in the 
process of interpreting and applying it. Their detailed narratives of individuals' 
relationships with the constitutive legal environment and with particular laws and legal 
situations provide a theoretical and practical approach to the study of bureaucratic 
responses to the ADR legislation. Their categorization of the three typical responses as 
conformity, contestation, or resistance, reflecting attitudes of deference to the power of 
law, taking advantage of the many opportunities to engage with or "game" the law, or 
finding ways to avoid or resist the law, offer a paradigm for interpreting the varying 
responses to the ADR legislation. The robustness of the data in legal consciousness 
empirical studies, several of which are included in the theoretical foundations review, 
also informed the key informant interview verbatim reporting in this study, with its 
emphasis on providing sufficient detail for the readers to form their own impression of 
21 A. Pratt," Dunking the Doughnut: Discretionary Power, Law and the Administration of the 
Canadian Immigration Act" ( 1999) 8 Social & Legal Studies 199 [Pratt] 
22 P. Ewick & S. Silbey, "Conformity, Contestation, Resistance: An Account of Legal Consciousness" 
(1992) 26 New England Law Review 73 [Ewick & Silbey 1992]; P. Ewick & S. Silbey The Common 
Place of Law: Stories From Eve1yday Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998) [Ewick & Si Ibey 
1998]; S. Silbey, "Legal Culture and Legal Consciousness," in International Encyclopedia o/Social and 
Behavioral Sciences, Smelser & Baltes eds. (New York: Pergamon Press 2001) [Silbey 2001]; S. Silbey, 
"After Legal Consciousness" (2005) I Annual Review Law & Social Science 323 [Silbey 2005] 
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the legal consciousness and decision-making processes of the key informants 
interviewed. 
The literature on whether and how much to legislate ADR is presented to demonstrate 
the differences in views regarding what types of legislation, if any, appear appropriate 
for ADR and, specifically, what purpose and what aspects of ADR such legislation 
should address. The views of Lande, Pou and Kleefeld23 on ADR legislation are 
reviewed, and the empirical research carried out in Australia and New Zealand into 
health professions self-regulatory Board members' attitudes toward the possibility of 
ADR legislation is reported and serves as a useful comparison with the Ontario 
situation. 24 The question for the Australian regulators was hypothetical, as no such 
legislation had been introduced, whereas the data in this study reflect the situation 
where the ADR legislation is already in place, and therefore advances the research in 
this important area. Meidinger, Freeman,25 Lande and Ewick and Silbey are sources 
of perspectives on the importance of stakeholder consultation and involvement in the 
legislative design process and whether such participation, or lack of it, and the sense 
of procedural fairness or lack of it, influence legal consciousness regarding the 
legislation and administrator attitudes that affect its implementation. 
23 J. Kleefeld, "ADR and Professional Regulation" in Se(f-Governing Professions: Regulatory Issues 
(Vancouver: Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia, 2001) [Kleefeld] 
24 G. Howse, C. Naksook, D. Halstead, & R. Honigman, The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in 
Australia and New Zealand by Health Practitioner Registering Bodies (Melbourne: La Trobe 
University Centre for Public Health Law, 2004) [Howse] 
25 J. Freeman, "The Private Role in Public Governance" (2000) 75 New York University Law Review 
543 
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Chapter Four provides a brief overview of the methodology (presented in 
comprehensive detail in Appendix A) and the detailed Research Findings resulting 
from the qualitative in-depth key informant interviews focused on the particular case 
study. Three sets of questions (or avenues of discussion and exploration) posed to the 
key informants reflect Friedman's division of the legal "system" into three aspects: 
the socio-cultural context that gives rise to legislation, the structure and substance of 
the legislation itself (including the procedures and organizations for rule development 
and management), and the ways that the legislation influences the behaviour of the 
"legal actors" within or connected in some significant way to the legal system, or, as 
Friedman expresses it, "how and why rules are made and what effect they have on 
people's lives."26 Interviews commenced from each of three "neutral" starting points 
about the ADR legislation, reflecting Friedman's legal studies foci: 
1. What do you think gave rise to the ADR legislation? 
2. In your opinion, how appropriate is the ADR legislation? 
3. What impact has the ADR legislation had on College practices? 
Each interview section started with a form of the general question and followed up 
with ever-deepening probes to uncover the underlying individual and cultural 
perspectives in each area of questioning. The informant responses were often dense, 
complex and intense, with interviewees providing thoughtful, discursive comments 
within each of the three areas. The interviews were open-ended, conversational 
exchanges, with most lasting slightly over one hour. 
26 Friedman supra note 10 at 2 
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Informant responses to the first set of questions (What do you think gave rise to the 
ADR legislation?) and the subsequent probes for clarification identified the following 
official and unofficial goals of the legislation: to improve public protection; 
legitimize the use of ADR in the College complaints resolution process; standardize 
the ADR processes across the regulatory community of Colleges; increase efficiency 
in relation to resolving complaints regarding publicly funded health professionals; 
relieve pressure on the publicly funded Health Professions Appeal and Review Board; 
and the perceived shift in discretionary power away from the professions and the 
Colleges to the Government. 
In very general terms, attitudes towards the legislation fell into one of four categories: 
1. The ADR legislation is important and needed, and will have a positive and 
beneficial effect on the use of ADR in the College complaints process; 
2. The ADR legislation is important and needed, but this version of it is too 
rigid, onerous, unrealistic, burdensome, complicated and costly and has, or 
may have, a "chilling" effect on ADR use in the College complaints process; 
3. The ADR legislation is not needed and will have a negative effect; 
4. The ADR legislation is not needed and will have neither a negative nor a 
positive effect. 
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Responses to the second set of questions (In your opinion, how appropriate is the 
ADR legislation?) elicited comments on the legislation's overall appropriateness, as 
well as the appropriateness of each of the individual provisions of the ADR 
legislation. There was considerable discussion of the definitions within the legislation 
and the fact that a complaint must be recorded in order to be a complaint and thus 
subject to the ADR legislation. This discussion revealed in some an underlying need 
and an identified opportunity for routes of "escape" from legislative "capture." 
Three other issues caused considerable concern and controversy - the confidentiality 
of ADR proceedings, time limits on the disposal of a complaint, and the need to 
separate the ADR facilitator from all other aspects of the complaints resolution 
process. Informants expressed widely divergent opinions about how the legislation 
was developed, particularly regarding College participation in the design process. 
Interesting perspectives emerged regarding whether or not a complaint is a dispute 
and whether ADR is appropriate to complaints resolution, as well as whether the 
ADR process should have been authorized within individual College regulations, as 
opposed to a "one size fits all" piece of legislation, given the perceived diversity of 
the regulatory community in terms of types of complaints, resources available and the 
perceived and experienced cultures of the different professions. 
The third set of questions (What impact has the ADR legislation had on College 
practices?) elicited a wide variety of responses among the Colleges surveyed. In 
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summary, and for various reasons given (which are discussed later), it was reported 
that the particular College either will: 
1. Stop doing ADR for complaints; or 
2. Not start doing ADR for complaints; or 
3. Adjust their own complaints system to 
a) avoid the legislated ADR process, while maintaining their own 
informal resolution/ADR process; and/or 
b) modify their own informal resolution/ ADR process to comply with 
legislation; or 
4. Delay taking action on implementing the legislated ADR system because of 
other more pressing regulatory imperatives (it not being a mandatory process); 
or 
5. Delay taking action on ADR until others have tested the new system and 
worked out all the potential problems (through considerations of efficiency or 
fear of "getting it wrong" and angering authority or looking foolish to others). 
The views of the Ministry officials on the likely impact of the ADR legislation on the 
regulatory Colleges are also reported, as well as College informants' views of the role 
and potential of the voluntary Federation of Health Regulatory Colleges and its ability 
to serve the needs of the regulatory community, particularly in future relations with 
the Government. 
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Chapter Five analyzes and discusses the case study findings in relation to the theory 
regarding regulatory culture, legal consciousness, constitutive legalism, 
administrative discretion and how these combine to illuminate the important 
questions raised in the ongoing debate about the benefits and costs, rewards and risks 
of ADR legislation. 
1. It reflects on how the data help expose the tension between law and alternative-to-
law ("other than," or "non" law) and can highlight the presence of and resistance to 
constitutive legalism in ways that are relevant to ADR legislation, and whether the 
insights achieved through the lens of the ADR legislation might be applicable to 
understanding the intended and unintended consequences of legislation and regulation 
more generally. 
2. It discusses how ADR legislation in particular presents challenges that help 
illuminate individuals' attitudes to the purpose and efficacy oflegislation - how law 
helps and how law hinders decision-making. 
3. It explores whether the data validate Meidinger's five elements of regulatory 
culture - general cultural assumptions, political pressures, legal requirements, 
bureaucratic procedures and structural constraints - as the causes or justifications for 
types of discretionary decision-making in the interpretation and application of the 
legislation, which of these elements may have greater weight, and whether this 
approach provides a more robust understanding of the grounds for administrative 
discretion. 
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4. It also analyzes and discusses whether the three elements of Ewick and Silbey's 
legal consciousness theory regarding individual attitudes toward law and legality -
conformity, contestation and resistance - help describe and explain the types of 
response representing the effects of the regulatory culture elements on administrative 
discretion regarding whether and how ADR legislation is adopted. 
Chapter Six presents the conclusions to be drawn from the analysis and discussion, as 
well as recommendations for further research in this important area of study. 
Finally, I believe the findings in this dissertation demonstrate (as other research 
studies have before this) that we don't really understand anything important about law 
if we don't understand the context out of which law arises, the conditions that 
motivate those who develop the law and the pressures, concerns, expectations and 
real life constraints on those whose responsibility it is to implement or follow the law. 
Legal scholars give these phenomena and processes names like regulatory culture, 
legal culture, legal consciousness, etc., to describe what they perceive to be 
happening in the minds of individuals in the field of rules and regulation. Meidinger 
has theories about what regulators do and why they do it, and other scholars support 
and add to his theories with theories of their own. However, Meidinger says we don't 
pay nearly enough attention to finding out what real people are thinking, feeling and 
doing in real situations when we think and write about regulation. 
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Ewick and Silbey demonstrate that when legal scholars take the time to sit down with 
people and encourage them by open-ended (and open-minded) questions, they may 
tell us what they think and feel about their circumstances and their attitudes toward 
rules and the legal environment with a vividness of detail and expression that may 
surprise us and challenge our beliefs. They suggest that we honour the trust these 
informants place in us by faithfully recounting, in their own words, the drama they 
perceive they are living. When we sincerely ask about and carefully listen to what 
these individuals have to say about law and regulation, we can learn a great deal 
about law and legal processes -what works and what doesn't work so well. This 
knowledge provides a firmer foundation for improvements in the process and 
substance of legislation. 
Lande and Pou tell us that there are ideal ways to ensure alternative dispute or 
complaints resolution processes are appropriately designed to meet their purpose, and 
since legislating ADR can, as with other rule-making, have unintended consequences, 
very careful consideration should be given to the particulars of the legislative design 
process as well as to the substance of ADR legislation and to ADR legislation's 
potential effects. They are supported by other regulatory theorists who call the 
process by which individual managers or workers decide, on the basis of many 
discoverable considerations, which parts of law to enact, which parts are open to 
negotiation or "gaming," which parts to avoid, disregard or subvert and how they do 
so, administrative discretion. This dissertation seeks to go behind and beyond the 
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terminology to where law is daily enacted - in the workplaces where regulators 
juggle myriad managerial and regulatory issues, with finite resources, to discharge 
their responsibilities to the legislation, the Government, the members of their 
profession, the staff of their organizations, the complainants, stakeholders and the 
wider public interest, as well as to satisfy their own professional and personal values, 
needs and desires. 
This dissertation does not address the features or benefits of ADR compared to other 
ways of resolving complaints or disputes in the professional self-regulatory system. It 
may help to clarify whether ADR in practice benefits or suffers from legislation 
governing its use. It does seek to discover whether regulators' attitudes towards ADR 
as a concept and a process, in the context of their other interests and concerns as 
regulators within a specific social, political, economic and cultural context, influence 
their responses to this specific ADR legislation. In so doing, this dissertation owes a 
great deal to the efforts of those scholars who have led the way in justifying robust 
evidence-based regulatory culture research and to the honesty and generosity of those 
in the regulatory community who proved to this scholar that the evidence is all around 
us if we take the trouble to find and use it to improve the regulatory environment in 
which we live. 
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Chapter Two 
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND 
This chapter sets out in summary form the history and background to the RHP A ADR 
legislation. It reports on what issues the legislation was intended to address, 
including improved transparency, efficiency, standardization, consistency, fairness 
and accountability, with protections against potential abuse of an alternative process, 
so as to maintain public confidence in the College complaints resolution process and 
in the regulatory system. 
The Regulated Health Professions Act27 provides the legislative authority and 
framework for regulatory Colleges (which have their own Acts of incorporation) to 
regulate the members of their profession(s) in the public interest. The RHPA 
currently governs some 300,000 healthcare professionals in Ontario through 21 
Colleges. Each College has its own Act of incorporation. The RHP A assigns 
authority, duties and responsibilities to: 
• the Minister of Health and Long-Term Care; 
• the Colleges that regulate health professions; 
• the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HP ARB); and 
•the Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council (HPRAC). 
27 Regulated Health Professions Act, SO 1991, c 18 (RHPA) 
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The RHP A comprises two related schedules. Schedule I lists the "Self Governing 
Health Professions," and Schedule 2 comprises the extensive Health Professions 
Procedural Code (HPPC), which contains the detailed authority, duties and 
procedures for carrying out the Colleges' statutory responsibilities. Among the areas 
of statutory authority provided for in the RHP A HPPC is the authority to receive and 
investigate complaints and the requirement to dispose of them in specific ways. 
RHP A 1999 - 2007 
Five-Year Review 
The RHPA was proclaimed on December 31, 1993 and took effect on January 1, 
1994, following the necessary preparations required for compliance with the entirely 
new structure and approach to professional self-regulation, which was considered at 
the time (and many would say still is) a model of its kind in the world. Each new Act 
of this type is required to undergo a statutory review after five years, to ensure it is 
fulfilling expectations and, following a process of public consultation, to be revised as 
necessary. The RHPA five-year review was initiated by a Report and series of 
questions drafted by the Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council (HPRAC), 
based on research it had previously conducted.28 Submissions were invited from 
interested stakeholders and a Final Report was issued, containing extensive comments 
and recommendations for the revision of the RHPA. HPRAC noted in its report, 
28 Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council, Weighing the Balance June 1999 
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Adjusting the Balance (2001),29 a high level of concern among the many stakeholders 
it consulted about the use of ADR in regulatory College complaints and discipline 
procedures. While expressing support for the efficiency of ADR over the hearings 
process in some situations, the HPRAC report faulted the Colleges' use of ADR for 
lack of transparency, fairness and accountability and recommended strict legislative 
provisions to restrict the use of ADR to very limited circumstances to guard against 
its abuse and to maintain public confidence in the regulatory system. 30 
Some Colleges are now using alternate dispute resolution (ADR) processes to 
handle complaints. These Colleges believe that, in some situations, a less 
complex and time-consuming process can result in an outcome that satisfies 
all parties. It is noteworthy, however, that ADR settlements are not part of the 
public record. The Regulated Health Professions Act does not refer to 
alternative methods for settling disputes since this is a relatively new 
approach. 
Fifteen out of 21 Colleges have some type of ADR process, either formally or 
informally (PWC Report, Vol. 6, p.17). Among the 15 Colleges that use ADR, 
there is no consistent approach in the use of ADR. Some do or would use 
ADR for professional misconduct of a sexual nature involving only comments. 
Some would or do use ADR for professional misconduct of a sexual nature i. 
involving more than comments. 
HPRAC views the use of ADR involving a complainant in cases relating to 
physical sexual abuse as problematic because of the inherent power imbalance 
between the complainant and the respondent health professional and the sense 
of vulnerability and potential for revictimization that can result. Furthermore, 
physical sexual abuse is not a "dispute" to be resolved, but a misconduct to be 
addressed. 
The lack of transparency of any of the ADR processes and lack of public 
access to information regarding the settlements reached is a further concern to 
29 Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council Adjusting the Balance, A Review of the Regulated 
Health Professions Act -Report to the Minister of Health and Long-Term Care. March 2001 
30 Ibid at 68 and 69 
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HPRAC. Accountability of the health professional is difficult to measure and 
ensure. Disclosure to the public is lacking and there may be implications for 
public safety and accountability of health professionals. Moreover, because 
ADR settlements are not necessarily part of the recorded discipline process, it 
is impossible to assess the effect AD R has, or will have, on encouraging 
reporting of sexual abuse, provision for funding for therapy and counselling 
(HPPC, s. 1.1), or the exercise of an individual's legal rights (HPPC, s. 3(1)6). 
Thus, use of ADR in some cases may be undermining prevention of recurrence 
of sexual abuse, protection of the public from harm, and overall effectiveness 
of the complaints and discipline processes. This concern has been addressed 
above by recommendation 5 on disclosure. In fact, any remediation agreements 
resulting from ADR would be published on the register. 
To clarifY when it is appropriate to permit resolution of a report or complaint 
of sexual abuse outside of a discipline hearing, it is recommended that: 
Recommendation 25: 
The Minister direct that Colleges never use ADR involving a person who was 
allegedly the subject of sexual abuse by a member for cases of sexual abuse as 
defined ins. 51(5)2 of the HPPC 
Recommendation 26: 
The HPPC be amended to require that all settlements or undertakings 
reached with members as a result of a complaint or mandatory report 
alleging sexual abuse be subject to approval by a committee or panel. 
These recommendations - and all the others in HPRAC's 2001 report - languished 
(as did HPRAC itself) for four years until a change in Government revived the 
statutory body and referred to it a number of initiatives, including a re-examination of 
the earlier HPRAC RHPA report and the recommendations in terms of their 
"currency and completeness. "31 The subsequent report, New Directions (2006), 
updated from 2001 and based on additional research and stakeholder consultations, 
31 Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council, Regulation of Health Professions in Ontario: New 
Directions, April 2006 at 293 [New Directions] 
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took a different approach to ADR, recommending its use as a way of resolving 
complaints and other issues early in the regulatory Colleges' complaints and 
discipline system. In delivering the HPRAC Report and Recommendations, the 
HPRAC Chair wrote to the Minister: 
Many Legislative Framework issues examined by HPRAC, such as college 
structure and processes, complaints resolution and regulations approvals 
processes have been outstanding for a number of years. They address matters 
affecting the efficiency, accountability, performance, quality and transparency 
of our health professionals and the colleges that regulated them. HPRAC has 
concluded that some of these now require urgent attention. 32 
The Report notes that "while some colleges use alternate or informal resolution to 
attempt to resolve a complaint initially, there is .J:io permissive enabling language in the 
statute, and no requirements for publication of the resolution in certain 
circumstances." It further states that "alternate resolution can resolve an issue 
expeditiously and find mutually acceptable solutions that are appropriate to the 
circumstances." 33 While also cautioning about transparency and accountability, the 
second HPRAC report (2006) endorsed the use of alternative dispute resolution and 
recommended legislative changes to legitimize the process and govern its use. 
32 Ibid at 1 
33 Ibid at 39 
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HPRAC 2006 ADR Recommendations34 
40. That a new definition of be alternate resolution be added to the Health 
Professions Procedural Code as follows: 
"alternate resolution process" includes mediation, conciliation, negotiation or 
any other means of facilitating the resolution of issues in dispute. 
41. That a new section be added to the Health Professions Procedural Code as 
follows: 
Alternate Resolution 
1. A panel of the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee may direct a 
complainant and the member who is the subject of the complaint to participate 
in an alternate resolution process for the purposes of resolving the complaint 
or an issue arising from the complaint, unless the complaint relates to an 
allegation that the member has committed sexual abuse of the kind described 
in subparagraph i, ii, iii, iv or v of paragraph 2 of subsection 51 ( 5). 
2. All settlements achieved by means of an alternate resolution process must 
be reviewed and approved by the panel. 
3. If the panel approves of a settlement, it shall create a written record of the 
process conducted containing, at a minimum, a description of the settlement 
reached and the matters disclosed during the process, and shall place this 
record on the register maintained by the Registrar. 
4. If a settlement cannot be reached using the alternate resolution process or if 
the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee refuses to approve the 
settlement, the usual process of the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports 
Committee shall commence. 
5. An alternate resolution process may only be used if, 
(a) the complainant and the member consent, on an informed and voluntary 
basis, to participate in the process, 
(b) the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee has made written rules 
concerning use of the process [including rules on full and frank disclosure of 
all matters and comprehension by both the complainant and the member of the 
language used]. 
( c) the rules provide that a person appointed to help resolve a matter by means 
of this process may be a member of the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports 
Committee or a person independent of the Committee; however, a member of 
the Committee who is so appointed shall not subsequently deal with the matter 
if it comes before the Committee unless the complainant and the member 
consent. 
6. No person appointed to help resolve a matter by means of an alternate 
resolution process shall be compelled to give testimony or produce documents 
34 Ibid at 105 - 107 
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in a proceeding with respect to matters that come to his or her knowledge in 
the course of his or her assistance other than a proceeding under the Regulated 
Health Professions Act, a health profession Act or the Drug and Pharmacies 
Regulation Act or a proceeding relating to an order under section 11.1 or 11.2 
of the Ontario Drug Benefit Act. 
7. No record, document or thing prepared for or statement given concerning 
an alternate resolution process is admissible in a proceeding other than a 
proceeding under the Regulated Health Professions Act, a health profession 
Act or the Drug and Pharmacies Regulation Act or a proceeding relating to an 
order under section 11.1 or 11.2 of the Ontario Drug Benefit Act. 
Some seven months after receiving these recommendations, the Minister of Health 
and Long-Term Care introduced Bill 171, An Act to improve health systems by 
amending or repealing various enactments and certain Acts (The Health Systems 
Improvements Act 2007), an omnibus bill covering many aspects of health care and 
protection in Ontario, the RHP A being only one of several health-related laws 
reviewed and revised. ADR legislation was among the proposed changes to the 
RHP A, but in a different version from that recommended by HPRAC. The 
introduction to the Bill describes the Regulated Health Professions Act as being 
"significantly modified to reflect a new streamlined process for dealing with 
complaints and reports made against members [of colleges]. The Code is amended to 
permit the use of alternative dispute resolution with respect to a complaint."35 
35 Health System Improvements Act, SO 2007, c 10 [HSIA} at ix 
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Government Policy Goals 
In introducing the Health System Improvements Act 2007 in the Legislature, the 
Minister identified several specific goals that the new complaints resolution 
provisions, including ADR, are intended to achieve: 
1. Streamline the complaints process, addressing the concerns of patients and citizens 
frustrated by the lack of transparency or the slowness of the complaints process; 
2. Standardize the response process; 
3. Create very clear timelines and expectations about the appropriate response; 
4. Create circumstances that will, in a very deliberate way, enhance the transparency 
with which these matters are addressed. 36 
The significant differences between HPRAC's advice to the Minister of Health and 
Long-Term Care for ADR legislation and those proposed and ultimately passed into 
law are 
• The discretion and authority to refer (not "direct") the complaint to an ADR 
process (rests solely with College Registrar [not Investigations, Complaints 
and Reports (ICR) Committee] in legislation); 
• Consent for participation (in legislation); 
• Informed and voluntary participation (not in legislation); 
36 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates Official Report of the Debates (Hansard), 38th Parl, 2nd Sess, 
No 53 (12 December 2006) at 1420 (Hon George Smitherman); Ontario, Legislative Assembly, 
Debates Official Report of the Debates (Hansard), 38th Parl, 2nd Sess, No 53 (20 March 2007) at 1550 
(Hon George Smitherman); Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates Official Report of the Debates 
(Hansard), 38th Parl, 2nd Sess, No 53 (28 May 2007) at 1600 (Hon George Smitherman) 
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• Written rules for the alternative dispute resolution process (not in legislation); 
• The confidentiality of all communications within the process (in legislation); 
• That the ADR facilitator cannot be compelled to give testimony regarding the 
matter in any proceeding (in legislation) 
• Publication of the settlement and matters disclosed on the public Register (not 
in legislation); and 
• Concurrency of the ADR process with Complaints Committee investigation of 
the matter (in legislation). 
The Legislation 
Bill 171 Health System Improvements Act 2007, Schedule M· RHPA Schedule 2 Health 
Professions Procedural Code amendments - ADR Legislation 
The Code is significantly modified to reflect a· new streamlined process for dealing 
with complaints and reports made against members. The Code is amended to permit 
the use of alternative dispute resolution with respect to a complaint.37 ix 
17. ( 1) Subsection 1 ( 1) of Schedule 2 to the Act is amended by adding the following 
definition: "alternative dispute resolution process" means mediation, conciliation, 
negotiation, or any other means of facilitating the resolution of issues in dispute; 
("processus de reglement extrajudiciaire des differends") 
Alternative dispute resolution with respect to a complaint 
25.1 (1) The Registrar may, with the consent of both the complainant and the 
member, refer the complainant and the member to an alternative dispute resolution 
process, (a) if the matter has not yet been referred to the Discipline Committee under 
section 26; and (b) if the matter does not involve an allegation of sexual abuse. 
37 ix [This Explanatory Note was written as a reader's aid to Bill 171 and does not form part of the 
law. Bill 171 has been enacted as Chapter 10 of the Statutes of Ontario, 2007 i] 
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Confidentiality 
(2) Despite this or any other Act, all communications at an alternative dispute 
resolution process and the facilitator's notes and records shall remain confidential and 
be deemed to have been made without prejudice to the parties in any proceeding. 
Facilitator not to participate 
(3) The person who acts as the alternative dispute resolution facilitator shall not 
participate in any proceeding concerning the same matter. 
Ratification of resolution 
(4) If the complainant and the member reach a resolution of the complaint through 
alternative dispute resolution, they shall advise the panel of the resolution, and the 
panel may, (a) cease its investigation of the complaint and adopt the proposed 
resolution; or (b) continue with its investigation of the complaint. 
Timely disposal 
28. ( 1) A panel shall dispose of a complaint within 150 days after the filing of the 
complaint. 
Not affected by ADR 
(2) A referral to an alternative dispute resolution process under section 25.1 does not 
affect the time requirements under this section. 
In contrast to the previous definition of ADR in the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, 
which has in the past governed the use of ADR in connection with the regulatory 
college Discipline process, the new definition in the amended Health Professions 
Procedural Code describes ADR as a "process" rather than a "mechanism" and 
includes the listed types of ADR as well as "any other means of resolving disputes," 
rather than stating them as the meaning of ADR.38 
When Bill 171 was referred to the Standing Committee on Social Policy for debate 
and public input, there were strong objections from some Colleges to the 
38 RHPA Schedule 2, Health Professions Procedural Codes I (1) 
39 
confidentiality and concurrency provisions, principally on the grounds that a) 
confidentiality was counter to the regulatory principles of transparency and 
accountability, and could prohibit the College from taking action on worrying 
information that might come to light about a member's practice during the ADR 
process; and b) concurrency with an ongoing investigation duplicated efforts 
unnecessarily, thus undermining what was identified as the regulatory principle of 
efficiency. Following the Standing Committee debates and oral representations, and 
several hundred written submissions, only a few of which related directly to the ADR 
provisions, the ADR legislation left the Standing Committee and was passed into law 
with only one minor alteration. 
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Chapter Three 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND DEBATES 
This chapter explores the theoretical arguments for and against ADR legislation, and 
what, if any, is "ideal" ADR legislation. The theoretical foundation for this study lies 
in the area of socio-legal studies, particularly studies of regulatory culture, legal 
consciousness and administrative discretion, which off er interesting and dynamic 
approaches to analyzing administrative responses to new laws, and to the ADR 
legislation in particular, and to understanding the conditions that produce or might 
explain "intended" and "unintended" consequences of legislation and the legislative 
development process, as understood through the lens of legal consciousness and its 
influence on regulators' administrative policy- and decision-making. 
The theoretical research, critical analysis and conclusions presented in this chapter 
have informed the approach taken later in this paper to designing the case study and 
to reporting and analyzing the responses of the RHP A regulatory community 
members - those who articulated ADR policy, drafted the ADR legislation, and those 
College officials who are charged with implementing it - to the research questions 
that probe their individual perceptions and understanding of the background to the 
legislation, whether, in their view, the ADR legislation in the form passed by the 
Legislature is appropriate, and what impact the ADR legislation has had or will have 
on their previous or current complaints resolution practices. Analysis of the 
theoretical debates regarding ADR legislation and administrative discretion also 
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support a discussion about whether constitutive legalism plays a significant (though 
perhaps unconscious) role, as Edelman and Stryker suggest, in influencing "how and 
when law matters" in regulatory culture and the direction of administrative discretion. 
As Edelman and Stryker state, while "[t]he constitutive legal environment is the 
realm of meaning-making, symbols, and culture;"39 "institutional processes within the 
constitutive legal environment" and "political processes are also operative as 
opposing forces contest the meaning of law and justice. ,,4o Based on the following 
theoretical discussion, the case study described later in this paper seeks to expose and 
identify the presence of conscious and unconscious meaning-making elements of 
culture and the alignment or opposition of the political and institutional forces within 
the regulatory community that determine the meaning of (the ADR) law, whether and 
how (the ADR) law matters and to what extent it fails or achieves its intended 
purpose. 
3.1 The Influence of Regulatory Community and Culture on Regulator 
Responses to new Legislation 
This section examines the theoretical literature on social attitudes and beliefs about 
law, its place in regulation and the power of law in shaping behaviour, either to 
conform to law or to resist law, and whether these attitudes and beliefs are influenced 
by the environment from which the law arises and where it has application. Can 
theory regarding law's social environment (community and culture) offer 
39 Edelman & Stryker supra note 4 at 543 
40 Ibid 
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perspectives and suggest explanations of how and why regulators respond to a new 
law in certain ways? Does the social environment of law as expressed in the 
regulatory community and regulatory culture itself play a role in determining 
regulator behaviour? 
Social culture is an anthropological and sociological concept that refers to the 
phenomenon of collective social construction of beliefs, norms, values and other 
aspects of common experience within a group or community. There are myriad types 
of groups and communities and all have in common the tacit and overt ideation of 
collective experiences, aspirations, values and expectations. One concept of a 
community that captures the general applicability of the term refers to it as actions 
and interactions that are based on shared expectations, values, beliefs and meanings 
between individuals - a cultural organism or system that reflects the attitudes and 
relationships of its members.41 The Merriam-Webster definition of culture relevant to 
this study of regulatory culture is "a set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and 
practices that characterizes an institution or organization," and "the set of values, 
conventions, or social practices associated with a particular field, activity, or societal 
characteristic. ,,42 
41 P. Bartle, "What is Community? A Sociological Perspective" Vancouver Community Network 
Community Empowerment Collective, (http://cec.vcn.bc.ca/cmp/modules/com-wha.htm retrieved 
March 2013) 
42 Merriam-Webster online dictionary (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/culture retrieved 
March 2013) 
43 
In his influential work examining the role of the concept of law in society, The Legal 
System: A Social Science Perspective,43 Friedman elaborates the notion oflaw as a 
social product, arising out of a social field or "culture." He defines legal culture as 
"those parts of general culture - customs, opinions, ways of doing and thinking - that 
bend social forces toward or away from the law and in particular ways. "44 He 
identifies the elements of the general culture that give rise to law as a "network of 
forces, arising from interests (felt needs and desires), which is at work creating 
norms, rules, and orders - 'legal acts'. "45 Law itself, according to Friedman, 
comprises "structures and rules," and "is one of three phenomena, all equally and 
vividly real": "the social and legal forces that press in and make the law; the law 
itself; and the impact of the law on behaviour in the outside world. "46 Friedman 
argues that the law "on the books" and the law "in action" are not invariably the 
same. Indeed, once "legal acts are communicated to people in society," people 
respond, modifying or not modifying their behaviour, exercising choice and 
discretion through the myriad "leeways, options, and irrationalities" provided by the 
system, the law, and the cultural context in which the law is situated. 
Friedman asserts that "a legal system in actual operation is a complex organism in 
which structure, substance, and culture interact. To explain the background and 
43 Friedman supra note 10 
44 Ibid at 15 
45 Ibid at 4 
46 Ibid at 2. 
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effect of any part calls into play many elements of the system."47 In Friedman's view, 
knowledge of the elements of the legal and social system in which the law arises and 
their relationship to one another is essential not only to understanding the substance 
of the law itself, but also to understanding the impact of the law on those affected by 
it and the choices they make in relation to modifying their behaviour (or not) in 
response to the law. "Legal behaviour cannot be understood except in context, 
including the cultural context. ,,4S 
According to Friedman, the elements of the legal system and subsystems create a 
continuous feedback that interrelates with and impacts the elements of the system, 
whose components include institutions (legislatures, regulatory bodies, courts and 
enforcement agencies); rules, laws and norms; and dispute resolution processes. 49 
Since, according to this view, the legal system is not a hermetic element within the 
larger society, what it "does and what it is reflects the distribution of power in society 
- who is on top and who is on the bottom; law also sees to it that this social structure 
stays stable or changes only in approved and patterned ways."50 
An important element of cultural analysis in the study of organizations (as a form of 
community) is the inclusion of the "non-rational" elements in the understanding of 
47 Ibid at 16 
48 Ibid 
49 Ibid at 17-19 
50 Ibid at 20 
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culture and its influence on individual and collective meaning- and decision-making 
and action, suggesting that the regulators in this study may be influenced by 
(conscious or unconscious) non-rational (e.g., intuitive, emotional, ideological) as 
well as "rational" considerations in their response to the ADR legislation. 51 
[W]hether one treats culture as a background factor, an organizational 
variable, or as metaphor for conceptualizing organization, the idea of culture 
focuses attention on the expressive, nonrational qualities of the experience of 
organization. It legitimates attention to the subjective, interpretive aspects of 
organizational life. A cultural analysis moves us in the direction of 
questioning taken-for-granted assumptions, raising issues of context and 
meaning, and bringing to the surface underlying values. 52 
Friedman's cultural perspective on the embedded nature of the law within society, 
affecting and being affected by general social, political and economic trends and 
offering openings for individual interpretation and application of the law, has been 
influential in socio-legal studies of law, legal culture and legal consciousness. His 
discussion of legal culture as a constitutive dynamic, flowing from general culture 
into fields of normative, legislative and legal practice and out again, reforming the 
general culture, has much in common with and may have influenced Meidinger' s 
view of regulatory culture and regulatory communities and the critical forces within 
and surrounding the regulatory community that determine how rules are developed 
51 
"Perhaps because [culture] is such a common-sense term, we all 'know' what it means without much 
explanation (precisely why organization scholars should be cautious in using it). For academics, culture 
provides a conceptual bridge between micro and macro levels of analysis, as well as a bridge between 
organizational behavior and strategic management interests. For practitioners, it provides a less 
rationalistic way of understanding their organizational worlds, one closer to their lived experience. L. 
Smircich, "Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis" (1983) 28:3 Administrative Science 
Quarterly at 346 
52 Ibid at 355 
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and applied (or not) by the members of the community - collectively and 
individually. 
According to Meidinger, regulatory culture is what happens in a regulatory 
community, which comprises "the regulatory agency, the lawmaker, the regulatee(s), 
the public, etc.,"s3 whose members behave like any other community in the socio-
political interplay that generates, favours, overthrows and regenerates ideas and 
governing principles and acceptable norms of behaviour within the community. 
The groups involved in regulatory policy and practice are thus larger than 
regulatory agencies. For this and other reasons, it may be more helpful - both 
for understanding the current situation and for moving it in desirable directions 
- to think of primary regulatory groups as regulatory communities rather than as 
bureaucratic organizations. s4 
In a regulatory community, members act both individually and collectively, according 
to their own perceived interests as well as from a shared vision of the community and 
its place in the larger society.ss Community members influence each other, act with 
reference to each other and variously desire each other's respect or, conversely, 
consciously or unconsciously think and act outside the perceived norms of the 
community, which are the basis of "appropriate" behaviour,s6 while remaining 
constituent members of the regulatory community. Thus, "[ c ]ulture is not always 
fully conscious or cognitive. Much of the culture we carry around with us is 
53 Meidinger 1987 supra note 7 at 364 
54 Ibid at 364 (italics in the original) 
55 Ibid at 365 
56 Ibid 
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uncomprehended and unexamined. We act on it simply because that is how people 
act in our group. . . . Equally important, culture cannot always be revealed simply by 
asking people their attitudes regarding issues. It often must be read from their 
behaviors and products. In an important sense, then, culture is not really just what 
people 'carry around in their heads'; it is what they enact in their daily lives."57 
Meidinger claims that the sum of the decisions and interactions of all the members of 
the regulatory community actually constitute the "regulatory culture," which, in turn, 
has the power to determine how regulation is organized and carried out in specific 
instances. 
Therefore, as well as being arenas for the pursuit of preexistent interests, 
regulatory communities appear to have the capacity to be "constitutive" - that 
is, to be forums in which appropriate individual and collective behavior (and 
interests) are defined and redefined. 58 
Cultural values, beliefs and behaviours in a regulatory community are constantly 
being defined and redefined with reference to the community members and the 
shifting tides of power within the community and in the larger social, political and 
economic environment in which the regulatory community operates. Meidinger 
observes that inconsistencies and illogicalities are commonplace elements within a 
regulatory community and among the values held by the members of the 
community. 59 Indeed, normative and dissonant understandings and values routinely 
57 Ibid at 361 
58 Ibid at 363 
59 Ibid at 365 
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co-exist in a regulatory environment and are resolved and then reappear as 
community members encounter and address constantly emerging issues. 
In Meidinger's view, regulatory culture is also the result of individual and collective 
regulatory community interaction with general cultural assumptions held by the wider 
society, political pressures from within and from outside the regulatory community, 
including the pressure to meet the needs of the larger system, legal requirements 
imposed on the regulatory community, as well as bureaucratic procedures available to 
and structural constraints experienced by the community as a whole and by its 
individual constituent members.60 Meidinger asserts that all these pressures, 
dynamics and dimensions both within and from outside the community together make 
regulatory culture and regulatory administration. 61 
Recent studies of regulatory culture continue to emphasize the importance of cultural 
understandings in accepting, interpreting, and carrying out (or distorting) regulation 
on the basis of"[ w ]ebs of significance understood as cultural meanings essential in 
our understanding of ourselves and others, our contextual frames and our daily 
handling of challenges. ''62 
In the cultural approach data is interpreted in relation to the dynamics of the 
context; the relation between the actor, the situation, the technology in use 
etc., searching for the driving forces influencing 'what's going on'; like 
60 Ibid at 3 73 
61 Ibid at 372 
62 Tharaldsen & Haukelid, supra note 17 at 3 77 
49 
economical frames, project organization and rewards, values in use, strengths 
and weaknesses, what and how to improve, etc. Important success criteria in a 
cultural approach would also be related to the involvement of management 
and employees in the intervention to come. 63 
These studies also conclude that it is often the difficult-to-discern complexities of 
regulatory culture as it is actually lived and experienced by the relevant actors that 
can bring about paradoxical results. Regulatory culture must be taken fully into 
account in regulatory research, because only "[t]hen a fuller picture of why rules and 
procedures are not always followed, or why well-intended incentives might have 
paradoxical, undesired consequences might be better perceived.''64 For example, the 
findings from recent regulatory culture studies in high-risk regulatory environments 
suggest that hierarchical positioning, as evidenced in the response to social dynamics 
in the regulatory culture, impact whether and how new rules or legislation are 
adopted. The role of community leaders and the manner in which they demonstrate 
leadership can be seen to influence group dynamics and attitudes toward rules and the 
rule-making process: 
Leadership has a central position in regulatory culture. If, however, an attempt 
is made to explicitly 'lead' a culture, the effects might be entirely contrary to 
what is expected (e.g., an organisation in which the workers criticised the 
'cultural propaganda' and 'ideology' spread by their manager)." By 
highlighting the impact of certain forms of communication ("ideology" and 
cultural "propaganda"), their finding and conclusions suggests a possible 
explanation for why some rules - and some leaders - are followed, while others 
produce contrary results. 65 
63 Ibid at 382 
64 Ibid at 384 
65 Reiman & Oedewald supra note 1 7 at 9 
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Reiman and Oedewald also found that "[ s ]ome members are seen as model 
representatives of the group. These individuals have a more powerful influence than 
others on the formation of norms. "66 Therefore, attention to and awareness of the 
potential effect of modeling behaviour by influential members of the community (not 
necessarily leaders in official status) may help explain group member behaviours that 
conform to or diverge from the "official" rule. 
Meidinger maintains that a cultural perspective on regulation is necessary to 
understanding that underlying individual and community assumptions about norms 
and values determine how and whether rules are adopted, resisted or contested. 
[A] cultural perspective appears desirable because of the normative directions 
in which it points. By highlighting the processes of values construction and 
interest definition, for example, it opens us to understanding that we make 
many choices in developing and implementing regulation, and that those 
choices have major collective components as well as individual ones. 67 
If there is an RHP A regulatory community, are there perceived leaders in the 
community (individuals or organizations) and do the behaviour and practices of 
perceived leaders in the community constitute the norm within the community and 
influence the attitudes and behaviour of the other members of the community towards 
the ADR legislation? 
66 Jbid at 10 
67 Meidinger 1987 supra note 7 at 376 
51 
3.2 The Influence of General Cultural Assumptions about the Role and Power of 
Law on Regulator Responses to the New ADR Legislation 
Meidinger's "general cultural assumptions" that make regulatory culture and 
regulatory administration would likely include an assumption - conscious or 
unconscious - about the concept, presence, power, role and general impact of law and 
formal or informal social normative ordering in the macro and micro social, political 
and economic environment. The importance of cultural analysis of the constitutive 
legal environment is also emphasized by Susan Silbey in her studies of legal 
consciousness, which are dealt with in more detail later in this section. Like 
Meidinger, whose work she and Ewick reference in their _work on legal 
consciousness, Silbey grounds understanding of causes, influences and manifestations 
of attitudes towards law and non-law in the observation and analysis of the 
constitutive environment. 
Constitutive analyses work to resolve these debates concerning causality, 
determinism, structure, and agency in studies of culture and legal 
consciousness. Research from a constitutive perspective emphasizes the roles 
of consciousness and cultural practice as communicating factors between 
individual agency and social structure rather than expressions of one or the 
other.68 
[C]onstitutive cultural analyses oflegal consciousness describe the processes 
by which law contributes to the articulation of meanings and values in daily 
life. Attention is directed to the local contests to create controlling meanings 
from competing discourses within most aspects of ordinary life.69 
68 Silbey 2001 supra note 22 at 8627 
69 Ibid 
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Edelman, Stryker and Suchman share Silbey's view of law as a pervasive belief 
system and general cultural assumption permeating the most fundamental values and 
meanings of organizational life. 
At the most fundamental level, the constitutive legal environment profoundly 
shapes social norms about human agency, responsibility, and accountability 
(Lempert and Sanders 1986). Likewise, it shapes concepts of economic 
rationality and efficiency, offering basic logics that seep into the culture and 
infrastructure of social interaction within organizations. 70 
In their analysis, law constructs and legitimates organizational forms, inspires and 
shapes organizational norms and ideals and helps constitute the identities of legal 
actors. 71 Law permeates society and influences thinking about organization structures 
and processes and emerges in various contexts as rules (to be followed, "gamed," 
ignored, resisted, avoided, escaped, broken, etc.) and, more often, as unconsciously 
absorbed and accepted conventions, "the way things are done around here," as noted 
earlier.72 Thus a new law may be perceived as an appropriate response to the need to 
regularize or legitimize certain practices within the community at large, and, in this 
case, more specifically within a regulatory community, or as an unexpected and 
unwanted intrusion into a community's accepted (though perhaps imperfect) way of 
dealing with a particular set of circumstances or behaviours. 
Edelman and Suchman observe that organizations often adopt structures and practices 
because the socio-legal environment constructs them as proper, _responsible, 
70 Edelman &Stryker supra note 4 at 541 
71 Edelman & Suchman supra note 18 at 493 
72 Edelman & Stryker supra note 4 at 540 
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legitimate and natural.73 As well as having an obvious, observable influence, legal 
consciousness and culture often play a more subtle and invisible role in the strategies 
of organizations and communities. 74 
The constitutive legal environment consists of concepts, definitional 
categories, labels, and ideas that play a subtle and often invisible role in how 
economic actors, including but not restricted to organizations, come into 
existence, organize their activities and relationships, and arrange their 
govemance.75 
As Meidinger notes, a regulatory community is constantly under pressure to respond 
to, reflect, and meet the needs and conform to the assumptions of the larger system, 
which is heavily permeated with general assumptions about the importance of law in 
all aspects of society. 
[V]arious direct pressures that social systems impose on regulatory 
communities all mean that the larger social system will continue to play a 
significant role in the understandings that guide regulatory practice. 76 
A local community organized around regulation experiences pressure to 
produce it to fit the needs of the larger system - within certain costs, forms, 
organizational arrangements, etc. [based on a set of cultural understandings].77 
While Edelman and Stryker are not unique in identifying the pervasiveness or 
hegemony of "legalism" or "legality" in Western societies and legalism's influence 
on ways of thinking about social order, organization and processes, they articulate, in 
ways that are relevant to the discussion of ADR, how the power and control that 
73 Ibid at 532 
74 Ibid at 540 
75 Meidinger 1987 supra note 7 at 370 
76 Ibid 
77 Ibid at 369 
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legalism asserts over ways of seeing, understanding and articulating means of solving 
problems and handling complaints and concerns determine how far and in what ways 
alternative processes may be accepted or adopted. 
Consistent with ideas of law as legality and symbols, legal power resides not 
only in the overt exercise of law but also in the form of cultural hegemony -
in subtle understandings of rights, responsibilities and rational action. Beliefs 
and practices that are highly institutionalized are a very potent form of power, 
acquiring mythical status as rational or proper or fair, with the result that they 
go unchallenged and become nonissues. 78 
The power of legalism in the general culture influences many social and political 
choices, including, it might be argued, the institutionalization, codification and 
''juridification"79 of ADR practices by legislating ADR procedures, and reflects the 
conscious or unconscious movement toward the dominance of legality and "legalism" 
over alternative approaches to problem-solving and complaint or dispute resolution. 80 
Meidinger asserts that"[ v ]irtually all activity in legal arenas [including 
"administrative regulation"] attempts to achieve a vision of appropriate social 
arrangements," and is therefore political in nature.81 He observes that when issues 
and problems arise in regulatory communities, decision-making about the issue or 
78 Edelman & Stryker supra note 4 at 532 
79 See L. Blickner & A. Molander on the concept of juridification in Arena Centre for European 
Studies, University of Oslo Working Paper No.14, March 2005 
80 See, for example, C. Menkel-Meadow "Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of 
Innovation Co-Opted or 'The Law of ADR"' (1991) 19 Florida State University Law Review 1; P. 
Brooker "The Juridification of Alternative Dispute Resolution", (1999) 28 Anglo American Law Review 
1 
81 Meidinger 1987 supra note 7 at 378 
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problem usually returns to the legislature whence they derive their authority.82 This 
assumes that the legislature and the law are the primary authority in regulatory culture 
and communities. Meidinger suggests, however, that much of regulatory 
administration occurs beyond legal declarations in the everyday acts and interactions 
among members of the regulatory community and that these daily acts and 
communications (overt and subliminal) constitute regulatory culture. 83 
Meidinger' s conclusions reinforce the perception that events and trends in the legal 
environment have a profound effect on collective thinking about various aspects of 
society concerned with dispute resolution and justice. Some solutions come to appear 
preferable under the influence of various complex, inter-related and evolving trends 
and pressures. For example, alternative dispute resolution processes (mediation, 
negotiation, conciliation, private arbitration) could come to appear as an appropriate 
and even preferable solution to a particular perceived problem or combination of 
problems (e.g., court costs and wait times, a complainant/plaintiff's lack of standing 
or participation), and ADR legislation may be deemed to be the best way to support 
the implementation of that solution. However, there may be significant disagreement 
within the regulatory community with the definition of the "problem," and with some 
or all aspects of the proposed solution. Therefore, the legal paradigm or "constitutive 
legalism" that appears to dominate much of Western society may be a source of 
82 Ibid at 370 
83 Ibid at 3 73 
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support for the legitimation of ADR or the means of undermining what many 
supporters of ADR consider to be its benefits (e.g., informality, reduced costs and 
wait times, party participation) that ADR' s "alternativeness" is intended to provide. 
The research in the case study presented later in this paper offers an opportunity to 
examine whether these considerations influence regulator responses to the RHP A 
ADR legislation, whether the key informants identify the paradox between legalism, 
ADR law and alternatives to law, and whether such awareness may influence their 
administrative behaviours. 
3.3 The Influence of Current Political Pressures on Regulatory Community 
Responses to the ADR Legislation: Professional Autonomy, Self-Regulation and 
the Legal Environment 
As Edelman and Stryker state, while "[t]he constitutive legal environment is the 
realm of meaning-making, symbols, and culture,"84 "institutional processes within the 
constitutive legal environment" and "political processes are also operative as 
opposing forces contest the meaning of law and justice. "85 Among the external and 
internal political pressures experienced by the RHP A regulatory community recently 
is the major shift in public and consumer attitudes towards professional healthcare 
providers. Some of the issues that impact on the healthcare professional community 
and the paradigm of professional self-regulating bodies include general social and 
economic pressures towards public cost constraints, greater consumer choice and 
84 Edelman &Stryker supra note 4 at 543 
85 Ibid 
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control, 86 greater transparency and accountability of public bodies, including those 
like the regulatory Colleges in Ontario whose authority is a direct delegation from the 
provincial Legislature. This section examines recent theoretical and empirical studies 
relating to the status of professional self-regulation for political issues that may 
influence regulators' responses to the ADR legislation. 
In many jurisdictions the professional claim to autonomy and privileged self-
regulatory status has been challenged successfully by the public and by the state. 
Two important reasons for state intervention into and greater control of the 
professions appear to be the failure of the self-regulatory model to police and prevent 
very serious breaches of public trust, most notably in the U.K., where the autonomy 
of physicians (as well as lawyers) to regulate the members of their profession has 
been drastically curtailed as a result of public reporting of egregious professional 
misconduct where the regulator failed to take appropriate action to protect the public 
from harm and the public, rather than the professional interest, from being served. As 
well, the needs of a changing society for increased access to a wider range of 
affordable healthcare services from a wider spectrum of healthcare providers 
previously considered "alternative" to the mainstream health professions, and the 
government's need to control public expenditures by ensuring efficient access to 
86 Recently, internet technology and the democratization of information on the web have made health 
information available to the wider public ("Dr Google"), thus eroding one of the principal arguments 
and motivations for professional regulatory, social, economic and political privilege - access to and 
exc1usive "ownership" of a body of specialized knowledge and information. 
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appropriate levels of care, provide impetus toward greater state control of the 
healthcare professions. Thus the need for greater economic efficiencies in state-
financed healthcare models has combined with growing public distrust in the 
reliability of the professions to act transparently and effectively in the public interest 
and to be accountable for safeguarding public protection over the rights and interests 
of the profession to limit the extent of health profession self-regulation. 
Some see the reduction in professional autonomy and increase in direct regulation by 
the state as an inevitable and irreversible trend in the provision of health services, 
leading to a rebalancing of social~ political and economic power between consumer 
and service provider, mediated by the legislative authority of government. Burns is 
one of a number of scholars who describe Western societies as entering a period of 
"post-professionalism," which includes a reduction in the power of lawyers and 
doctors, among others, to dictate the terms of the social contract in their favour. Post-
professionalism heralds "new ways to think intellectually in framing an epistemology 
of professions, professional organizations, professional practices, and professional 
discourses, not merely extrapolating the professions' standard model as a (half-baked) 
theory of society. "87 
87 E. Bums, "Developing a Post-Professional Perspective for studying Contemporary Professions and 
Organizations" 
www.mngt.waikato.ac.nz/ ejrot/cmsconference/2007 /proceedings/newperspectives/bums. pdf at 4. 
See also E. Freidson, "The changing nature of professional control" ( 1984) 10 Annual Review of 
Sociology I; E. Freidson, "The reorganisation of the medical profession" (1985) 42 Medical Care 
Review 11; D. Coburn, "Freidson, then and now: An 'intemalist' critique ofFreidson's past and 
present views of the medical profession" (1992) 22 International Journal of Health Services 497; D. 
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Prior to the seminal work of Freidson and Johnson around 1970, a number of 
opppositional pairings were posed in either or both academia and the everyday 
world: the knowledge imperative of professions v organisational and 
functional imperatives of bureaucracies, business imperatives for profit and 
competition v professions' ethicality and public service, professional altruism 
and community orientation v trade union self-interest and corporate hostility. 
These were never true as simply stated, though all were posited at different 
junctures. It is in the more recent period, however, which I have been 
describing as the post-professional period, that the untruth or very limited 
truth of such dichotomies has been shown to be part of a much more complex 
and changing formation of later modernity. 88 
Bums anticipates a new era where the dominant professional relationship to society 
and the state has been seriously and perhaps irretrievably eroded and where the 
accepted "truths" contained in professional discourse have lost credibility and 
authority. 
So there is an implicit, if not explicit, power contestation around whose 
discursive truths will prevail. It may be that the disaggregation of that brilliant 
conjunction of benefit/normativity and expertise/science that the professions 
managed to create in their formative period is an aspect to focus upon even as 
professions are increasingly closely tied to the hierarchies of corporate and 
political governmentality and power (Johnson, 1995).89 
Harrison and McDonald make similar observations about legitimation and loss of 
professional dominance in their article90 attributing the changes partly to the rise of 
Kenny & B. Adamson, "Medicine and the health professions: Issues of dominance, autonomy and 
authority," (1992) 15 Australian Health Review, 319; R. Olsen, "The Regulation of Medical 
Professions" 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/239527/Regulation-of-Medical-Professions?page=l; M. Moran & B. 
Wood, States, Regulation and the Medical Profession (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1993) 
B. Salter, "Medical regulation: new politics and old power structures" (2002) 22 Politics 59; and P. 
Thomas & J. Hewitt, "The Impact of Clinical Governance on the Professional Autonomy and Self-
Regulation of General Practitioners: Colonization or Appropriation?" (2007) 
http://www.management.ac.nz/ejrot/cmsconference/2007/proceedings/newperspectives/thomas.pdf 
88 Ibid at 9 
89 Ibid at 10 
90 S. Harrison & R. McDonald "Science, consumerism and bureaucracy: New legitimations of medical 
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consumerism and partly to a growth in the bureaucratization of the professions. Their 
observations are relevant to this case study for the potential political issues behind the 
formalization, through legislation, of heretofore informal, profession-controlled 
informal complaints resolution processes. 
One might say, therefore, that institutions have an associated discourse (a term 
that we employ rather broadly) of legitimation that includes not just the 
language in which the institution is presented, but also the external agencies 
from whom (amongst other sources) legitimation is sought, and the demands 
and procedures associated with those agencies. The dependence of the 
medical profession upon legitimacy bestowed by the state is virtually 
ubiquitous. Even in countries (such as the USA) regarded as bastions of 
market capitalist enterprise, the medical monopoly is maintained through 
some form of state registration or licensure and the state provides substantial 
"third party" public funding for medical care.91 
Their comments about the "discourse of legitimation" and the complex influences of 
this discourse and its underlying political and social philosophy on all stakeholders of 
the professional dominance paradigm are substantiated by the research conducted in 
Ontario and documented by O'Reilly,92 Spoel and James93 and Gilmour et al.94 
O'Reilly studies the changing political and policy climate and the public debate that 
led to the passage of the RHP A in 1991. She provides evidence of the self-regulatory 
and political power reduction among the traditionally dominant health professions 
professionalism" (2003) 16 The International Journal of Public Sector Management at 110 
91 Ibid 
92 P. O'Reilly, Health Care Practitioners: An Ontario Case Study in Policy Making (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2000) [O'Reilly] 
93 P. Spoel & S. James," Negotiating Public and Professional Interests: A Rhetorical Analysis of the 
Debate Concerning the Regulation of Midwifery in Ontario, Canada" (2006) 27 Journal of Medical 
Humanities 151 [Spoel & James] 
94J. Gilmour, M. Kellner, B. Wellman, "Opening the Door to Complementary and Alternative 
Medicine: Self-Regulation in Ontario" (2002) 24 Law & Policy 149 [Gilmur et al] 
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(principally the physicians and surgeons), especially in the area of judicial processes, 
and documents the growth of a holistic, participatory, consumer-rights-driven 
professional regulatory paradigm. In her analysis, the new legislation was developed 
to bring professional self-regulation into alignment with the broad standards of the 
society of the day. 
Today's state officials and advisers in health policy are increasingly turning to 
communitarian or holistic appeals. That is, the embedded judicial orientation 
favouring individualism, freedom, rights, private property, adversarial 
confrontation, defence, and conservatism are being challenged by alternative 
ideas of the collective good, social obligation, compassion, stewardsh~, · 
cooperation and consensus building, patient outcome, and innovation. 5 ••• 
Nor is it an easy task to translate these ideas [holism, collectivity] and 
practices into the legislation, regulations, and bylaws needed to govern a 
highly complex, technical set of practices and practitioners while still 
maintaining integrity to principle. This is only to say, we have a creative 
potential here, and we should make use of it.96 
The political battles O'Reilly recounts reflect the determination of the mainstream 
professions to maintain the autonomy they had previously enjoyed, as well as the 
equal determination of public policymakers to wrest a significant part of that 
autonomy from them, to enforce greater transparency and public accountability on 
their processes, and to open the professional health regulatory model to non-
mainstream professions. 
The critique of the disassociated nature of the judicial sphere becomes 
particularly important to health care policy as the vital relationship between 
the care provider and patient begins to be reconstituted. The old paternal 
relationship between the medical profession and her or his individual patient 
has come increasingly under attack and may well be replaced by the judicial 
95 O'Reilly supra note 92 at 226 
96 Ibid at 227 
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relationship between rights-bearing individuals, particularly as the patient or 
client fights for more autonomy and choice.97 
In O'Reilly's assessment, 
The new act [RHP A 1991] has succeeded in updating its predecessor 
legislation with regard to the economic, political, and judicial standards or 
blueprints in good repute in Ontario today. With these changes comes a shift 
in the privileges and obligations of the key actors of the sector. Political-
judicial control mechanisms for both the professions' governing bodies and 
the public (including those via the state) were enhanced. Our broader 
blueprints of governance - participation, consent, representation, 
responsibility, and accountability - were brought to bear on the sub governing 
system of professional self-regulation. And while they remain considerably 
weaker than in our broader society, the latter's more demandin~ blueprint is 
now more clearly positioned as the model of good governance. 8 
Spoel and James examine the particular case of the midwives who strove to become 
recognized as a separate self-regulating profession under the new RHP A. They 
analyze the rhetoric employed by the actors in that struggle - those who advocated for 
the midwives and those who opposed their recognition through being granted separate 
self-regulating status. Spoel and James parse the terms employed in that heated 
debate to assert or deny legitimacy and power, especially how the concept of the 
"public interest" was interpreted and used by both sides in their arguments for and 
against self-regulation for midwives.99 While the mainstream professions used the 
public interest to argue for protection against the safety risks they perceived (or at 
97 Ibid at 226 
98 I bid at 200 
99 Compare O'Reilly at 219 "In particular, whom does [selfregulation] protect, the public or the 
professionals? It was made clear during this policy process that the governing bodies of the 
professions are meant to represent the interests of the public. But the public interest is a notoriously 
slippery concept, and it remains to be seen just what interpretation the new professional colleges place 
on this obligation." 
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least insisted) that regulatory autonomy for midwives would create, the midwives 
interpreted and argued the public interest in terms of their direct accessibility to 
pregnant women providing greater freedom of choice to consumers, thus identifying 
the public interest with consumer rights. Spoel and James conclude that the net result 
of this struggle among the stakeholders in the RHP A regulatory community was that 
the professions were increasingly becoming more state-controlled. 
[W]hile the HPLR100 increased the number of health professions 
independently "self regulated" by their own Colleges, these Colleges were to 
be subject to more comprehensive, state-controlled regulatory procedures than 
previously. Further, although the concept of the "public interest" appears as a 
primary motivating value in the HPLR symbolic hierarchy, this value merges 
ambiguously with the associated, but not identical, value of consumer 
"freedom of choice. "101 
As Meidinger observes, the political shifts and pressures in the larger system in which 
the regulatory community is embedded cause structural and procedural changes in the 
regulatory legal environment, 102 with their attendant benefits and costs. Some 
healthcare professionals thought they perceived a gain for themselves in the 
legislative changes, while others perceived a loss. Government itself appeared to gain 
more control over the professions by asserting its decision-making power on behalf of 
the consumer of healthcare services and on behalf of the public expense accounts by 
including less costly, now "safely" regulated services among those available to 
100 The Health Professions Legislation Review, an extensive research and consultation process 
established by the Ontario Government in 1982, which produced the report, Striking A New Balance, 
which was the foundation for policy discussions leading to the Regulated Health Professions Act 
(1991 ). 
101 Spoel & James supra note 93 at 171 
102 Meidinger supra note 7 at 3 70 
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consumers. At the same time, Government increasingly demanded and achieved 
greater transparency and accountability by legislating significant proportions of 
public appointments to the governing councils of the previously exclusively self-
regulating professions. The members of the professions were still paying the full cost 
of regulating themselves, but the regulatory model was shifting away from self-
regulation, with Government clearly in charge of the legislative and professional 
regulatory agenda. 
A similar struggle to that of the midwives occurred at the time the RHP A was under 
review ten years later, from 2001 to 2007, in connection with the desire for 
professional recognition through self-regulation by other health professions. These 
professions undertook various lobbying initiatives to gain self-regulatory status and 
the benefits they expected (or hoped) that this would bestow on their members. 103 
Research by Gilmour et al. documents key informant interviews with the leaders of 
these "complementary and alternative medicine" ("CAM") professions regarding 
their expectations of self-regulation and the manner in which they framed their 
arguments against a very vociferous and defensive opposition from the mainstream 
professions with long-term self-regulatory status. While previously the mainstream 
professions controlled entry to the practice of the professions through strict (and, 
some would say, arbitrary) qualifying policies, through the proposed revisions to the 
103 Such benefits might include potential coverage for their services by the government funded and 
administered health insurance plan (OHIP) or (more typically) by third-party insurers. 
65 
RHP A, the Government took that privilege and prerogative from them by recognizing 
and legitimizing other professionals practicing naturopathy, homeopathy, kinesiology, 
psychotherapy, acupuncture and traditional Chinese medicine. It was during that 
debate about including "alternative" practitioners in the pre-existing regulatory 
framework and community that the new legislation governing the use of ADR in the 
College complaints resolution process was also proposed and discussed. 
The studies by O'Reilly, by Spoel and James and by Gilmour et al. are among the few 
examples of empirical research into how legal actors within or connected to the 
RHP A community perceive its culture and dynamics and how the culture and the 
community influence member needs, interests· and practices. These studies describe 
the struggle by community "outsiders," who desire equal legal recognition and 
legitimacy through inclusion within existing legal structures, and full access to 
practice privileges now increasingly controlled by Government. They demonstrate 
how the constitutive legal environment establishes and maintains the legal 
framework, institutions and processes by which some may gain and some may lose 
power and privilege. All play within and with the rules of legal legitimacy -
promoting, accepting, resisting, ignoring, flouting, manipulating or seeking to change 
them to their advantage. These studies provide very useful empirical data regarding 
the historical and political context for the ADR legislation and are a valuable resource 
in understanding the responses of the members of the RHP A community to the ADR 
legislation. 
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3.4 The Influence of Regulatory Culture and Politics on Regulator Legal 
Consciousness and the Influence of Legal Consciousness on Regulator 
Administrative Discretion in implementing the ADR Legislation 
Does the theory of legal consciousness provide a tool for categorizing and 
understanding variations in regulator responses to the ADR legislation? Assuming that 
regulator responses will not be uniform and that variations might be related to 
regulators' individual and collective views of the appropriateness of the ADR 
legislation within the context of the regulatory bureaucratic organization, the regulatory 
system and the legislated duty to serve and protect the public interest, can legal 
consciousness theory help describe and possibly even explain variations in the exercise 
of regulator administrative discretion in the complaints resolution process? 
Building on Friedman's identification and explanation of the role of legal culture, 
Silbey - independently and in empirical research carried out and reported on with 
Ewick - developed an approach to legal consciousness that focuses on, records, 
documents, values and seeks to understand how individuals relate and respond to law 
and legality. 104 Ewick and Silbey's approach uses individual narratives about lived 
experience to reveal how individuals experience and respond or react to law in their 
day-to-day lives. They describe legal consciousness as emergent, complex and moving, 
and having shapes and patterns that are determined by the situation, the organization 
and the position of the individual both within the general social and legal culture and 
104 Ewick & Sil bey 1992; Ewick & Silbey 1998; Sil bey 2001; Silbey 2005 supra note 22 
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within their particular community or organization.105 Legal consciousness can be 
unconscious to the individual but revealed in their expressed or implied assumptions 
about social hierarchy, power relationships and dynamics, and normative 
understandings about appropriate or acceptable behaviour. Ewick and Silbey's research 
leads them to observe that, like regulatory culture, individual legal consciousness is 
usually local, contextual, pluralistic and filled with conflict and contradiction, as 
individuals navigate the moving currents of law and assumptions about social norms 
and legality manifest in the culture around them and embedded within their own values 
and beliefs. 
Ewick and Silbey's focus on stories - detailed narratives in the words of the individuals 
studied - grounds their subsequent analysis in the conscious and unconscious, 
expressed and implied expressions of relationship to law, including not only the "law 
on the books," but law as a pervasive presence in society. Their open-ended semi- or 
unstructured, in-depth, phenomenological approach to informant interviews has directly 
influenced the methods employed in this study in the hope that this approach will 
provide a robust data base for understanding the RHP A regulatory community and 
culture, and regulator perceptions, values, assumptions, ideas and beliefs, including 
those not directly stated (whether conscious or unconscious), that inform their 
discretionary decision-making in relation to the ADR legislation. 
105 Ewick & Silbey 1992 supra note 22 at 742 
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Ewick and Silbey report that, in the face of a powerful legal presence in the culture, 
expressed in law or implicit in everyday transactions, individuals or communities may 
be uncertain how to engage effectively with the legal culture. For some, legality is a 
reassuring presence, preserving and promoting order, while for others, legality 
represents a game with interesting challenges, risks and opportunities for gain or loss, 
depending on the skills of those who engage its rules. However, for still others, the 
hegemony of legality and the tendency it engenders to seek legal solutions to myriad 
everyday problems are experienced as oppressive and threatening, and to be avoided or 
resisted in whatever ways seem available in the situation, because law appears 
arbitrary, capricious and dangerous. 106 Hence these individuals, organizations and 
communities may resort to "tactical engagements with law, which are opportunistic, 
transient and express a form of power. 107 
Through recording the narrative impressions of life lived in the shadow of the law (i.e., 
all life in Western, if not all modem-day societies), Silbey concludes that "[t]hese 
accounts encompass the range of cultural materials with which people produce and 
experience legality as a structure of social action." 
The stories incorporate alternative normative bases for legal claims to authority, 
varying constraints that define action as legal, varying sources for legal 
capacities, as well as varying temporal and spatial locations for law. In one 
account, the law is remote, impartial and objective, something to be invoked for 
solemn and collective purposes that transcend the messiness and partiality of 
individual lives. The law itself resides in times and spaces separate from 
106 Ewick & Silbey 1998 supra note 22 at 192 
107 Ewick & Silbey 1991 supra note 22 at 743 
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everyday places and, while enacted by legal functionaries, exists apart from the 
words or deeds of particular persons. In a second account, legality is understood 
to be a game of skill, resource, and negotiation, where persons can seek their 
own interests legitimately against others. Law in this rendering appears as a 
defined arena for strategic interactions, sometimes engaged playfully and 
sometimes with deadly seriousness, but always simultaneously alongside and 
within everyday life. A third story describes the law as an arbitrary power 
against which people feel virtually incapacitated. Often the only means of 
deflecting the legal power is to employ various subterfuges and evasions. These 
minor forms of resistance typically leave the law unchallenged and unchanged. 
Their employment and effectiveness is premised, however, upon a potentially 
subversive recognition of the structure and organization of legality in everyday 
life.108 . 
Legal consciousness research has produced a sizable literature upon which this case 
study draws. Marshall and Barclay, for example, develop the Ewick and Silbey 
paradigm of responses to the law - conformity, contestation and resistance - in their 
study of sexual harassment. 109 They note that "in the intersection of the existing law 
and their own preferred action lies a zone of volition in which individuals make 
decisions about how law will shape their behavior."110 An individual's perception 
(including their beliefs and values) of the law in general is significant in controlling 
individual volition with respect to their response to specific laws. The same law can be 
interpreted by an individual, or different individuals in different circumstances or 
having different perspectives, as constraining and controlling or liberating and 
empowering. Any new law encompasses broader social meanings than the specific 
subject matter of the law might suggest and can create new possibilities that enjoy the 
108 Silbey 2001 supra note 22 at 8627 
109 A. Marshall & S. Barclay, "In Their Own Words: How Ordinary People Construct the Legal 
World" (2003) 28 Law & Social Inquiry 617 
i io Ibid at 623 
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legitimacy bestowed by the authority of the state. The enactment of law in practical 
application is influenced by individual beliefs and aspirations and has individual and 
collective effects. 111 
While Hull, in a study oflegal consciousness, legality and same sex marriage112 notes 
that recent legal consciousness research applies interpretive methods to individual 
narratives in an effort to describe how various social actors experience and 
understand the law, she and other legal consciousness scholars acknowledge that 
collective awareness of law and legality is embedded in individual perspectives and 
can be seen as much in resistance to law as in compliance. 
Resistance to law can be collective or individual, can take many forms, and is 
not always effective. The defining features of resistant consciousness are 
awareness of one's relative lack of power, a sense of the possibility of turning 
a situation to one's advantage, and an implicit "justice claim" that the current 
conditions are unfair and that those with more power are responsible for this 
unfairness (Ewick and Silbey 1998, 183). From the perspective of "against the 
law" consciousness, legality is "something to be avoided" because it is 
arbitrary, capricious, dangerous (Ewick and Silbey 1998, 192).113 
In studying legal consciousness in a business regulatory environment, Larson114 
observes the interdependency of individual legal perspectives among those within the 
relevant social field that creates a shared vision or consciousness that could be 
described, according to Meidinger's defining conditions, as a regulatory culture. 
111 Ibid at 624 
112 K. Hull, "The Cultural Power of Law and the Cultural Enactment of Legality: The Case of Same-
Sex Marriage," (2003) 28:3 Law & Social Enquiry 629 
113 Ibid at 633 
114 E. Larson, "Institutionalizing Legal Consciousness: Regulation and the Embedding of Market 
Participants in the Securities Industry in Ghana and Fiji" (2004) 38:4 Law & Society Review 737 
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By applying the study of legal consciousness beyond individuals to the 
emergent consciousness shared among participants in a social field, we can 
address questions of when law applies, when compliance is necessary, and 
how relations between competing institutions and firms are conceived. At the 
same time, the organizational field can be brought to bear on legal 
consciousness: Norms and practices that enable and constrain action are 
shaped within fields and consciousness is institutionalized through 
participants' internalization of the characteristic background assumptions in 
the field (Campbell 1998).115 
Of particular relevance to this case study of the attitudes and perceptions of legal 
actors' in the RHPA regulatory community towards the ADR legislation and how 
·those perceptions affect the implementation of the legislation is Davina Cooper's 
1995 study ofU.K. local government legal consciousness in response to a process of 
"juridification," in which local practices were being supplanted by new laws, 
regulations, policies and procedures imposed and enforced by a central authority. 116 
Cooper's legal consciousness research into the politically inflected narratives of local 
government representatives provides an illuminating parallel to the Ontario healthcare 
self-regulatory College officials' reactions to the provincial Government's new ADR 
law. While the regulatory Colleges are not "local government," they are similar in the 
sense that they govern distinct "local" populations (of health professionals) within the 
larger public governance system and derive their power to do so directly from 
statutory authority of the provincial Government. Like municipal governments 
within the province of Ontario, the RHP A regulatory Colleges are statutory 
"creatures" of the provincial Government, and therefore not so much "self-
115 Ibid at 740 
116 D. Cooper, "Local Government Legal Consciousness in tbe Shadow of Juridification" (1995) 22:4 
Journal of Law and Society 506 [Cooper] 
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regulating" by their members as agents of government policy between the members 
of the professions and the provincial Government. Indeed, the discrepancy between 
the self-governing description and the reality of greater provincial Government 
control may be part of what gives rise to the frustration that leads to resistance to and 
avoidance of new constraints on administrative discretion. Cooper suggests that the 
use of law to constrain affects the legal consciousness of the regulatory actors: 
[C]entral government's explicit use of law to limit municipal discretion meant 
law became the mechanism through which local government power was 
constrained, and through which its subservience to the centre was 
reconstituted and reinforced. 117 
Cooper describes a pattern of local government compliance, selective 
implementation, non-compliance, evasion and resistance to the imposition of law. 
She dr3:ws upon Sarat' s research 118 into the legal consciousness of welfare recipients 
and finds interesting and unexpected parallels between their attitudes of 
powerlessness and resistance in the face of legal authority and those of the local 
government officials she studied in their response to the increased juridification of 
their field of responsibility. She connects the individual response with the collective 
regulatory culture, replete with collective experience, meaning, values, attitudes, etc., 
through which lens individual responses are constructed out of legal actors' personal 
experience and adapted to particular legal circumstances. 
[A ]ttention to consciousness emphasizes its collective construction and the 
constraints operating in any particular setting or community, as well as the 
117 Ibid at 508 
118 A. Sarat, "' ... The Law is All Over': Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare 
Poor" (1990) 2 Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 378 
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subject's work in making interpretations and affixing meanings. Legal 
consciousness research challenges the notion that people simply absorb a 
dominant legal ideology. Instead, law is understood experientially, in ways 
shaped by class, education, geography, and occupational positioning.119 
Cooper notes that, like Sarat' s welfare recipients whose sole source of power is to 
engage in tactics that restore some sense of agency while not disrupting the authority 
of the law,120 the local government actors may not contest the central authority's right 
to impose legislation that affects local practices, ''what they do contest, however, is 
the assumption that change occurs in the form law or its 'masters' intends." 121 It is 
precisely the assertion of personal agency in affecting how the intent of the law is 
realized that the local government actors and the welfare recipients achieve or restore 
some sense of discretionary power and control. 
[The Sarat research] emphasizes the creation of [legal] consciousness as a 
situated practice involving agency - collective and individual. While it is 
important to hold on to wider economic, political, and cultural determinants of 
[legal] consciousness, the role of agency and the possibilities it opens up for 
oppositional understandings are equally important. Second, the literature 
highlights the relationship between legal consciousness and power. 122 
On the one hand, municipal actors claim that 'the law is the law' - a 
normatively closed tool of government policy - at the same time, they engage 
119 Cooper supra note 116 at 510 
12° Compare Ewick & Silbey 1991 supra note 22 at 748: "Despite being opportunistic and transient, 
tactical engagements with such institutional powers are a critical, albeit often neglected, element of 
consciousness .... It is out of the play of strategy and tactic, of power and resistance, that Millie's legal 
consciousness emerges .... These tactics are a sort of anti-discipline, which, like the disciplinary power 
they oppose, are dispersed and invisibly distributed throughout everyday life .... The fact that tactical 
resistances, such as Millie Simpson's, are momentary and impermanent victories of the powerless, 
contingent upon opportunities presented, rather than created, means that they are often dismissed as 
trivial, having little, if any, political significance .... Serious attention to tactics of resistance, the basis 
of conformity, and the mobilization of contestation affords a fuller description of power." 
121 Cooper supra note 116 at 509 
122 Ibid at 510 
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in law games which highlight the open, albeit skewed, nature of legal 
possibility. 123 
Cooper concludes on the basis of her research that law used instrumentally to reduce 
local discretion leads to an exposure of local or domestic practices and holds them up 
to the scrutiny ("gaze") of the law, thus increasing the sense of powerlessness and 
loss of control, agency and administrative discretion. Individuals and local 
collectives were obliged to scrutinize their practices "through the eyes of the law," 
and adopt "procedures identified as necessary to avoid challenge."124 
The image of law as a powerful, external force, increasingly displacing (more 
domestic) forms of organization and regulation has become almost a truism 
within local government. 125 
While some local government officials in Cooper's study were clearly dissatisfied 
with the imposition of new laws curtailing their discretion, they felt they had no 
choice but to comply. However, several of these chose to focus "their critique on the 
identity of those making law rather than on law itself. " 126 
Individual situations and experiences of legal constraint may give rise to a variety of 
responses, both positive and negative, and yet the individual experience does not 
necessarily disrupt the underlying acceptance and even support of the constitutive 
role oflaw in society. 
123 Ibid at 522 
124 Ibid at 508 
125 Ibid at 512 
126 Ibid at 513 
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Particular legal experiences may affect consciousness of law within a given 
domain. However, such experiences may not necessarily impact significantly 
on people's more general or abstract legal understandings which continue to 
be drawn from dominant, hegemonic ideologies. Thus, while law in particular 
may be criticized, law in general remains largely protected.127 
3.5 The Role and Legitimacy of Regulator Administrative Discretion in 
Adopting, Contesting or Resisting the ADR Legislation 
The healthcare professional self-regulatory sphere in Ontario can be seen as a 
"culture" that has its own norms, values, history and expectations, as the readings in 
Gilmour, Spoel and fames, O'Reilly and others suggest. It is a world populated by, 
for example, professionals of different status and power, patients and consumers, 
agencies and organizations, bureaucrats and Government. All these players 
participated to some extent in the development, drafting and passage of the ADR 
legislation. Who participates in the implementation phase to influence how the 
legislation will ultimately be actualized and experienced? On the face of it, much of 
the responsibility for the implementation appears to rest with the College Registrar, 
who has been given authority in the legislation to refer specific complaints to the 
ADR process that is defined by the terms of the legislation. 
This section looks more closely at the question of bureaucratic discretion, examining 
to what extent it is a legitimate policymaking process, and how it is guided and 
constrained by the culture of the wider society, of the particular regulatory sphere, 
and of the specific profession and College. There are many "regulatory cultures" 
127 Ibid at 521 
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according to Meidinger' s definition, including the state and its various clients, the 
legislative drafting community, the regulatory agency community, the professional 
community, the legal community, and so on. Each of these "cultures" impinges on 
and interacts with the others in the process of creating and applying legislation. 
Meidinger' s perspective encourages a full and dynamic perspective of the process of 
legislative development and application. 
In both his influential papers regarding the relationships among regulatory culture, 
rule of law, delegation, indeterminacy and administrative discretion, Meidinger 
challenges the fallacy (in his view) of greater legislative precision as the antidote to 
administrative interpretation of law and discretion in its application. 
Whatever the a priori situation, legislatures, courts, and agencies have in 
practice found it impossible to state decision-determining rules .... 
Conventions seem to refer to a much fuller array of behaviors than do rules. 
Many social actors might follow conventions without feeling legally bound to 
do so, perhaps without even thinking or fully knowing about them. They 
might follow them because they are convenient, simple, typical, traditional, or 
expected. Conventions might even describe shared expectations as well as 
typical behavior patterns. Because the realm of conventions seems much 
larger and denser than that of rules, conventions may allow a much more 
detailed structuring of social choice than do rules. 128 
For Meidinger, the idea of "convention" as a general, and not necessarily explicit, 
agreement about what constitutes "regular behaviours," and the "blurring of the lines 
between rule, principle and action," come "tantalizingly close to what many 
sociologists and anthropologists mean by culture. Therefore, an improved 
128 Meidinger 1987 supra note 7 at 358 
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understanding of culture might lead to an improved understanding of regulation and 
its relationship to discretion, indeterminacy, and collective choice."129 
The appropriate behaviors in any situation will necessarily vary somewhat 
because of the conflicting principles available in any given culture, and 
because of the political nature of culture construction. . . . [A ]ny culture will 
make some solutions more plausible than others. Accordingly, ... cultural 
understanding is likely to infuse, structure, and constrain behavior without 
determining it. 130 
Meidinger addresses the "problem" of discretion - when authoritative acts are not 
governed by legal rules - and concludes that discretion is always necessary, because 
no rule can precisely determine the actions to be taken (or avoided) in response, rules 
always being indeterminate. 131 Indeed, Rubin in his influential paper on 
administrative discretion132 comments that "only a legal scholar would need the 
concept of discretion."133 He views administrative discretion as a continuation of the 
policy-making process from government to agency, exercising the power of choice to 
advance the public good and as instrumental to the social goal. 134 Therefore 
administrators are making public policy when they interpret and apply legislation. 
129 Ibid at 359 
130 Ibid at 362 
131 Ibid at 357 
132 Rubin supra note 20 at 1299 
133 Ibid at 1312: "The problem is that only a legal scholar, who began from a normative commitment to 
democratically enacted rules, would need the concept of discretion to recognize the uncontrolled 
aspects of a bureaucratic system." 
134 Ibid at 1317: "Policymaking is the process by which a government agent, whether legislator, 
executive, administrator, or judge, uses some articulated method to establish general rules, or 
standards, for the implementation of governmental efforts. It is a more accurate and useful term 
because it illuminates both the nature of the process and the relationship between that process and 
other aspects of governance .... When a legislature grants rulemaking power to an agency, and when 
those in charge of the agency exercise that power, they are of course making choices, often choices 
h b. d" . 134 t at are not su ~ect to 1rect review. 
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They exercise discretion in selecting the best means to achieve what they perceive to 
be the legislative goal. 135 
In the same vein, Meidinger observes that, given the impossibility of stating decision-
determining rules, appropriate responses to rules are worked out by individual 
administrators within the context of the regulatory culture. 
The normative presumption that policy-making is to be done by a legislature 
and executed by its governmental agents has obscured several of the key 
empirical characteristics of modem administrative regulation. First, 
"delegations" of policy-making powers are quite widespread and take many 
forms. Some are to local or regional levels of government. . . . This rationale, 
that administrators were simply executing legislative decisions, was probably 
never quite believable to anyone who knew or thought about the actual 
operation of regulatory agencies. The indeterminacy of rules probably means 
that it is an inherently impossible condition to meet. In any event, it has 
become increasingly clear with political experience that agencies frequently 
make policy, sometimes quite controversial policy. 136 
Meidinger cites "professional groups (e.g., lawyers' and doctors' associations)"137 as 
among those to whom authority is commonly delegated, given their expertise in the 
professional domain. Meidinger emphasizes the role of regulatory culture and legal 
consciousness in determining how a specific statute will be interpreted and applied by 
individual legal actors in the regulatory community. 
135 Ibid at 1318: "The agency is not given a choice because it has earned the right to have one, or 
because it is entitled to the legislature's respect, or for any other deontological reason. Rather, the 
declared purpose of the agency's power of choice is to advance the public good. It is instrumental to a 
social goal. ... The fact remains that what the legislature asks the agency to do, and what the agency 
perceives itself as doing, is to make public policy, not exercise discretion. The agency is expected to 
gather infonnation, review various options, and decide which option best implements the legislature's 
goal. That is, of course, the classic description of the policymaking process." 
136 Meidinger 1992 supra note 7 (unpaginated) pdfversion at 4 
137 Ibid 
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To some extent, ... statutes can be seen to take on lives of their own. But 
those lives are significantly limited in two ways. First, statutes only have 
effects when members of regulatory communities choose to use them. But 
often no one chooses to do so. In practice, large amounts of regulatory policy 
are made without reference to statutes. Second, . . . statutes are generally 
indeterminate. They may preclude certain courses of action, but they 
generally do not require unique solutions. Therefore, the actual effect of any 
given statute will only be determined in the context of regulatory interactions 
reflecting the interests and aspirations of the participants in regulatory 
communities, the social context in which they operate and so on. In sum, 
statutes can help structure regulatory culture, but to facilitate actual re~latory 
practice, regulatory culture must go well beyond the dictates of states. 38 
Edelman and Suchman affirm Meidinger' s views of the constitutive role of the 
regulatory community in making law and policy through the exercise of 
administrative discretion. 
Because the ambiguity of law-on-the-books is not an occasional aberration but 
rather a political fact of life (Baer et al 1988), the practical meaning of any 
given law-in-action can only emerge through a highly interactive process of 
social construction. Perhaps not surprisingly, this sense-making exercise is 
likely to involve not only the official agents of the legal system (regulators, 
judges, litigators, and the like), but also the members of the focal organizational 
field. 139 
Initially ambiguous laws acquire sufficient specificity for judicial enforcement 
only after professional and organizational communities have socially 
constructed a taken-for-granted definition of compliant behavior (Edelman et al 
1996, Suchman & Cahill 1996, Suchman & Edelman 1996).140 
They observe that "organizations (and organized professions) participate actively in 
the social construction processes that give new laws their meanings, 141 ••• with 
intraorganizational professional constituencies playing a significant part in 
138 Meidinger 1987 supra note 7 at 370 
139 Edelman & Suchman supra note 18 at 502 
140 Ibid at 498 
141 Ibid at 505 
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determining which institutional norms and scripts get reflected in organizational 
structures and practices (Scheid-Cook 1992): 
Empirical evidence on the filtering role of the professions suggests that 
professional activities can either dampen or amplify the impact of law, 
depending on the circumstances. At times, professional staffs will reframe 
reform-minded legal ideals so as to minimize the law's impact on established 
bureaucratic routines. 142 
Professions, of course, are not alone in their ability to filter (and thereby 
transform) the law. Individual organizations, too, participate in the social 
construction of the regulatory environment, primarily through their bureaucratic 
practices and internal legal cultures. Indeed, organizational constructions of law 
often provide the chief conduits between formal law and everyday legal 
consciousness. For most people, the legal system is both remote and arcane, and 
popular understandings of law and legality come largely from day-to-day 
experiences in concrete bureaucratic settings, not from exposure to abstract 
doctrine (Macaulay 1987, Sarat 1990, Ewick & Silbey 1992, Fuller et al 1997). 
In these mundane organizational encounters, formal structures symbolize 
commitment to legal objectives, while informal norms give content to legal 
principles. Consequently, organizational responses to law play a key role in 
reifying legal mandates in daily life. Once again, such filtering agents can act 
either to amplify or to dampen law's impact. 143 
In the event of a conflict between the regulation and previous organizational 
practices, "organizations may adopt outwardly compliant structures as a visible 
demonstration of attentiveness to legal mandates, norms, and schemas - while at the 
same time preserving traditional managerial prerogatives by decoupling structural 
symbols from substantive practices. "144 While structures symbolize a commitment to 
142 Ibid at 499 
143 Ibid at 500 
144 Ibid at 496 
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legal objectives, it is the informal norms that give actual content to legal principles. 145 
In relation to this study, this observation appears to suggest that Colleges could adopt 
a formal ADR process structure in conformity with new ADR legislation, while 
continuing to carry on their own informal complaints resolution process (albeit 
"behind the scenes") as before. 
Edelman and Suchman emphasize that law is often complex and contradictory. It 
may create sanctions on the one hand, while also providing defences and loopholes 
that may be exploited to escape the sanctions on the other. Regulations are "replete 
with unintended consequences."146 The practical meaning of any law has to be 
socially constructed by the members of the field, as Larson's research on legal 
. d l~ consc10usness emonstrates. 
Black emphasizes the role of culture as the combination of norms and expectations 
that ultimately determines discretionary administrative decision-making, which she 
defines as the individual's (or agency's) freedom to choose courses of action in the 
interpretation of rules. 148 She characterizes such administrative discretion as dealing 
with the "space within and between rules,"149 that consists of organizational norms 
and practices, past experiences, personal relationships, as well as the decision-
145 Ibid at 500 
146 Ibid at 488 
147 Larson supra note 114 
148 Black 200la; Black 2001 b supra note 19 
149 Black 2001a supra note 19 at 2 
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maker's own perceptions and attitudes, in effect, their legal consciousness. Whether 
explicit rules are present or absent, the exercise of administrative discretion will 
always be informed and constrained by bureaucratic and organizational norms, as 
well as broader political and economic pressures and moral and social norms, i.e., by 
the very substance of regulatory culture and the five influences Meidinger identified 
as making it: general cultural assumptions, political pressures, legal requirements, 
bureaucratic procedures and structural constraints. She concludes that regulators or 
enforcers must pay attention to the legal framework, the organizational practices and 
the internal cultures of the regulatory community in order to understand how culture 
determines the discretionary decision-making process. In this way, Black neatly 
summarizes Meidinger's and this study's approach to regulatory research. 
Ford characterizes the regulatory community as the statutory "interpretive 
community"150 in her study of principles-based regulation in the securities industry, 
asserting that legislation only means what everyone understands that it means, rather 
than how clearly and precisely it is drafted (pace Colin Diver151). Ford favours rules 
over principles when seeking to safeguard rights like participation and procedural 
fairness, although rules often "exact higher costs" and encourage "loophole 
1 so C. Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation A Research Study Prepared for the Expert Panel on 
Securities Regulation (2009) (Ford] at 4 
151 C. Diver, in "The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules" (1983) 93 Yale Law Journal 65, 
advocates greater precision (the three elements or dimensions of which he identifies as "transparency, 
"accessibility," and "congruence") in rule-drafting as a means to minimizing interpretive discretion 
and "administrative failure," which he attributes to imperfect information and the divergence of social 
and private preferences. 
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behaviours" to escape their narrow boundaries, leading to unintended 
consequences. 152 While rules and legislation generally favour more accountability, 
are more transparent and better able to protect rights, they can lead to "gaming" 
behaviours, as Silbey and others have documented and discussed, as well as stifling 
individual bureaucratic innovation and "cabining" the discretion of individual 
frontline actors. 153 Morrell, referring to Lipsky' s research among professionals and 
"street-level bureaucrats,"154 describes how the legislation is interpreted to allow the 
professional manager in a regulatory agency to accomplish the complex tasks for 
which they are responsible, to operate within the resource constraints (time, financial 
and human resources, space, technology, etc.) of the agency or organization 
(Meidinger's "structural constraints" and "bureaucratic procedures"), to mediate 
between the agency and its "clients," all the while exercising the power that is 
conferred upon them by virtue of their expertise in their "complex domain."155 
152 Ford supra note 150 at 8 
153 Ibid at 43 
154 K. Morrell, "Re-defining professions: Knowledge, organization and power as syntax" 2007 
http://www. mngt. waikato .ac.nz/ ejrot/ cmscon ference/2 007 /proceed ings/n ewperspectives/morrell. pdf 
(retrieved March 2013) at 17 "The theme of complexity in the organisational context finds expression 
in Lipsky's ( 1980) notion of the 'street level bureaucrat'. This offers more insight into what it means to 
be a professional as part of a wider social arena (Hoggett, 2006). Lipsky's point is that street level 
bureaucrats have enormous power because they have great scope for applying discretion. This power is 
not simply a function of legislative or social sanction, nor does it arise solely from the nature of their 
organizational situs. Instead the scope is a consequence of the discretionary powers necessary to 
accomplish complex tasks and to mediate between individual client needs and institutional interfaces. 
It is also a function of resource constraints. Lipsky argues that the scale and extent of this power goes 
unanalysed. This model is in some ways less critical than other analyses of the system of professions 
(Abbott, 1988), because Lipsky does not imply that the source of power results from professionals' 
seeking to further their own interests. Instead, it arises from complexities in the context. Nonetheless, 
this discretion raises issues about the accountability of street level bureaucrats to organizations, clients, 
the law, and professional norms." 
155 Ibid at 16 
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Banks156 also acknowledges the difficulties the bureaucrat faces in dealing with new 
legislation and regulation, noting the additional burdens it imposes: additional 
paperwork, distortions in decisions about agency and organizational priorities, limits 
to choice, additional cost impositions and reduced flexibility, thereby prolonging 
decision-making and using up scarce resources, thus inviting the temptation to 
evasion as much as (or more than) compliance. 157 Therefore, he concludes, additional 
regulation frequently leads to unintended consequences that can undermine the 
legislator's goals for the regulation/legislation. 158 
An important Canadian case study of bureaucratic discretion in the interpretation and · 
application of immigration law has found that the enforcement officials and 
bureaucracy, rather than making individual decisions with reference to the legislation, 
are significantly influenced by internal bureaucratic values as well as by larger, 
mutating social values in applying their decision-making discretion to particular 
cases.
159 Pratt describes discretion as a form of constitutive power, the workings of 
which cannot be adequately understood in the abstract. 
Rather than considering discretion as the absence of governance, discretion is 
considered here as a powerful form of governance, one which facilitates the 
translation of certain social concerns into exclusionary immigration law, policy 
and practices. Discretionary power is inflected by shifting, historically specific 
discourses. 160 
156 G. Banks,"The Good, The Bad and the Ugly: Economic Perspectives on Regulation in Australia." 
(2004) 23 Economic Papers: A Journal of Applied Economics and Policy 22 
157 Ibid at 24 
158 Ibid at 26 
159 Pratt supra note 21 
160 Ibid at 201 
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[S]ince the 1960s, legal scholars have increasingly acknowledged that there is 
in fact no clear distinction between discretion and law. It is today more 
commonly conceded that laws and their application are suffused with discretion 
and that administrative discretion is in fact extensively curbed by rules. 161 
Through observation, interviews and analysis of a particular context, she explores the 
ways in which discretionary power facilitates the translation of shifting social concerns 
and priorities into what she determines to be exclusionary immigration law and policy. 
Her study begins with a brief critical review of the academic literature on discretion, 
paying particular attention to and disputing liberal assumptions about discretion - that 
law is the primary instrument of social regulation and that discretion is a residual 
category of law that is exercised by individuals who are essentially autonomous. 
Both Black's article and Pratt's investigation of how discretion actually works at the 
level of the "street level bureaucrat" are important to understanding how the culture -
including the wider social culture, the regulatory and professional self-regulatory 
culture and the culture of the particular profession and College in question -
influences the context that produces the range of possibilities within which the 
individual bureaucrat's power of discretionary choice will be exercised. Like 
Edelman and Stryker, Pratt refers to the dominance of the legal paradigm in 
evaluating the role of discretion. 
The debate has thus been polarized: discretion is good, discretion is bad; 
discretion is arbitrary, discretion is necessary for the advancement of important 
public policies; discretion needs to be preserved and defended, discretion needs 
to be curtailed and controlled. The limited framework and circular nature of the 
debate is the result of the false discretion/law binary on which it rests. This 
161 Ibid at 202 
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binary imagines that there is a clear distinction between the two and that they 
are inversely related: 'where law ends, discretion begins'. The dominance of the 
liberal legal paradigm is further evident in the primary place accorded to 'law' 
as the most important regulatory instrument in society, leading, in this context, 
to the taken-for-granted assumption that the problems of discretion can only be 
effectively addressed through the constraints and checks offered by law .... 
Rather than viewing it as the unruly shadow of law which allows for the 
relatively uncomplicated expression of individual agency operating unchecked 
within boundaries set by legal constraints, discretion is more fruitfully regarded 
as a productive regulatory power, the uses of which are inflected by shifting, 
historically specific discourses and material conditions. 162 
Pratt's study suggests that scholars ought to view discretion as a positive form of 
power, rather than as the absence of law, and ask different questions about discretion 
in the application of laws - questions that relate to particular, historically specific 
contexts. 
Rather than asking how discretion can be eliminated, curtailed or expanded and 
made fairer and more just, the guiding question becomes how does this power 
work? What are the channels, processes, organizational and institutional 
networks and relationships that facilitate the uses of discretion in a particular 
governmental context? What are the dominant discursive influences on the uses 
of discretionary power in the governance of liberal subjects? 163 
Pratt sees promise in research about discretionary decision-making using semiotics 
and ethno-methodological insight, which 
bring to the discussion a serious interest in context and the social construction 
of realities and subjectivities that begin to challenge liberal assumptions. These 
studies explore how decisions are 'constructed' as opposed to 'made' by 
decision-makers. In this, they complicate the taken-for-granted liberal 
understanding of autonomy and subjectivity. As well, they do not seek to 
identify new universals to explain decision-making but rather see decision-
making as an activity constructed by a myriad of contextualized influences that 
are shifting, dynamic and historically specific. These influences do not merely 
162 Ibid at 217 
163 Ibid at 220 
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shape, guide, constrain or determine individual decisions; they actually 
constitute them. 164 
3.6 The Influence of the Concept and Characteristics of "Alternativeness" to 
Law in Determining Ideal ADR Legislation and Regulator Responses to the 
RHP A ADR Legislation 
This section focuses on the work of Lande, Pou, Kleefeld and Howse et al regarding 
whether and how to create legislation that will govern the conditions and 
circumstances when ADR can be used and the conduct of the ADR process. The 
arguments for and against ADR legislation, its potential benefits and costs, the risks 
and rewards of legislating ADR are examined. With respect to the need for clarity 
and flexibility in ADR legislation, the theories discussed below both support and 
challenge the earlier discussion of administrative discretion in the interpretation and 
application of regulation. 
Legislating ADR 
Lande is one of the principal advocates for minimal, flexible and permissive ADR 
legislation.165 Lande's view is that legislation should be a limited and last resort in 
developing and promulgating new ADR policies. He believes that legislation should 
be avoided whenever possible and non-regulatory support mechanisms preferred 
because many of the benefits of ADR are lost when the process is fixed and 
prescribed. "Policymakers should generally begin by considering nonregulatory 
164 Ibid at 223 
165 Lande 2005 and Lande 2007 supra note 5 
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options and adopt regulatory options only to the extent needed to accomplish desired 
goals."166 
In his important paper on ADR legislation, Lande refers to the constitutive hegemony 
of legalism in society as demonstrated by the choice to legislate in an area (ADR) that 
could rightly be considered "other than," separate and even completely the opposite 
of a legalistic approach to dispute resolution. Citing Menkel-Meadow, 167 Lande notes 
that while ADR is a "field that was developed, in part, to release us from some-if 
not all--of the limitations and rigidities of law and formal legal institutions, 
[n ]onetheless, many members of the current ADR movement operate implicitly based 
on 'legal centralist' assumptions that society is and should be ordered primarily by 
state-created and enforced rules. Law is only one means of social control-and often 
a relatively ineffective one."168 However, he acknowledges that, "[o]f course, some 
legal regulation is appropriate, ... and regulation per se does not necessarily result in 
legalization. "169 He later observes that, while legal definitions of ADR "might seem 
innocuous, they can have major impact on the nature of the process being 
regulated."170 Lande's comments address the power of constitutive legalism to 
reinforce or undermine individual and communal agency and relationships within a 
regulatory community through the apparently innocuous use of legal terms and 
166 Lande 2007a supra note 5 at 624 
167 C. Menkel-Meadow, "Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale oflnnovation Co-Opted or 
'The Law of ADR '" (1991) 19 Florida State University Law Review l 
168 Lande 2007a supra note 5 at 642 
169 Ibid at footnote 94 
170 Ibid at 650 
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definitions. Echoing the legal consciousness view of how individuals respond to law, 
Lande writes: 
[T]he scope of effective regulation is limited by difficulties implementing 
enforceable rules. Moreover, people--especially lawyers-do not simply 
respond to rules bfi behaving as intended by the rulemakers. Professor Stewart 
Macaulay writes 1 1 that people: [ c ]ope with law and cannot be expected to 
comply passively. Many people are able to ignore most legal commands, or 
redefine them to serve self interest or "common sense" ... Sometimes, 
however, the command of the law rings loud and clear and has direct impact 
on behavior. In short, the role oflaw is not something that can be assumed but 
must be established in every case. 172 
Given the likelihood that some {particularly those in the legal profession) may 
approach legislation, including ADR legislation, with an adventurous "gaming" spirit, 
in which law is something to be played with and around, as opposed to something 
concrete and inflexible, Lande proposes that "would-be ADR regulators should 
consider how lawyers are likely to react to--and possibly "game"-any new rules as 
they try to accomplish their clients' goals."173 
Lande's view is that ADR legislation may not be desirable at all, as it concretizes 
certain aspects of ADR in law,174 and thereby undermines some of its key benefits to 
participants, including flexibility, responsiveness and choice, which make ADR a 
preferable alternative to the courts. 
171 S. Macaulay, "Law and the Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any There There?" (1984) 6 Law & 
Policy 149 at 153 
172 Lande 2007a supra note 5 at 645 
173 Ibid at 646 
174 Ibid at 623 "[I]nvoking government power to establish ADR policy can increase the risk of 
developing orthodox dispute resolution ideologies by officially favoring certain procedures and 
disfavoring others." 
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While appreciating the valuable benefits of using rules as policy instruments 
in many situations, this Article argues that we should normally resist the 
temptation to make policies governing "alternative dispute resolution" (ADR) 
processes merely or primarily by adopting new rules. Strategies that rely 
exclusively or primarily on regulation can create significant problems. In the 
name of promoting uniformity, regulation can restrict or discourage legitimate 
choices by disputants and dispute resolution professionals. This would 
undermine a fundamental value of the ADR field in promoting increased 
choice between dispute resolution alternatives. 175 
In a summary of his article, presented as Recommended ADR Policy Principles, 
Lande provides a clear statement of what he considers the appropriate goals of ADR 
legislation: 
Dispute resolution professionals should aspire to a goal of developing a 
good overall dispute resolution system with a variety of desirable processes 
and approaches. In other words, the goal should be a pluralistic dispute 
resolution system rather than one with rigid orthodoxies about what dispute 
resolution procedures are appropriate or not. Recognizing the evolving nature 
of the legal system and dispute resolution processes, dispute resolution 
practitioners should develop flexible and dynamic models and avoid static, 
brittle models. 176 
Lande's article addresses the concern of other senior scholars in the ADR community 
(e.g., Fairman,177 Peppet 178) that the introduction of collaborative law and other 
alternative processes to traditional adversarial dispute resolution practices should be 
accompanied by regulations to define and direct their use. Lande focuses on the risks 
of over-regulation of ADR processes, while acknowledging the benefits to having 
rules about certain aspects of ADR design and practice. Lande maintains that, "[ i]n 
175 Ibid at 620 
176 Lande 2007b supra note 5 at 1 
177 C. Fairman, "A Proposed Model Rule for Collaborative Law" (2005) 21 Ohio State Journal on 
Dispute Resolution, 73 
178 S. Peppet, "Lawyers' Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and Collaboration: The End of the Legal 
Profession and the Beginning of Professional Pluralism" (2005) 90 Iowa Law Review, 475 
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general, policymakers should explicitly identify and prioritize their goals at the outset 
of an ADR policymaking process."179 In his view, the appropriate areas for ADR 
legislation are as follows: 
a. Rules are needed to regulate and restrict the use in litigation of 
communications in ADR processes. 
b. Regulation is appropriate to regulate the relationship between ADR 
processes and the courts, such as when parties are required to use ADR or 
when the courts will enforce the results of ADR processes. 
c. Some regulation is appropriate to protect ADR consumers, though this is a 
challenging task and thus regulation should be done cautiously and often in 
coordination with non-regulatory policies: 
d. Default rules for ADR processes are appropriate when a substantial number 
of people have actually encountered significant problems because their ADR 
agreements were silent or ambiguous about particular issues. 180 
The ideal, according to Lande, is for the goal-setting phase to precede the actual ADR 
policymaking process, his views on which are discussed later in this paper in the 
section on process design. Lande insists on the importance of policymakers being 
explicit from the outset on what purpose the ADR legislation is intended to serve. 
However, part of his opposition to ADR legislation is founded on the commonly 
expressed concern that laws do not always accomplish or even promote the goals for 
which they were developed and may have unexpected negative results. 
A more pragmatic problem is that legislative drafting is often crude and prone 
to unintended consequences. . .. Although definitions might seem innocuous, 
they can have a major impact on the nature of the process being regulated. 181 
In any event, the very existence of laws where there were none previously has 
an impact on the way issues are viewed, interpreted and understood. 182 
179 Lande 2007asupra note 5 at 641 
180 Lande 2007b supra note 5 at 3 
181 Lande 2007a supra note 5 at 650 
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Despite describing what he sees as the legitimate goals of ADR legislation, Lande 
goes on to say that, while "regulation is appropriate to establish ADR process 
definitions and thus create legitimacy and build a sense of security about particular 
dispute resolution processes[ ... I]n my view, these can be desirable benefits of 
appropriate regulation but do not justify regulation by themselves."183 In other words, 
while Lande recognizes that defining acceptable ADR processes (e.g., mediation, 
conciliation, negotiation) creates legitimacy for these processes and gives potential 
participants in the processes some security about their use, having these spelled out in 
law - while useful - is not necessary or perhaps worth the potential costs of ADR 
legislation. 
As a matter of policymaking, this Article argues that we should enact rules 
only if there is a legitimate instrumental purpose for the rules and that a 
constitutive purpose by itself is an insufficient justification. Governmental 
authority is a powerful and precious resource that is easily subject to abuse. 
Thus it should be used cautiously and only when justified. 184 ••• In general, 
under our common law system for developing legal rules, it is generally better 
for policymakers to refrain from adopting such ADR rules unless and until 
there is demonstrated need.185 
In a section of the paper entitled "Appropriate Regulation of ADR," Lande asserts 
that rules may be needed because the behaviour involved in the ADR process "cannot 
often be determined objectively without great difficulty. Although other issues, such 
as prevention of coercion, may be appropriate for regulation, a strategy relying 
182 Ibid at 622: "In addition to affecting behavior by creating actual or potential consequences, rules 
can also affect behavior by changing people's cognitive patterns." This observation relates to the 
cultural and cognitive hegemony oflaw and legality/legalism described in Edelman and Stryker. 
183 Ibid at 647 
184 Ibid at 648 
185 Ibid at 654 
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exclusively on regulation may not be effective because of difficulties in detection and 
enforcement. In such situations, it may be appropriate to develop a strategy that 
combines regulation and other policy tools." 186 Default and other rules should only 
be considered when there is sufficient evidence from experience that the process does 
not work without them. 187 
ADR Statutes - Inherently Ridiculous Irony or a Small Part of the Way to Nirvana 
As ADR advances into the mainstream, a growing number of jurisdictions 
have passed legislation specifically addressing AD R use by agencies, courts, 
and other governmental bodies. The trend has resulted in a rich body of 
legislative approaches and thinking from which helpful insights and guidance 
can be gleaned. While much of this legislation may prove useful in 
stimulating beneficial state activities, there is some portion that has been 
poorly informed and even detrimental. People who draft, comment on, or 
introduce ADR legislation should be mindful that implementing better dispute 
handling is a process, not an act. 188 
Pou covers some of the same ground as Lande, focusing on the inherent tension in 
designing ADR legislation that, on the one hand, provides formality for the sake of 
public accountability, process consistency and predictability, and on the other, 
maintains the flexibility and informality that are the supposed (and frequently 
vaunted) characteristics of ADR, as well as being the realm in which significant 
administrative discretion can occur. Pou's observations also point to an ideal tension 
in which the safety of known limitations through clear rules supports, rather than 
inhibits bureaucratic creativity and administrative discretion. 
186 Ibid 
187 Ibid 
188 Pou supra note 5 at 6 
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There are, though, real limits as to what [ ADR] legislation can accomplish. 
First, there is an obvious tension in the very idea of "ADR laws," all of which 
are, in a sense, trying to "legislate flexibility." Some see this irony as 
inherently ridiculous, and believe it best to say nothing by statute -- thus 
avoiding "slippery slopes" and any need to interpret. But governments 
operate by rules and procedures that are intended to promote things like 
accountability and consistency. When this chafes someone, it is called "red 
tape;" at other times, it is "due process." While numerous scholars have told 
us that informality is the lifeblood of the administrative process, this 
informality tends to occur most often within a prescribed framework, and 
departures from that framework can cause considerable anxiety among those 
who work within the bureaucracy or who oversee it. We need to, in a sense, 
make ADR processes an integral part of that framework and make officials 
comfortable with them. Legislation is one way to move toward this goal. 189 
In the context of governmental use of ADR, Pou describes an ideal ADR world "if 
governmental use of ADR - at whatever level, federal, state, or local - were to reach 
its full potential."190 In his view, such ideal government support for ADR would 
include: 
• Creativity, energy, and leadership at all levels in promoting appropriate, 
informed use of ADR methods 
• A predictable, accommodating legal framework allowing maximum 
appropriate ADR use, and personnel or other incentives to match 
•Understanding and acceptance of ADR and its potential utility among 
agency managers, agency political leaders, auditors, enforcers, and other 
internal components 
•Adequate resources to experiment with useful process alternatives and a 
comfort level regarding such experimentation both inside government 
organizations and among legislative overseers 
• Government organizations within which individual process decisions reflect 
sound dispute systems design theory and practice, as well as a broad 
perspective about the pro's and con's of any particular process choice (i.e., not 
"pass the buck" or "reduce my section's burden", but rather "what's best for 
the whole agency's mission and for its clientele?") 
189 Ibid at 7 
190 Ibid 
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• Long-term design and resource decisions that are based upon solid 
evaluation data as to ADR activities' goals and results. 191 
However, to get close to this state, which Pou describes as ADR ''Nirvana," 
legislation is not, strictly speaking, necessary. Indeed, most government entities can 
already do - and are doing- many, if not most of these things without legislation 
("formal underpinnings"). 192 The purpose of ADR legislation, according to Pou, is to 
ensure that agencies using ADR "have authority to engage in binding arbitration, to 
acquire neutrals' services expeditiously, or to provide parties with meaningful 
assurances of confidentiality."193 Pou sees ADR legislation as "giving ADR a 
legislative imprimatur by explicitly telling agencies and those who deal with them 
that these entities have many arrows in their DR quivers, and setting a basic 
governmental policy encouraging experimentation and fostering use of flexible, 
consensual alternatives by allowing parties to reshape processes to meet their real 
needs." 194 Legislation provides ADR with state-sanctioned legitimacy and authorizes 
more than the traditional dispute resolution processes. It also supports ADR as "a 
basic governmental policy." 
191 Ibid at 8 
192 Ibid 
193 Ibid 
194 Ibid 
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Pou takes up the issue of generalized ADR legislation ("one size fits al1"195) as 
opposed to various, agency-specific, somewhat fragmented and possibly inconsistent 
versions of ADR legislation. Rather than seeing the first as ignoring individual needs 
or the second as only leading to confusion, Pou values both approaches, though 
preferring the "potential value of cross-cutting laws that provide general 
authorization, rather than on specific laws building ADR into a particular agency 
program or decisional process. While a broad-brush approach has inherent 
disadvantages when compared with tailored laws that mesh ADR processes with 
existing procedural schemes, it can avert the fragmentation and confusion that may 
result if legislatures balkanize ADR by defining terms, setting standards for neutrals, 
or crafting confidentiality rules or judicial review tests afresh with each program."196 
Pou summarizes the purpose of generalized ADR legislation as follows: 
Broad-based ADR legislation, rather than a patchwork approach spread across a 
number of statutes, can effectively address a number of important issues in 
governmental ADR. Specifically, it can: 
• Create a statutory framework that promotes thoughtful, consistent policy 
toward agencies' use of ADR; 
195 R. Jones,"Florida's Experience with Dispute Resolution Legislation: Too Much of a Good Thing?" 
(2000) http://consensus.fsu.edu/ADR/PDFS/FloridaADR.pdf at 2. Jones enquires whether the 
proliferation of ADR statutes and the underlying policy support for ADR in the state of Florida has 
helped to legitimize and increase the use of these problem solving and dispute resolution procedures or 
whether ADR laws have led to confusion regarding under what conditions parties should consider the 
use of ADR procedures. He believes the experience overall has been positive, although the 
proliferation of such laws has also led to some confusion regarding what procedures parties should 
choose from. He urges that greater attention be paid in legislative drafting to barriers that inhibit the 
use of the procedures as well as increased involvement of the dispute resolution community with 
legislatures and legislative staff in system design questions. He observes that "legislative drafters often 
take a meat cleaver vs. a scalpel approach in designing ADR procedures" and concludes that a "one-
size fits-all" approach to ADR legislation produces more problems than it resolves. 
196 Pou supra note 5 at 8 
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• Raise agencies' (and especially agency lawyers') awareness of and comfort 
with innovative dispute resolution methods; 
• Reflect an appropriate general balance between prescription and flexibility in 
employing these processes, protecting sensitive communications, acquiring 
neutrals' services, and assuring judicial oversight; 
• Address issues for which specific safeguards or enhanced certainty can 
promote fairness, prevent abuse, or encourage appropriate ADR use (e.g., an 
ADR Act's prohibition against requiring an agreement to use arbitration as a 
condition of awarding any contract or benefit; or meshing ADR procedures, 
such as confidentiality protections, with those prescribed under other laws); 
• 
• 
• 
Assign responsibility - both within agencies and more broadly - for ADR 
implementation; 
Afford a basis for regular legislative oversight of agency dispute resolution 
initiatives; 
Require agency personnel to focus on use of ADR case-by-case in selected 
. 197 
settmgs. . · 
Pou highlights certain aspects of the ADR environment that may be critical to the 
successful implementation of ADR in terms of agency and consumer use and that 
cannot be determined by statute. These aspects deal with the dimensions and 
dynamics of the regulatory culture where ADR is being introduced or developed. 
"Wholly apart from their unintended side effects, there exist any number of obstacles 
that passing new laws cannot really address. " 198 Laws cannot assure adequate 
resources, affect the agencies' other priorities (which may compete with ADR 
requirements), ensure leadership of the ADR initiative within the agency, or create an 
infrastructure for education, training and sharing of best practices within and among 
agencies. Laws cannot ensure inclusive, high-quality design of the program, 
197 Ibid at 9 
198 Ibid 
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acceptable and ethical programs, a supply of adequate neutrals, rigorous evaluation of 
programs, general education of the public and consumers, or insulate ADR initiatives 
from the contingencies of bureaucratic structures and attitudes or from unforeseen 
interactions with other laws with different goals or inconsistent and conflicting 
processes. 
Pou sees ADR legislation as "only a starting point," frequently creating its own 
obstacles, particularly "in light of many legislators' tendency to see their decisions 
largely in political or personal terms, which often leads to compromises that 
lawmakers deem necessary to get a bill enacted but that can introduce new 
ambiguities or gloss over necessary policy choices in ways that inhibit the 
legislation's goals or even make things worse."199 The goals of the legislation can 
often be short-circuited by the powerful underlying priorities of the authorities that 
draft and impose the legislation. Legislation often serves more than one agenda and 
the effects of the combination of (stated and unstated) agendas can sometimes 
undermine the stated purpose of the legislation. 
Pou warns that legislating ADR processes and procedures cannot change the attitudes 
of those who will pay only lip service to the legislation - observing only the letter and 
not the spirit or intention of the ADR law, assuming they are in possession of 
sufficient information to be aware of what the "spirit" or intention of the law may be 
199 Ibid 
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or are capable of imagining how the spirit of the law might relate to how they see and 
understand the prerogatives or constraints of their own situation. 
Far more ... will be needed, to reorient many individuals and institutions so 
that they take these statutory mandates seriously and so that their compliance 
is genuine and thoughtful and not just minimal or, worse, self-serving.200 
It may be a false dichotomy that Pou draws between "self-serving" and "genuine" 
compliance with ADR legislation, given the ideal flexibility that allows scope for 
discretion in the application of the law. Self-serving compliance may in fact be a 
legitimate and even desirable feature of ADR laws' flexibility that allows the interests 
of the bureaucrats to be accommodated within the overall ADR mandated process and 
procedures. 
ADR Legislation for Professional Self-Regulatory Bodies (Canada) 
In his study of ADR and professional self-regulatory colleges (not only healthcare 
professions) that compares the Ontario and B.C. experience, John Kleefeld201 
200 Ibid at 8 
201 Kleefeld supra note 23; See also L. Feld & P. Simm, Complaint Mediation in Ontario's Self-
Governing Professions (Waterloo: Fund for Dispute Resolution, 1995); L. Feld & P. Simm, Mediating 
Professional Misconduct Complaints (Waterloo: The Network Interaction for Conflict Resolution, 
1998) who study the use of ADR in the health professions self-regulatory system. The authors examine 
the potential strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and limitations of a mediation program. They 
explore a number of key issues in the operation of a complaint-mediation program in the context of the 
College of Physicians and Surgeons program, including neutrality and the public interest, satisfaction 
of the parties, the nature of the complainants, motivations and expectations of the parties, the issues of 
coercion and power imbalances, the form of the hearings, and the roles of lawyers. They evaluate each 
of these in terms of its consequences for the effectiveness of the process. Feld and Simm, as well as P. 
Marshall & R. Robson, "Conflict Resolution in Health Care" (2006) 7 Law and Governance 74 and G. 
Siskind & P. Marshall, Jn Search of Elegant Outcomes in Complaint Resolutions: The Participative 
Resolution Program at the College o.f Nurses of Ontario (Toronto: College of Nurses of Ontario, 2001) 
study and report on the "how to" and the real and potential benefits and costs of designing and using 
ADR in the College complaints and discipline process, but only indirectly refer to the aspects of 
regulatory culture, legal consciousness or administrative discretion addressed in this paper. 
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examines the motivations for incorporating ADR into the complaints resolution 
process and addresses the need for authority and the jurisdiction for use of ADR at 
different points in the complaints process. Kleefeld notes that in some jurisdictions 
(e.g., Ontario), ADR has been an available option to the parties once the dispute 
enters the judicial (i.e., discipline hearing before a duly constituted tribunal) phase of 
the complaints resolution process (as contemplated and sanctioned by the governing 
administrative law). 
Jurisdiction to Engage in ADR: A Threshold Question 
Before discussing what those alternative processes look like, or what they 
might look like, a threshold question needs addressing: for any given process, 
does the regulator have jurisdiction to use it and if so, where is the jurisdiction 
to be found? B.C. has nothing quite like Ontario's Statutory Powers 
Procedure Act, whose s. 4 gives regulators a general power to use alternative 
processes to resolve complaints. Rather, jurisdiction must be found in the 
regulator's own statute or in subordinate legislation, such as regulations or 
bylaws, validly passed pursuant to that statute. That is important because 
statutory authority to deal with a matter cannot be delegated or conferred on 
another person or body except as allowed by the statute, even if all parties 
consent. Generally, through a liberal and remedial reading of the legislation, 
jurisdiction to engage in some form of ADR can often be found or implied in 
the legislation. But settlements reached under such processes will usually 
have to be approved by the appropriate person or committee, as set out in the 
statute. In some cases, legislative amendments or bylaws may be needed to 
clarify jurisdictional uncertainty about the use of ADR. 202 
Despite Kleefeld's observations regarding the Ontario experience, no clear authority 
existed prior to the new legislation for use of ADR at an earlier phase of the 
complaints resolution process, since the SPP A required that the reference to ADR be 
made by a tribunal, and many concluded that, unlike the Discipline Committee, the 
previous Complaints Committees were not, strictly speaking, tribunals, hence no 
202 Kleefeld supra note 23 at 7 
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specific authority existed, although a general authority in the RHP A to act in ways 
"not inconsistent" with the Act provided sufficient assurance for some Colleges to 
engage in informal resolutions of complaints. The new legislation gives authority 
directly to the Registrar, at any point following the filing of a complaint, to try to 
resolve the matter by referring the parties, with their consent, to an ADR process, and 
possibly before the ICR Committee has even begun to investigate the complaint. 
ADR Legislation for Healthcare Professional Self-Regulatory Bodies (Australia 
and New Zealand) 
A recent empirical study addresses the question directly of whether and to what 
extent it is necessary or desirable to codify ADR principles and procedures in 
legislation governing healthcare professional self-regulation. 203 The authors of the 
study define ADR as not "a specific process, but rather [ ... ] a shared set of methods, 
goals, assumptions or values. "204 Their study, which was carried out in Australia and 
New Zealand in 2003, is based on interviews with members of the Councils and staff 
of healthcare profession self-regulatory Boards in those jurisdictions.205 The study 
exposes two opposing perspectives among those directly involved on whether to 
legislate ADR in healthcare professional self-regulation. The two views may be 
summarized as follows: 1) legislation is useful because it provides authority, 
203 Howse supra note 24 
204 Jbid at 3 
205 The Howse study addresses one aspect of the ADR process in one jurisdiction. While it may be 
tempting to try to analyze the "legal consciousness" of the participants in this study from the 
quotations provided, without full texts of their responses to the researchers' questions and without a 
more direct experience of the social, political, cultural and legal contexts in which their views were 
situated, that would be a perilous and perhaps foolhardy exercise. 
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credibility and assurance to the consumers of the process; and 2) legislation may 
render the process too inflexible, thus diminishing its responsiveness and limiting the 
necessary discretion to select and apply appropriate processes to address the 
requirements of a particular situation. 
Views on the need for legislative reform to adopt ADR are divided. On one 
side, participants felt that the Boards already had many ADR techniques 
available for use, and that such techniques were used at the Board's discretion. 
According to this view, legislative change was unnecessary because the 
Board's essential duty is to protect the public. Concern was expressed that to 
formalize ADR would reduce the existing flexibility, and lead to inappropriate 
use. On the other side, participants felt that ADR use by Boards should be 
legislatively recognised so as to give Boards compliance powers, and to 
provide transparent and consistent guidelines for ADR use by all Boards. 206 
Some study participants asserted that specific ADR legislation is unnecessary because 
of the Boards' essential duty to protect the public interest (requiring all processes to 
meet that minimum standard). However, ADR legislation could affirm ADR's role in 
fulfilling the public interest mandate. 
The debate about whether Boards should adopt ADR centres around their 
integrity. On one hand, legislative change to embody ADR is not relevant 
because public safety, not an individual's satisfaction, is their immediate 
concern. On the other hand, Boards would be less able to function in the 
public interest without the power to use ADR to help manage complaints in a 
. 1 d f~ . 201 time y an cost e iectlve manner. 
Legislating ADR is also seen to be undesirable because formalizing ADR would 
reduce its flexibility and could lead to inappropriate use. 
206 Howse supra note 24 at 6 
207 Ibid at 100 
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Several participants said legislative change was not necessary, because the 
present system allows enough flexibility for Boards to manage complaints 
effectively 208 
The ability to be flexible while satisfying legislative requirements is the key to 
Boards managing complaints more effectively without legislative reform. 
There are prominent concerns that such flexibility would be lost if ADR is 
formalized in the Act because legislation could become over prescriptive, 
standardised and difficult to change. 209 
Other respondents supporting ADR legislation focused on the coercive power of the 
legislation through giving Boards compliance powers to direct the use of ADR in 
certain situations, as well as on legislation's ability to enforce uniformity and 
consistency by providing transparent and consistent guidelines for ADR use by all 
Boards. 
The state can confer legitimacy on a process that may appear to some stakeholders to 
operate outside the usual judicial framework. Recognition in statute provides a 
measure of confidence that the process is sanctioned by the state as appropriate to be 
used in the complaints resolution process. In the Howse study, Board members of 
smaller professional self-regulatory Boards in particular found the legitimizing effect 
of ADR legislation beneficial and reassuring to their members and to the public. 
[P]articipants expressed mixed views on the need for legislative change to 
formalize ADR use in resolving complaints about professional misconduct. 
Participants from smaller Boards, or Boards which have not practiced many 
ADR techniques, are more likely to support the legislative change than those 
from larger Boards, or from Boards which have used ADR techniques 
frequently .... 
208 Ibid at 86 
209 Ibid at I 01 
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Although some Boards exercise discretion and use ADR techniques in 
resolving complaints, some participants felt that this capacity to use ADR 
should be better recognized so that people are compelled to adopt it. The 
Board's legal position will be clear and parties involved in a complaint will 
comply with the process. To make the most effective use of ADR, one 
participant suggested that it should be formalized in their individual health 
registration Act. "Just to formalize our ADR process a little bit more, that 
would be best done legislatively."210 
In the Howse study and elsewhere, consistency is identified as a desirable outcome 
that justifies codifying ADR processes in legislation. Predictability of process and 
equitable treatment of professionals and members of the public across various Boards 
are two goals that may be met in some measure by enacting legislation. 
The participants who thought that change shoul~ be made to current 
legislation to allow Boards to utilize ADR based their views on the following 
·reasons: 
Providing appropriate mechanism and guidelines to Board's practice 
If Boards are going to use ADR techniques, there needs to be an appropriate 
mechanism provided in the legislation .... [W]ithout clear guidelines, Boards 
may operate ADR differently; this could be dangerous.211 
A high degree of prescriptiveness, on the other hand, could limit the flexibility ADR 
can offer to tailor the process to the circumstances. 
If mandated, it is too rigid, difficult to change and might be used 
inappropriately. 
If Boards want to utilize ADR, they should do so voluntarily, based on the 
flexibility in the existing system. Some participants cautioned that if ADR 
was formalized in the law, it would have disadvantages .... [I]t could be 
difficult to draft a meaningful legislation with ADR approach .... [L ]egislative 
change might dictate the Board's processes and remove flexibility. Concern 
was expressed that the legislation might be used inappropriately, might be 
overused, or might become another layer of bureaucratic process. If 
mandatory, and part of, rather than an alternative to the formal system, 
concern was expressed that ADR legislation might not be used as effectively 
210 Ibid at 84 (italics in the original) 
211 Ibid at 85 (italics in the original) 
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as it is now. One participant with a legal background stated that the use of 
ADR could be encouraged by Boards being made more aware of their options, 
which could become standard practice for all Boards before a matter goes to 
hearing. Legislative change is not only unnecessary, but also difficult to alter 
later on.212 
Some respondents to the Howse et al. study noted complainant empowerment as an 
important beneficial outcome of ADR legislation by making it a requirement through 
the use of ADR to involve complainants more directly in the complaints resolution 
process than is generally permitted under the judicial decision-making process that is 
the core of the complaints-handling system. 
ADR brings a sense of closure for consumers because it expands the focus of 
complaint management to include them. Boards' pursuit of power to carry out 
ADR satisfies these goals of the consumer movement. 213 · 
Legitimacy, formality, clarity and consistency regarding the appropriate use of ADR 
by professional self-regulatory bodies were cited by the participants in the Howse et 
al. study as the main goals of and reasons for advocating legislation. These values are 
embedded in the political, social and cultural contexts in which the study was 
undertaken. While including the Howse et al. study as a very useful and relevant 
reference for research into the Ontario experience, it is important to state that the 
jurisdiction it reports on has a different history of professional self-regulation and has 
made different decisions about other aspects of the complaints resolution process, 
including a centralized, rather than a profession- and Board/College-specific 
complaint intake process. 
212 Ibid at 87 (italics in the original) 
213 Ibid at 101 
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3.7 The Influence of the Regulatory Community's Experience of the Legislative 
Design and Development Process on Regulator Legal Consciousness and 
Responses to the ADR Legislation 
The Legislative Design Process 
One hypothesis about how regulator legal consciousness and administrative discretion 
might be influenced to comply, contest or resist the ADR legislation concerns the extent 
to which the regulator perceives the way the community and the individual regulator 
was consulted or was involved in the legislative development process. As Meidinger 
argues, the legislature that delegates authority can and does step in to remedy some 
perceived problem in a regulatory community, often without having adequate 
information about the problem as it is experienced by the actors in the community. He 
suggests that the legislature involve the regulatory community in the negotiation and 
development of solutions that are practical and appropriate, based on administrative 
experience, knowledge of client needs, feasible procedures and available structural 
resources (time, money, human resources, skills, technology, etc.).214 Meidinger's 
approach is supported by public policy scholars commenting on the process of 
regulatory design through a regulatory negotiation ("reg neg") process.215 This 
214 Meidinger 1992 supra note 7 at 9 
215 See, for example, Freeman supra note 25; J. Aronson, '•Giving Consumers a Say in Policy 
Development: Influencing Policy or Just Being Heard?" (1993) 19 Canadian Public Policy 367; P. 
Aucoin & R. Heinztman, "New Forms of Accountability," in B. G. Peters and D. J. Savoie, (eds) 
Revitalizing the Public Service (Montreal: McGill/Queens University Press, 2000); R. Goldfiend, 
"Negotiated Rulemaking and the Public Interest"http://www.abanet.org/dispute/essay/goldfiend.doc; 
P.J. Harter, "Negotiated Regulations: A Cure for the Malaise" (1982) 71 Georgetown Law Review 
151; D. Spence, "Agency Policy Making and Political Control: Modeling Away the Delegation 
Problem" (1997) 7 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 199. Spence focuses on the 
shift in some of the literature on political control of administrative agencies away from an emphasis on 
agency autonomy and toward the view that politicians can and do exert significant amounts of control 
over agency decisions. He notes that much of the new theory of political control comes from positive 
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approach is also supported, as reported above, by scholars commenting on the 
development of ADR legislation. Freeman describes the goals and desired outcomes of 
the regulatory negotiation process and its relationship to administrative decision-
making thus: 
Also known as regulatory negotiation (reg-neg), it is a consensus-based 
approach to developing rules[.] ... [S]ome accounts portray regulatory 
negotiation as a deliberative process that facilitates creative solutions .... By 
giving all parties a stake in the rule, regulatory negotiation is thought to foster 
commitment to the resulting agreement, which, presumably, might facilitate 
implementation. 216 
[E]very aspect of policy making, implementation, and enforcement depends 
on the combined efforts of public and private actors. They must work out 
how to deliver a service, design a standard, and implement a rule. My 
contractual metaphor envisions that working out as negotiation. Similarly, 
there is no moment of decision to which one can point and say, "Aha, there 
policy was made!" or "There policy was implemented." The process of 
design, implementation, and enforcement is fluid. Administrative law 
scholars tend to take "snapshots" of specific moments in the decision-making 
process (such as the moment of rule promulgation) and analyze them in 
isolation. Rules develop meaning, however, only through the fluid processes 
of design, implementation, enforcement, and negotiation. This is not to deny 
the significance of rule promulgation as a separate rrocess, or the rule itself as 
a product, but to situate both in a larger dynamic.21 
Meidinger addresses the question of who participates or is allowed to participate in 
the regulatory debate, who is included and has "standing" within the "regulatory 
theorists who emphasize the ability of politicians to shape agencies' decision-making environments in 
ways that steer agencies' subsequent decisions toward the politicians' policy goals. Spence concludes 
that it is flawed design and methodology that support such a view and that agencies do continue to act 
with a great deal of autonomy when exercising most delegated policy-making authority. This research 
supports the impact of the RHP A and ADR legislative changes and their policy and political bases as 
adjusting the power balance within the healthcare system and in the regulation of professionals. 
216 Freeman supra note 25 at 653 
217 Ibid at 572 
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community," and who can then influence outcomes regarding the form and substance 
of the legislation. 
To talk about regulatory culture as a real phenomenon it is helpful to delineate 
a group in which it might be seen to operate. After all, cultures are shared by 
groups as a matter of definition. Just as importantly, defining the group 
participating in regulatory culture is also a political act; for it speaks to who 
can legitimately participate in the formation and enforcement of regulatory 
policies. Thus the age-old legal debate about standing, and the struggle for 
and against expanded participation in regulation, can be understood in part as 
efforts to define the bounds of the social group that will create and enact 
regulatory relationships.218 
Meidinger' s observations about the participation by members of the regulatory 
community in the development of rules and relationships parallel Lande' s view of 
how ADR legislation should be developed and applied- a key feature of DR design 
best practices being the involvement of the key stakeholders in its development, 
articulation and application. Indeed, Meidinger suggests that the legislature as part of 
the regulatory community may not be in the best position to develop rules for 
subsidiary agencies enacting delegated authority. 
Because the legislature faces a plenitude of issues, it might not decide an issue 
hotly contested within a partial community with great care. Second, and more 
importantly, that community might have a much stronger relationship to and 
greater knowledge of the issue (valuable local culture) than the legislature. 
Rather than distrusting that relationship, and seeking refuge in pure 
democratic decisional procedures, we might be better off allowing it to 
continue and to grow. Third, when issues involve substantial uncertainty, it 
may make sense, rather than resolving them in one fell swoop, to let the 
interested regulatory community work out tentative accommodations, then 
follow the development of the problem, and make adjustments when 
necessary .... Although the formal distribution of authority is important, 
expertise -- detailed knowledge of the regulatory domain and the likely 
218 Meidinger 1987 supra note 7 at 363 
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operation of alternative policies -- is also a major source of regulatory 
influence.219 
The dispute resolution system design process itself and whether or how it is followed 
may be one important reason why the ADR legislation is ultimately adopted/complied 
with, contested/"gamed," avoided or resisted. If ADR legislation is to be developed 
at all, and for the reasons he suggests make it worthwhile, Lande strongly favours a 
Dispute System Design (DSD)220 approach to the process of ADR policymaking. 
"Policymakers should use a dispute system design framework in analyzing policy 
options, which includes assessment of disputants' needs and interests."221 
Furthermore, he suggests that, while "[ i]t is unrealistic to expect that every proposal 
for ADR policy will include a systemic analysis of how the proposed policy would fit 
into or affect the relevant dispute resolution system[, n ]onetheless, it is an ideal worth 
striving to achieve when feasible. As a corollary to the principle that the DR field 
should provide a variety of desirable options, it should also engage representatives of 
219 Meidinger 1992 supra note 7 at pdf 9 
220 Lande 2005 supra note 5 at 630: "The ADR field has developed a subfield for policymaking about 
disputing, called "dispute system design" (DSD) .... A full-fledged DSD effort may not be feasible in 
many situations because it would require more time, effort, and other resources than available or 
appropriate. ADR policymakers should consider using DSD procedures and principles as much as 
feasible given their circumstances." See also, inter alia, S. Carter, "The importance of party buy-in in 
designing organizational conflict management systems" (1999) 17 Mediation Quarterly 61; C. 
Costantino & C. Merchant, Designing Conflict Management Systems: A Guide to Creating Productive 
and Healthy Organizations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996); K. Slaikeu & R. Hasson, Controlling 
the Costs of Conflict (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1998); W. Ury, J. Brett & S. Goldberg, Getting 
Disputes Resolved (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988) 
221 Ibid at 624 
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parties and other stakeholders"222 in decisions about dispute resolution processes as 
much as possible and appropriate. 
Lande describes some of the features of the DSD process that he believes should be 
followed to develop appropriate ADR legislation: 
When developing policies about dispute resolution processes, policymakers 
should use DSD procedures and principles as much as feasible given their 
circumstances. DSD focuses on systematically managing a series of disputes 
rather than handling individual disputes on an ad hoc basis. In general, it 
involves assessing the needs of disputants and other stakeholders in the 
system, planning to address those needs, providing necessary training and 
education for disputants and relevant dispute resolution professionals, 
implementing the system, evaluating it, and making periodic modifications as 
needed. When developing dispute resolution processes, designers should 
engage representatives of parties and other stakeholders as much as 
appropriate and consider offering a variety of processes to satisfy parties' 
various interests and preferences.223 
In designing ADR processes, policymakers should normally solicit input from 
key stakeholder groups. The process of eliciting input may take various forms 
and depend on the resources available. In some cases, it may involve 
formation of a committee that includes representatives of the various 
stakeholder groups. It is valuable to convene a group of stakeholders, 
including practitioners, as well as independent analysts. Being human, all of 
us have blind spots and biases. Convening a representative group with diverse 
perspectives can help identify such biases and lead to a better policy than what 
like-minded experts or a single stakeholder group might devise. Collecting 
data from stakeholders can be especially helpful. ... After assessing 
stakeholders' interests, policymakers should develop policies to satisfy those 
interests, engaging stakeholder representatives in the policymaking process as 
much as feasible. 224 
222 Ibid note 52 at 630: "Stakeholders are those whose interests would be affected by a decision or 
action. In the context of dispute resolution, stakeholders might include, but are not necessarily limited 
to, disputants, dispute resolution professionals, public or private organizations, and communities. 
Dispute resolution professionals might include lawyers, neutrals, judges, and other court personnel, 
among others." 
223 Ibid at 630 
224 Jbid at 639 
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In his overview of ADR legislation, Pou views the legislation as one point on a 
continuum of ADR process design, development, measurement, evaluation and 
remediation. "[I]mplementing improved dispute handling is a process, not an act. 
Legislation authorizing and encouraging ADR must explicitly recognize this and 
create a framework for setting that process in motion. "225 
The Howse research does not address the question of the ADR legislation policy 
development process. Conducted in the absence of ADR legislation, it is concerned 
mainly with the attitudes of key stakeholders toward the potential risks and 
advantages, the perceived benefits and costs if ADR legislation were to be applied to 
the health profession regulatory bodies in Australia. 
ADR Legislative Design: Power, Participation and Procedural Fairness 
As Freeman observes in her studies of regulatory negotiation, whether and how 
legislation is adopted depends to a very great extent on the participation of key 
stakeholders in the rule development process. 
Social psychology teaches us that parties are more likely to view outcomes as 
legitimate when they play a meaningful role in the process. Parties may 
derive satisfaction not solely from getting what they want in a bargaining 
process, but from being included in the enterprise, taken seriously, and offered 
explanations for decisions. Evidence from the most recent study of regulatory 
negotiation supports such claims. 226 
225 Pou supra note 5 at 7 
226 Freeman supra note 25 at 656 
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Only recently has empirical research turned to the question of how people 
think about the law. One important strand of this work develops theories about 
procedural fairness and substantive justice (see Tyler 1990; Lind & Tyler 
1988).227 
Ewick and Silbey's research suggests there exists within legal consciousness a kind of 
"procedural consciousness. "228 In their interviews they observed a "deep, broad-
based normative consensus. While citizens expressed persistent skepticism about the 
fairness of legal institutions, they appeared to be committed to both the desirability 
and possibility of realizing legal ideals of equal and fair treatment. "229 
Citizens value procedure more than substance. The stratified structure of the 
legal system is thus sustained by a "procedural consciousness. "230 
People care about having neutral, honest authorities who allow them to state 
their views and who treat them with digruty and respect.231 
In their studies of risk management initiatives that depend on rule-making to support 
public safety, Tharaldsen and Haukelid identify the importance of participation in the 
rule-making design process by those who will be responsible for implementing the 
rules. This involvement is necessary and even critical given the frequently tacit 
power dynamics operating in the regulatory culture. They note that any larger 
regulatory culture engenders varying power differences that give rise to sub-cultures 
227 L. Neilsen, "Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens about Law 
and Street Harassment" (2000) 34:4 Law & Society Review 1055 at 1059 note 6 
228 Ewick & Silbey supra note 22 at 739 
229 Ibid 
230 Ibid 
231 Ibid. See also J. Conley & W. O'Barr, Rules Versus Relationships: The Ethnography ofLegal 
Discourse (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) for an examination of the contrast between 
legal discourse and the narratives those engaging the legal system expect the system needs to hear, and 
their disappointment when they are not heard. The valuing of narrative is at the heart of legal 
consciousness research and the basis for the case study presented in this dissertation. 
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and counter-cultures within the larger culture.232 For example, their research 
uncovered a link between workers' perception of management's good faith in 
establishing new safety rules and the workers' willingness to follow them. Worker 
involvement in the development of the rules was seen to be an important factor in 
achieving the adoption of the rules. "Important success criteria in a cultural approach 
would also be related to the involvement of management and employees in the 
intervention to come."233 These findings contribute empirical evidence to suggest 
that participation in the design and development of legislation may be a significant 
factor influencing how and whether members of the RHP A regulatory community 
adopt, contest, "game" or resist the new ADR legislation, if, for "management," we 
substitute Government, and, for "workers," we identify the officials of the regulatory 
Colleges. 
The issues of trust that arise in the study of rule-making in a regulatory culture, based 
on the regulated's perceptions of the rule-maker's/legislator's motives and the rule-
maker/legislator's understanding, appreciation of and willingness to take into account 
the expressed interests, concerns and experiences of those to be regulated, as 
evidenced in a participatory process that is perceived to be "fair," are cited by both 
regulatory and ADR scholars as relevant and important to ADR system design and to 
the field of rule-making in general. Evidence-based theory in particular suggests that 
232 Tharaldsen & Haukelid supra note 17 at 379 
233 Ibid at 382 
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grounds for cynicism or suspicion include perceptions of negative, manipulative, 
controlling or punitive legislator/rule-maker motives for the legislation, these 
perceptions being among the principal reasons observed for why legislation and rules 
are not followed, or are subverted in some way to compensate for the perceived 
injustice and unfairness to the parties being regulated. Judging from the scholarly 
research reviewed, this could be as true for ADR legislation as for other types of 
regulation. 
3.8 Theory-Based Conclusions About Regulatory Culture, Administrative 
Discretion and Legislating ADR 
As stated in the Introduction, the basic focus of this dissertation is not the design or 
practice of ADR itself, but rather the reasons for and effects of legislating ADR. 
Hence, the theoretical frame of the dissertation is the study of regulation, of which 
ADR legislation is one of myriad subsets, however one with very particular 
characteristics that reflect on the nature of regulation itself. Because there is a way in 
which ADR can be considered a concept, practice or process that stands apart from, is 
complementary/supplementary or alternative to law, or is, in some sense, a non-law-
based complaints or dispute resolution process, the tensions within the process of 
regulation itself are highlighted or heightened when ADR is the lens through which 
the regulatory field is studied. 
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This chapter has laid out the arguments commonly cited for and against legislating 
ADR, with empirical evidence provided in the Howse study regarding how regulators 
in the actual field chosen for the case study, but in another jurisdiction, view the 
potential costs and benefits, risks and rewards of legislation governing the use of 
ADR in complaints resolution. Theoretical arguments have been presented that 
legislating ADR processes confers the benefit of the authority and legitimacy that 
law's social standing can provide to those who are reassured by law's imprimatur. 
Moreover, some in the field argue that ADR legislation governing the form and use of 
the ADR process may also provide the benefit of greater consistency and 
predictability across a field of ADR-using organizations where such consistency 
appears desirable. 
Lande, Menkel-Meadow and other advocates for the alternativeness and non-law 
character of ADR argue that ADR legislation can (whether consciously or 
unconsciously, intended or unintended), however, result in ADR's alternativeness 
being diminished or curtailed. Attributing to law the power to contain, "cabin", 
capture (or recapture) a mode of dispute or complaint resolution that these ADR 
scholars see as operating usefully outside law's constraints and limitations, they argue 
that ADR's attributes must be preserved from over-legislation. 
However, this chapter has also presented theoretical and empirical research that 
challenges the view that law's constraining power is inescapable, arguing instead that 
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legislation when it is drafted is inevitably porous and indefinite and subject to 
interpretation in myriad ways that make ample use of its ambiguity, as well as its 
clarity (adherence to the "letter," as opposed to the "spirit" of the law). Lande and 
Pou describe what they believe ADR legislation can and cannot provide to support 
the ADR process and those responsible for or participating in it. They also draw 
attention to the general nature and tendency of rules to produce unintended as well as 
intended consequences, thus challenging the idea that ADR (or any) legislation will 
necessarily ensure consistency in its application. Several regulatory scholars cited in 
this chapter make the point that legislation governing any activity or behaviour cannot 
be drafted in a way that is sufficiently precise as to determine specific actions. 
The theory of the indeterminacy of rules is linked to the theory that there is a process 
of often complex, creative interpretation, grounded in individual and collective 
experience, that takes place as the regulated determine, by conscious and unconscious 
criteria, how they will respond to the legislation. This process of interpretation that 
informs administrative choices is described and supported by the extensive literature 
on administrative discretion. Meidinger's scholarship emphasizes the connection 
between the concepts of the indeterminacy of rules and administrative discretion. He 
views administrative discretion as the customary, often reflexive decision- (and 
policy-) making process that the regulator follows to determine appropriate responses 
to legislation. As for the factors that enter into that individual regulator's decision-
making process, Meidinger identifies the powerful influence of regulatory culture, 
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which, he asserts, comprises five significant considerations: general cultural 
assumptions, political pressures, legal requirements, bureaucratic procedures and 
structural constraints. 
Other scholars have been cited in this chapter as supporting Meidinger' s view of the 
regulator's conscious and unconscious deliberative process that weighs costs and 
benefits, risks and rewards of any given legislation to the individual regulator and to 
the regulatory community as a whole. Pratt and Black in particular support 
Meidinger's view that, in addition to personal, managerial and professional 
considerations, the regulator's perceptions of the general social, economic and 
political environment, and the norms and conventions of the regulatory community 
itself are influential in determining types of responses to legislation/regulation. Black 
and Pratt each make the case for these bureaucratic discretionary choices being both 
complex, personal, local and significantly influenced by community considerations, 
thus reinforcing Meidinger's view of the important role of the regulatory community 
in administrative discretion. 
Regulatory scholars' insistence on the importance of understanding the particular 
regulatory community's issues in a specific place at a certain point in time (regulatory 
culture as Hwhat is going on here") as influences on individual and collective 
decision-making led to identification and reporting on developments in health 
professional self-regulation at the time of the legislation and at the time the research 
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was carried out. Thus the chapter included several examples of recent theoretical and 
empirical research into current issues in the professional self-regulatory field. 
Among the various and important, often competing influences on the regulator's 
decision-making process about whether or how to respond to legislation is the 
regulator's and the collective regulatory community's perceptions of, beliefs about 
and relationship to law, the power of legislation and the legislative development 
process. This chapter has therefore examined and reported on the work of several 
recent scholars who address the phenomenon of legal consciousness: how individuals 
and communities perceive, think and feel about law and how those beliefs and 
perceptions influence their behaviour - what strategies and tactics individuals and 
communities engage in to comply with law, contest law and/or avoid, resist or escape 
law's coercive power. Ewick and Silbey provide extensive theoretical and empirical 
evidence for the existence of individual and collective legal consciousness. This 
chapter has also invoked the work of subsequent legal consciousness scholars whose 
work provides further empirical evidence of the phenomenon, as well as extending 
and, in some instances, challenging and offering alternative interpretations of the 
evidence Ewick and Silbey have presented regarding the existence and influence of 
legal consciousness on strategies and tactics in relation and response to law. 
Finally, scholarship was presented that identifies the potential influence of the 
regulator's perceptions of the power dynamics between the legislator and the 
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regulator who is subject to the legislation in that regulator's legal consciousness, 
particularly how the actual process of developing the legislation/regulation can 
influence whether and how legislation or regulation is adopted. This chapter has 
reviewed scholarly studies on the aspects and influence of party participation in 
regulatory development - openness, inclusiveness, respect, fairness - as affecting 
legal consciousness and the likelihood and mode of adoption, as well as the influence 
of regulatory community role models on regulatory community members. As Lande 
has argued, participation in the dispute system design and development by concerned 
stakeholders whose input is valued and respected is an important element of good 
dispute system design theory. This observation is corroborated, as the chapter ·shows, 
by other empirical research into legal consciousness and regulatory negotiation. 
A Concluding Note on the Theoretical Research Methodology 
This chapter has followed a thread of theoretical debate along several logically related 
paths of enquiry into legalism, regulation, legal consciousness, administrative 
discretion and ADR legislation, while contemplating the particular theoretical 
dilemmas ADR legislation might present in the regulatory culture of the Ontario 
health profession self-regulatory domain. This chapter has explored relationships 
between the selected theories and concepts in the fields of regulatory and ADR 
scholarship: law and alternative-to-law ("non law"); the pros and cons of regulating 
an alternative-to-law; the influence of the way law-makers and the subjects oflaw 
think about the power of law in social life (hegemony of law or constitutive legalism) 
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on decisions to legislate and whether and how to respond to the legislation; the reality 
that almost no legislation can be completely precise, but leaves ample room for 
interpretation (indeterminacy of rules); the process of deciding what to do about 
legislation (administrative discretion); and the influence of regulatory culture and 
community on considerations about what to do about legislation. 
In pursuing an understanding of what makes legislating ADR and the subsequent 
exercise of administrative discretion in relation to how the legislation is interpreted 
and applied contentious enough to give rise to passionate debates in the academic 
literature, the theoretical trail of discovery reflects a series of choices and decisions 
determined by one scholar's particular interests and intuition. Hence the theoretical 
research narrative or framework presented in this chapter, and in this dissertation 
generally (including the choice of including a case study and the particular case 
subject to be studied), reflects a scholarly "administrative discretion" that selects, 
extracts, uses and organizes - from a vast field of available regulatory and ADR 
scholarship - a particular cluster of theories that appear to be the most relevant to the 
study at hand. Another scholar studying the impact of ADR legislation might follow 
a different trail and decide on an entirely different case study (or none at all) as 
determined by their own interests, beliefs, training, values, as well as by current 
scholarly philosophies and approaches. 
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In relation to his landmark studies of regulatory culture, indeterminacy of rules and 
administrative discretion, Meidinger states that the regulatory scholar's crucial tasks 
at present are to observe and understand logical regulatory practices; map ongoing 
relationships and describe forms of power in actual regulatory communities; give 
weight to the particular problems faced and the role of concrete experiences in 
structuring regulatory outlook; and capture key differences and similarities of work 
practice that enable the development of typologies of regulation. 
The case study that follows seeks to respond to Meidinger' s exhortation by seeking, 
observing and recording concrete empirical evidence of the experiences, relationships 
and practices in a specific regulatory community; the particular forms of power and 
the problems the regulatory community and its stakeholders experience and how 
these structure their regulatory outlook and produce differences and similarities in 
their behaviour. The goal is to compare the theories discussed above, and the 
theoretical framework outlined in this paper, and to discover whether and to what 
extent the empirical evidence supports or challenges the theory in ways that enable a 
better understanding of the regulatory process, especially in relation to whether and 
how to legislate ADR. 
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Chapter Four 
CASE STUDY RESEARCH AND FINDINGS 
4.1 Case Study Introduction and Outline of Methodology 
The primary object of this case study, including primary document research and 
qualitative in-depth interviews, was to respond to Meidinger's challenge to develop 
empirical evidence that would reveal the various elements of regulatory culture and 
account for regulator choices in applying administrative discretion. Since Meidinger 
does not suggest a preferred methodology for discovering the legal consciousness 
foundations for regulatory culture and administrative discretion, the first challenge for 
the scholar developing such a case study was to select or develop the best 
methodological approach that would permit a full exploration and discovery of how, 
in this case, the members of the RHPA regulatory community perceived the ADR 
legislation related to the College complaints resolution process. 
A number of possible approaches were considered, including survey questionnaires; 
structured interviews with a series of questions relating to the ADR legislation and 
regulator practices; in-depth, unstructured interviews with key informants; and in-
depth, semi-structured interviews with key informants. Issues of representative 
sampling, how to frame the research to potential informants (how much to suggest to 
them without unduly influencing their responses) and how to record the data were 
among the key issues identified and considered. A full discussion of the 
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methodological approach and related considerations is presented in Appendix A: 
Comprehensive Methodology. 
After considerable deliberation, it was decided that this study of regulatory culture, its 
influence on regulator legal consciousness and the impact of legal consciousness on 
the regulator's administrative discretion regarding responses to ADR legislation 
would rely on a combination of investigative methods that have been proven to yield 
best results when examining cultural phenomena in the regulatory field. The 
advantages and possible shortcomings of taking an in-depth qualitative survey 
approach, on a particular issue, using a representative sample of informants, are 
discussed more fully in Appendix A. However, a summary review of the reasons for 
selecting this approach may be helpful here. 
Research by organizational culture, legal consciousness and regulatory culture 
theorists has strongly influenced this study's methodological approach. 
Investigations by Reiman and Oedewald,234 Sackmann,235 Sommer and Sommer,236 
and Ewick and Silbey237 have addressed the challenges of exploring 
phenomenological elements of the subjects' inner cultural landscape or legal 
234 Reiman & Oedewald supra note 17 
235 S. Sackmann, "'Uncovering Culture in Organizations" (1991) 27:3 Journal of Applied Behavioral 
Science 295 
236 B. Sommer & R. Sommer, A Practical Guide to Behavioral Research Tools and Techniques 4th Ed. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) 
237 See particularly the discussion of legal consciousness methodology in Ewick & Silbe 1998 supra note 
22 
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consciousness and have established criteria and specific methodologies for empirical 
regulatory culture research. 
In-depth, issue-focused, phenomenologically oriented interviews 
The key informant narratives that follow in this chapter are the result of a deliberate 
methodology selected so as to produce the most robust and suggestive accounts of 
legal consciousness operating in the RHP A regulatory culture to influence 
administrative discretionary decision-making. Careful review of methodological 
literature in relation to cultural studies offered various combinations of approaches. 
Reiman and Oedevald' s studies of safety cultures cited earlier recommend a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative surveys to reveal both the overt and tacit 
elements of regulatory culture in an approach they call "contextual assessment of 
organizational culture (CAOC). ,ms For organizational culture, this case study refers 
both to the RHP A regulatory culture and the culture of the particular regulatory 
College. 
Cultural perspective is interested in the meanings and generation of these 
meanings in a given organisation. Of special interest are the meanings that 
relate to the demands of the particular work. These meanings are also 
constructed in interaction with other members of the organisation. Cultural 
perspective thus emphasises collective and shared issues (and those issues that 
should be shared) over e.g. individual decision making. An individual always 
makes his/her decisions in a social context. The effect of this context can be 
so strong that the individual is not even aware of making a decision -
choosing between alternative ways of acting. It is this context, which sets the 
possibilities and boundaries of action that is our main focus of interest.239 
238 Reiman & Oedewald supra note 17 at 10 
239 Ibid (reference omitted) 
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Reiman and Oedewald assert that the phenomenon under study, such as ADR 
legislation, can only be understood in the context of the culture from "which it is 
difficult or impossible to separate the phenomenon itself. "240 Their research into 
regulatory culture confirms other cultural researchers' findings that questionnaires are 
inadequate means to uncover embedded cultural understandings. 
Organisational culture questionnaire methods have been criticised for the fact 
that it is not possible for them to map out a culture's underlying assumptions, 
because they are unconscious and often only poorly explainable .... With 
interviews it is possible to bring out subjective opinions and views on the 
significance of issues, which is not always possible with a structured form. 
Moreover, the uncovering of entirely new, surprising issues and ideas is more 
probable in interviews than in questionnaire studies. In interviews one can 
enquire about the justifications for actions and different measures. These 
justifications reveal the kind of picture that interviewees have of their work 
and its requirements as well as the kind of meanings that individuals assign to 
their actions .... During in-depth interviews, as open and as broad questions as 
possible are used, giving interviewees the opportunity to deal with them from 
the perspective of their own culture. 241 
Reiman and Oedewald' s work on regulatory culture research methodology validates 
and extends the cultural research methodology outcomes earlier reported by 
Sackmann, on which this research study is based. Sackmann' s research into various 
types of culture studies suggests that the most fruitful investigations of culture rely on 
inductive qualitative research, principally in-depth semi-structured or unstructured 
interviews with key informants that are issue-focused. 
In-depth interviews are used to uncover culturally based values, cultural 
beliefs, or knowledge structures .... [S]uch an in-depth interview may be 
called ethnographic, clinical or phenomenological. The common denominator 
240 Ibid at 8 
241 Reiman & Oedewald 2002 supra note 17 at 19 and 20 
126 
is that researchers do not introduce cultural issues from the outside or from 
their own cultural reference groups. Instead, by using broad and open-ended 
questions, by trying to use the insider's language, and bracketing their own 
assumptions, the interviewers entice the interviewees to unravel aspects of 
their everyday life in their particular cultural setting.242 
A semi-structured in-depth interview intended to uncover unconscious cultural 
beliefs, values, understandings or assumptions can sometimes frustrate or fail its 
research purpose by its lack of direction or focus. Therefore, Sackmann goes on to 
argue that 
"[a ]n issue focus enables both the surfacing of the tacit components of culture, 
and comparisons across individuals and research settings .... The [issue] 
should have the quality of a projective device - that is, provide a specific 
context but leave enough latitude for interpretation .... The tacit components 
of culture become apparent in the specific interpretations attributed by 
respondents .... [A ]n issue focus enables comparisons, because it introduces a 
specific context that forces respondents to draw on the same stock of 
knowledge. It channels the attention of respondents to the same cultural 
aspects within a given organization and reveals their framework about this 
issue .... The issue serves as a projective device, leaving latitude for different 
interpretations." 243 
Sackmann favours combining the issue focus, that surfaces cultural understandings in 
relation to a specific circumstance, with a phenomenological orientation that focuses 
"on insiders' perspectives, their everyday theories of organizational life, and what 
they consider relevant in that particular setting. "244 The combination of an issue 
focus and phenomenological orientation invites and promotes open and in-depth 
exploration of the informants' awareness and understanding through the lens of a 
242 Sackmann supra note 235 at 301 (italics in original; references omitted) 
243 Ibid at 304 
244 Ibid at 305 
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specific issue with which they have reasonable familiarity. In discussing the issue, 
Sackmann asserts, the phenomenology of the culture is revealed and any researcher 
bias is significantly reduced. The issue, as "projective device" (in this case, the ADR 
legislation), allows "respondents to reflect on taken-for-granted aspects of their work 
life. It [is] sufficiently ambiguous and thought-provoking to surface subconscious 
beliefs and at the same time non-threatening, because respondents ... answer freely 
and openly."245 
This case study is based on face-to-face interviews with relevant stakeholders, all of 
whom were directly associated with the policy development and practical 
implementation of the ADR legislation. It describes perceptions of the ADR 
legislation from three perspectives: where it came from (the background or what 
conditions gave rise to it), perceptions of the development process and the actual 
provisions, and the perceived impact of the ADR legislation on complaint resolution 
practices within the Colleges. The key informants were selected so as to obtain a 
diverse array of College and other key stakeholder perspectives. This "thickly 
described" case study seeks to create greater understanding of how ADR legislation is 
understood in the regulatory community. More specifically, this case study is 
intended to facilitate the identification of values and understandings that make up the 
"culture" that influences the individual and collective exercise of administrative 
245 Ibid at 310 
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discretion in this regulatory field and the factors that may determine adoption, 
avoidance of, or adaptation or resistance to the ADR legislation. 
Appendix A describes in detail how the RHP A" regulatory community" was 
determined for the purposes of the research. It is perhaps sufficient here to state that 
the principal representatives of the community were construed to be the Government 
(elected officials), the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (appointed . 
administrative officials); the Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council 
(appointed consultative officials); the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board 
(appointed judicial officials); and representatives of the professional regulatory 
bodies (Colleges), including large (LC), medium (MC) and smaller (SC) Colleges, 
Colleges where the professions provide services funded by the provincial public 
health insurance program (OHIP) and those whose services are funded privately, by 
individual clients or by their private insurers. 
From the Colleges, input was sought from the Registrars (chief administrative/ 
executive officers with overall regulatory as well as management responsibility, as 
well as statutory responsibility under the new legislation for determining complaints 
cases suitable for ADR); senior College staff responsible for the administration of the 
complaints resolution process; elected College Council members responsible for 
judicial decisions regarding complaints resolution; consultants to the College 
complaints resolution processes, including ADR experts and legal counsel. This 
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selection was made to ensure broad input to the study as well as to explore and 
validate, as far as possible, Meidinger' s concept of a regulatory community whose 
interactions on the five influences246 constitute a regulatory culture that influences 
individual responses to regulatory change. 
The interviews focused on three core areas: What do you think gave rise to the ADR 
legislation? In your opinion, how appropriate is the actual ADR legislation? What 
impact has the ADR legislation had on College practices? This basic interview 
protocol, designed principally for College key informants and their consultants/ 
advisors, was modified slightly to reflect the different perspectives of the officials of 
the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care and the Health Professions Appeal and 
Review Board. Interviews lasted approximately one hour. Only a few were briefer 
and most were longer. The discussions that followed each question and stage of the 
interview were lively and intense, and included many probing, follow-up questions 
for further information. At times the sequence of core questions would be varied 
when the informant( s) included information addressing a subsequent area of enquiry 
in their initial responses. The interview then flowed in the direction the informants 
led, thus providing precious insight into their perceptions and the inner logic of their 
responses. An opportunity was found later in the interview to return to any interview 
area that had been "skipped" as a result of the informant's free flow of ideas. All the 
246 General cultural assumptions, political pressures, legal requirements, structural constraints and 
bureaucratic procedures 
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key informant interviews were voice-recorded and the recordings were professionally 
transcribed. 
Some twenty-four hours of remarkably candid reflections have been condensed here 
into some fifty pages describing the constellation of issues that, taken together, 
embody and represent the informants' perceptions of the various regulatory culture 
dimensions within their legal consciousness that govern their administrative 
discretionary decision-making, as revealed in their attitudes toward the ADR 
legislation. Through attention to these narratives, it is possible to gain a sense of the 
community and the individuals that comprise it and to hear the tensions and the 
challenges expressed in their own words. 
The interview results (the verbal and conceptual content of the respective interview 
transcripts) from meetings with College officials, consultants and HP ARB in this 
chapter were analyzed, clustered and coded according to similarity (patterns) of 
concepts and themes mentioned with respect to perceptions of how the ADR 
legislation came about, how appropriate the ADR provisions appear to be and what 
impact the ADR legislation has or will have had on College practices prior to the 
legislation. In reporting these results, the source is indicated by a code that reflects 
the College size (SC, MC, LC) and a number that has been assigned to that College 
within that size grouping. 
131 
Ewick and Silbey's reports on the legal consciousness of their subjects is the model 
for reporting the views expressed by the key informants in this study. By providing 
significantly more than the most condensed snippets from their interviews, this report 
allows the reader to enter more fully into the culture the informants inhabit and 
glimpse the values, understandings, beliefs and meanings that inform the informants' 
thinking and behaviour about their work, their responsibilities, the power dynamic 
and socio-legal framework they perceive as governing their work and the impact of 
the ADR legislation within that cultural context. I believe that the chosen 
methodology has produced robust results that offer unparalleled insights into the 
administrative discretion process within the RHP A regulatory culture, thus promoting 
a more grounded and nuanced understanding of the consequences of legislative 
initiatives in the regulatory sphere, particularly with regard to ADR. 
Key Informant Interview Summary Results 
4.2 FIRST QUESTION SET/CLUSTER: What do you think gave rise to the 
ADR legislation? 
4.2 A Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (2 Senior Officials) 
Ministry senior policy officials of the branch responsible for the health regulatory 
Colleges agreed to an interview to discuss the ADR legislation. The legal counsel in 
the Ministry's Legal Services Branch responsible for drafting the legislation declined 
to meet, commenting (in a brief telephone exchange), however, that the Ministry 
policy staff had been fully involved in the legislative drafting "more than most." 
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In answer to the question regarding the background that gave rise to the legislation, 
the conversation with the Ministry policy officials began with the key informants 
referring to the HPRAC reviews and the recommendations in the 2001 and 2006 
HPRAC reports regarding the need to improve public and member understanding of 
and access to the College complaints and discipline system and to "heighten public 
awareness of the ADR process as part of the system." They referred to how "the 
Colleges, in their many and various ways, deal with different sorts of complaints." 
Bill 171, they said, was "intended to sort out and achieve efficiency and transparency 
of the complaints and discipline system." Colleges had reported to HPRAC and to 
the Ministry that "ADR had been remarkably efficient and useful in resolving 
complaints - complaints which had skyrocketed because of public awareness. And 
obviously, if you start raising public awareness of complaints and the system, it may 
lead to more complaints." ADR "gave the Colleges the opportunity to increase their 
outreach and increase public awareness of what they were trying to do, and increase 
the public's understanding of health professional regulation." Colleges, they pointed 
out, were "required to investigate complaints, but ADR allowed Colleges to prioritize 
complaints, focus [their] energies on -- quote/unquote -- more serious complaints, or 
complaints which touch on more serious issues .... They had found a way to bring 
ADR into the system whilst maintaining and providing resolutions which were in the 
public interest." 
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The MHL TC key informants suggested that the reason for formalizing ADR in 
legislation was because "the use of ADR was undeniable and because it met so many 
objectives of Bill 171 in making the complaints and discipline process more 
efficient." Because ADR had become the "watchword" in the last few years, and 
"such an important component of the scheme and supports it, probably some structure 
and, for lack of a better word, rules around it are appropriate." "At the end of the day, 
if you were increasing the public access, it's also important to have those types of 
parameters in the legislation to make sure that it was being consistently applied by 
various Colleges and various committees." They acknowledged that "without it being 
written down there," while "very few Colleges" would use ADR to deal with cases of 
sexual abuse, "there was also the need to ensure public safety, which was the other 
important aspect of Bill 171 .... You have to be very, very careful about the types of 
complaints that you put through an ADR system, and so that is what the legislation 
now says, as we know. Clearly as a result of that, Colleges will have to think a bit 
more carefully about the types of cases that go through ADR." 
The Ministry officials referred to the way the ADR was being used in the civil justice 
system and the parameters and guidelines around its use there, indicating that the 
same was simply being done "here, in this micro system." When asked to what 
extent those external developments in ADR affected the decision to legislate, the 
Ministry informants responded that while ADR was "popular in the labour and civil 
contexts," those were "on the periphery." "We were very firmly focused on what was 
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going on in the health regulatory system." They summed up by commenting that, 
overall, Bill 171 was intended to increase public awareness of and access to the 
regulatory system, acknowledge the effectiveness of ADR, and ensure public safety, 
bearing in mind what ADR processes were already there within the health profession 
regulatory system. They cited the Colleges of Nurses, Physicians and Surgeons, and 
Dental Surgeons ADR processes as examples of ADR systems already in place. 
When asked whether it was part of the Government's intention to give the ADR 
process legitimacy, they responded that they had not thought of the legislation in that 
way, but "maybe, to a certain extent, it does legitimize it a bit, at least in the minds of 
perhaps complainants and others, insofar as it's dealt with in the Act, and some rules 
and structure are put around it and so therefore a complainant or a member of the 
public who's participating in this process feels that it is genuine as opposed to 'Am I 
being railroaded by this profession protecting itself?' and 'What am I being asked to 
be a party to here?' when this actually gives it some structure and some legitimacy .... 
That's a very important point, the notion of it saying this is not just something that a 
College has cooked up to railroad them, and 'We don't really know what the 
Government or anybody else thinks about this.' We might know if we had been in 
some kind of civil action that it exists, but even in those circumstances, there's always 
that feeling of the out-of-court settlement, and, of course, that's something that the 
Colleges have been very, very keen not to press. I think that that's very much 
embodied by the idea that one of the key elements of this - something which all 
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Colleges did - was to ensure that the committee that was in charge - the statutory 
committee, be it the complaints committee or the ICR Committee - ratify the 
decision, so that there was the idea of it being in the public interest and maintaining 
the public interest rationale." 
"When looking at an ADR system," they said it had been important "to consider not 
only what was necessary and what was happening with Colleges, but also what was 
considered to be compatible with the law." "Clearly, whenever legislation is 
developed, there's advice sought and obviously legal direction is also sought. ... [The 
ADR legislation] has to be constitutionally compliant. It has to be compliant within 
the civil law doctrines of the day, so that kind of consideration absolutely." "The 
provisions that you see there in respect of ADR are consistent with matters of 
confidentiality and fairness and due process and all those things which are throughout 
the RHP A, which are the very common themes in respect of these kinds of matters 
and compliant within the constitutional law and various other principles in terms of 
process matters and legal matters." However, unlike ADR in other settings, where the 
settlement can be anything that meets the needs and interests of the parties involved, 
"whatever is resolved, unlike normal ADR where it could be pretty much anything 
you wanted, it has to be something that comes back [for the approval of the College 
statutory committee] and has to be compatible with the public interest. In other 
words, it has to be consistent with the RHP A from that perspective." 
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They commented that "framework" is a good word to describe the legislation since 
the RHP A itself is "a regulatory framework which contemplates a number of different 
micro processes or systems, whereby Colleges have the flexibility, by making 
regulations, to create a system which aligns and is compatible with their members, 
but within the legislative framework." The ADR legislation has "three or four central 
tenets, but is otherwise a framework." They emphasized that since the legislation 
deals with "23247 different communities who not only would have a different vision of 
what ADR is, but would also possibly be dealing with a different notion of what a 
complaint is, and the subject matter of a complaint can vary so dramatically within 
one College, never mind across the spectrum, ... reflecting that it is a very, very 
broad church. There's no getting away from that. As a result of that, you still have to 
try and find some consistencies for the reasons we've just mentioned. In something 
that impacts so directly on the public's participation in those processes, they should 
not be influenced by professional culture. I think arguably you could say that, 
without the legislation, there would be 28248 different [ADR processes] potentially, or 
not, as the case may be. So you have that situation where you're going into one shop 
to get the answers as opposed to going to 28. But certainly it's really only intended to 
be a framework. It's not prescriptive. It's intended to be a framework, and so the 
flexibility arguably is there .... There's not an extensive structured process in terms of 
how this works. There are some very simple and common notions of fairness, and 
247 Two Colleges regulate two different professions. 
248 Reference to 23 existing and 5 new self-regulating professions. 
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consistency with other legislation, but beyond that, there's lots of opportunities for 
Colleges to be creative." 
In response to a final question about the clarity of the legislation, they concluded the 
interview as follows: 
You could argue that there are several places in the RHP A where there may 
be, shall we say, procedural holes. It's not necessarily intended, but at the 
same time, the Colleges have a responsibility to ensure that they're conducting 
a process with all due fairness and with necessary consent. What I find so 
interesting is that this has raised a number of debates, which, in my opinion, 
have been raging all the way since ADR has begun, and the very fact that it 
was being used at all within the system. So, yes, it's in the legislation now, 
but it was always being used, so these things were always a possibility. I think 
it's interesting that people are thinking about these now, but I think with 
respect to what actually happens, we probably will have to wait and see and 
cross that bridge when we come to it. There's nothing in terms of a 
requirement for a formal review [of the legislation], but the health minister 
seems to be fond of writing letters to HPRAC, so something may tum up at 
some point in that respect, so you never know. But is anything planned 
currently, formally? No, not at this time, but that's not to say that as things 
play out, which they certainly will, and the various consequences - intended 
or otherwise -come into view, then who knows? We'll see. 
4.2 B Colleges, Consultants & HP ARB 
In reviewing and sorting the College key informants' answers to the first question 
area, "How did the ADR legislation come about? What gave rise to the ADR 
legislation?" the response analysis produced some common themes, with individual 
variations and emphases. 
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When asked about the background and what gave rise to the ADR legislation, the 
three most frequent responses were the perceived need to: 
1. improve public protection; 
2. authorize/legitimize ADR as a valid form of complaint resolution; and 
3. limit professional self-regulation. 
Other responses, in descending order of frequency, were the perceived need to: 
4. bring consistency to the ADR processes among Colleges; 
5. bring the regulatory College complaints resolution process into 
alignment with the use of ADR in other areas; and 
6. respond to media and political pressures from the wider community. 
The Perceived Need to Improve Public Protection 
The RHP A stipulates that the Duty of a health regulatory College in carrying out its 
Objects is "to serve and protect the public interest."249 A majority of individuals 
interviewed, across the spectrum of College size and experience with ADR, asserted 
that the primary reason for the ADR legislation was to improve public protection 
within the complaints resolution process. This would be accomplished through clear 
direction, structures and expectations, leading to greater accountability. Increased 
accountability leading to greater focus on the public, as opposed to professional 
interests, was cited by several of the respondents. "I suspect it was a legitimate 
concern about whether ADR processes are in the public interest or whether they're in 
249 RHPA, 1991, c 18, Schedule. 2, s 3 (2) 
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the interest of the profession." Putting it in legislation was seen to "ensure that the 
loop was closed in terms of accountability" (SC6). The legislation was perceived to 
be necessary to address "lingering concerns about what's going on in this ADR 
alternative resolution realm" (MC3), because ADR "was seen as something that 
regulators did behind the scenes and had the potential to give the impression of 
professional self interest. 'We'll take care of our own, thank you very much,' in a 
process that isn't public" (LC3). 
There is a sense at the Ministry (and they're quite blunt about it) that Colleges 
need to be more accountable and transparent. I think that this was one of 
those: to be more accountable and transparent. There's no transparency 
behind closed-doors ADR. And there's no accountability that stays out of the 
public process and realm. (MC3) · · 
These concerns were perceived to be held by "politicians" and "maybe an unease 
even among consumers, that, because it wasn't in statute, it might be used differently 
by different Colleges, and that it might allow a little sweeping under the rug of some 
things and allow some things to go below the radar" (SC6). "The public says, 'Self-
regulation is a crock. They're just protecting their own" (SC7). The media, too, were 
seen to have influenced the legislation. "There was a perception out there that ADR 
was a fast way to sweep things under the rug, and there was no accountability, and 
'Let's get rid of it.' I think the media drove a lot of that: 'backroom dealings,' and all 
that kind of stuff. Because there were no rules around it, it was easy for those who 
weren't familiar with the process to perceive how it was being abused or a way to 
cover things up" (MC2). "Sadly the media reports some things, and I think that that 
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can give self-regulation a bad name, I think unfairly. But that might be the motivating 
factor behind a lot of the regulatory changes that we see coming our way" (SCI). 
Several College informants commented that, prior to the legislation, the majority of 
College ADR processes were being conducted with respect for accountability and 
public protection, and that policymakers and decision-makers were responding, "as 
they should," to "the minority of cases where there was serious concern", but "losing 
sight of all the good stuff that was happening without public interest issues" (SC5). 
Colleges with "well-founded ADR programs" were perceived to be using them 
"successfully to deal with patient concerns" and to effect systemic changes within 
healthcare institutions (MC2). However, there was also a perception among College 
informants, referred to indirectly by several, and directly by a few, that, indeed, 
"some Colleges had ADR that was cooked, so the public did not have confidence in 
that process", leading the "the Minister and the Government and the public" to 
conclude that those Colleges were "not doing their job" in disposing of misconduct 
through "a quiet, confidential meeting and burying it" (MC4). 
One informant commented that some Colleges, in an attempt to manage their high 
volume of complaints, had started to become more "aggressive" in "channeling some 
complaints away from the complaints committee investigation process" (Cl). They 
were not being "unscrupulous" in doing so: it being a "survival mode" and an 
"understandable way" to cope with the overwhelming volume of complaints they 
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were receiving. In some of these cases, the perception was that complainants may 
have been encouraged to accept the member's apology, as arranged by the College, 
and, assuming they were satisfied with this outcome, to withdraw their complaint, 
without further investigation. This summary, informal resolution without an 
investigation may have led, in some instances, to systemic misconduct by the member 
being missed, along with the opportunity to remediate or sanction the conduct. It was 
also suggested that, prior to the legislation, a College might have the same person 
attempt to mediate a complaint between the complainant and the member, and, if the 
complaint could not be resolved, and with the information learned in the attempted 
mediation, take on the investigation of the complaint, thus potentially compromising 
the integrity of the College investigation process. 
Perceived Need to Legitimize the Use of ADR 
Some informants believed that the primary reason for the ADR legislation was to 
ensure it was seen as a legitimate, Government-authorized form of complaints 
resolution and part of the complaints resolution process. A few informants identified 
public protection and legitimation of the ADR process for complaints resolution as 
equal principal reasons for the ADR process to be enshrined in the RHP A. "I think 
there were two pressures - one to create safeguards and one from the Colleges saying 
we're not sure we're allowed to do this unless the legislation tells us we're allowed to 
do it. So it would empower those folks, I think" (MC3). "I have no proof, but I got 
the sense that it was legitimizing what a lot of the Colleges were already doing. A lot 
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of the bigger Colleges had a robust type of ADR program. It was going on and we 
need to put some framework around it and give that option to other Colleges to follow 
if they want" (SC4). 
Several informants suggested that discussions about the legitimacy of ADR for 
complaints resolution had been going on for some time among the Colleges. "There 
was divergence among the Colleges as to whether ADR was permitted or not. There 
were many who felt that they would have comfort if it was put in as an option related 
to the activity" (MC2). Two of the College informants stated that they thought any 
discomfort about legitimacy was exacerbated by legal opinion some Colleges 
received from nervous College lawyers concerned about insufficient legal 
authorization for the use of the process. "There are lawyers who said, 'To protect 
yourself, you [the College] need to get ADR in the legislation.' That isn't the advice 
we got, but it's possible that there have been some who were reticent to use it and this 
was seen as a way to support that. What we didn't want to see was that every 
complaint had to be investigated and this was a way to ensure it was seen as a 
legitimate regulatory response to a complaint" (LC3). 
The view that the ADR legislation was not required to legitimize its use was 
supported by several informants from Colleges that had developed ADR programs. 
One informant commented that he had been informed by "several lawyers and 
authorities in this area" that the basis for implementing ADR programs before this 
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legislation was a clause in the RHP A, with specific reference to the complaints 
process, that sanctioned "'other actions not inconsistent with the Act.' That was what 
everybody hung their hat on and said that means they could approve an ADR because 
that's not inconsistent with the Act. The Act is about public protection and managing 
these complaints" {Cl). Another key informant viewed the whole of the previous 
version of the RHP A as unrestrictive and open to a fairly wide interpretation of means 
to accomplish the legislation's goals. "We've never looked at the legislation as 
restrictive. You can opt to do that in a lot of ways and not just the ADR. We've 
looked at it generally as an opportunity to be innovative and creative as long as we 
are meeting and enhancing our mandate. All of the objects can be interpreted as 
either, 'It's the road and here it is,' or 'There are many paths.' But with that previous 
legislation, you had the diversity of where people would say, 'Well, it's not in there, 
so we can't do it,' which is about looking at it from a half-empty, rather than a half-
full perspective. So I think it's intended to be an enabler" (MC2). 
Some informants were frustrated by the concerns of those who worried about ADR's 
legitimacy, which caused them to resist using it. 
When RHP A came into place there was a reluctance to harness this kind of 
vehicle unless it was clearly provided for in the legislation. There was talk 
about that, so you'd get questions at meetings like, "Are we allowed?" Of 
course, for the Colleges that had been doing this for a long time, it's like the 
nine-headed question, "What do you mean, 'Are you allowed?' It's called 
Alternative Dispute Resolution! By its very nature it's meant to be an 
alternative to the formal stream." But I think that's why it [the legislation] 
came about. (MC3) 
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Perceived Need to Standardize ADR Processes 
Several informants believed that the legislation was needed in order to standardize the 
ADR processes in use or contemplated in the various Colleges. Various informal and 
more formal complaints resolution procedures were being followed and there was 
significant inconsistency among them. 
ADR processes were all over the map. Some Colleges already have this 
process in place to a "T". Some don't have anything, and some are like us -
they were in the process of coming up with something. Most big Colleges 
have some kind of formalized ADR process, like the College of Nurses -
because, with that number of complaints, you would expect them to have 
something very, very streamlined. And they do. (SC3) 
The legislation as an effort to standardize already existing and new processes was 
also linked to the growing use of ADR in other dispute resolution contexts. "If you 
walk outside the regulatory community, certainly mediation is done in a lot of other 
venues, as not only a case management tool, but as a value to the individuals, and so 
there's no reason why we shouldn't have it here, and it should be supported" (MC2). 
As another informant pointed out, "The ADR movement had come in with quite a 
force in other areas of law and naturally Colleges chose to use ADR- some formally, 
in the true sense, with facilitators, parties, agreements, and so on; but informal 
resolution was also taking place" (SC5). However, a few informants saw the "trend" 
to ADR as part of a Government strategy, perceived, somewhat cynically, as an 
attempt to win public support by appearing to empower greater collaboration between 
the public and the Colleges. 
I don't know where the genesis of that came from, to be perfectly honest, 
whether the Government thought it would be trendy to throw it in there and 
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make it look like it was empowering people to be more collaborative. I don't 
know. At the time that the legislation was drafted, was there anything going 
on in terms of society or anything that was happening that would have let the 
drafters or the policy makers think, "Maybe this is a prudent piece to put in"? 
I don't know. 
I mean, the family law courts make it mandatory now, and I can understand 
that that's because they don't want to clog up the system potentially. I mean, I 
think that was driven by "Let's try and take a stream there that maybe can 
function in another stream; take a bunch in one stream and put them in another 
stream." LC 1 
The Perceived Need for Increased Efficiency 
Only a few informants suggested that the purpose of the ADR legislation was to 
achieve greater efficiency or public cost savings. One College official saw it as a way 
of reducing the number of appeals that would go to the publicly funded Health 
Professions Appeal and Review Board. In this way, the perceived backlog ("a whole 
whack of appeals") at the Board would be reduced along with direct costs to the 
public purse. Imagining themselves as the Government officials, they reasoned: 
We'll reduce the backlog at the Complaints Committee level, so that they 
don't have to reach as many arbitrated decisions and the way to do that is let 
the parties, between themselves, reach an agreement. We'll put in some 
safeguards. One safeguard is that it has to be approved by the ICRC, but at 
least then you're guaranteed that it's not going to be appealed and we don't 
have to pay the folks down at the Appeal Board on this backlog. I think that's 
the motivation [behind the ADR legislation]. (SC2) 
All the Colleges, except the College of Midwives,250 are funded entirely by their 
membership, mainly through the payment of annual fees. The whole complaints 
(mainly investigative) and discipline (tribunal) system, apart from the Appeal and 
250 And the 5 Transitional Councils preparing for proclamation in 2013 or later (Kinesiology, 
Naturopathy, Psychotherapy, Tradtional Chinese Medicine, and Homeopathy) 
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Review Board and the Divisional Court to which College decisions can be referred, is 
funded by the individual members of each profession. One interviewee had formed 
the impression that the Government tended to pay particular attention to those 
Colleges where the public health insurance scheme pays for the services of its 
members. This would be a reason for the Government to try to achieve greater 
efficiency in the complaints resolution between those health professionals and the 
public they serve, including resolving complaints quickly and to the client's 
satisfaction. 
When Government thinks of self-regulated professions, there's a divide 
between publicly funded and privately funded, and their concern has been 
more towards publicly funded. That's where the public money goes in the 
system, so it almost does create a two-tier system where you've got publicly 
funded and you get privately funded, and publicly funded is where their focus 
is. (SCI) 
A Perceived Trend toward Power Shifting 
A few informants appeared genuinely baffled by the Government's decision to 
legislate ADR, while a significant minority interpreted the ADR legislation as another 
example of Government acting principally to serve political, rather than public 
interest purposes. One common theme that emerged was the ADR legislation as 
another example of the Government's move to curtail professional regulatory 
autonomy. "In the last couple of years, it seems that the federal government, the 
provincial government, and different branches within the provincial government are 
looking at regulation and self-regulation, and there's greater demands being placed on 
regulatory Colleges" (SC 1). 
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At the time of the interviews, the Government had introduced draft legislation giving 
it authority to appoint a supervisor to take over the affairs of a College that was 
deemed by the Minister to be failing in carrying out important aspects of its duties 
and objects. During the interviews, a majority of informants spontaneously expressed 
frustration with this initiative and with the manner of its introduction. Several College 
key informants described this as an excessive and unnecessary step, given that the 
existing legislation provided the authority for the Minister of Health and Long-Term 
Care to require a College to do anything she or he requested it to do. They reported 
that they had not received clear answers to their questions about why the power to 
appoint a supervisor to take over a College was necessary, nor had they had a 
response to their offer to sit down with Government officials to discuss how the 
problem the Government perceived might be remedied.251 
While the legislated authority to appoint a supervisor was not seen to be directly 
related to the ADR legislation, the ADR legislation became linked in the interview to 
a perceived trend to diminish the level of autonomy in professional self-regulation. 
I think there's a movement -- there's a belief that there's a movement for more 
regulatory control by the Government on self-regulating bodies. So certainly 
the appointment of a supervisor sort of speaks to that. ADR does not 
necessarily speak to that, I don't think. I don't know why they did it. ... There 
251 Since these interviews were completed, and following a Government-appointed independent 
consulting firm review of one College's practices (one interviewed for this case study), the Minister 
appointed a supervisor to oversee the College's affairs. See Appendix A for more on the possible 
impact of the timing of the interviews. 
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is talk about, well, look what happened in England. I mean, we may end up 
not having- the government may take it all back. I can't imagine why they 
would do that. (LC 1) 
It's just raising a lot of concern right now that the movement is moving away 
from self-regulation, and that can only stem from trust issues. So what are we 
getting wrong, and how do we get it back on track? I think that rather than 
reacting negatively to these things, there has been a lot of leadership [in the 
regulatory community] and a lot of maturity to try to understand what is the 
problem, what is the issue, and show them [Government] we will work with 
you to solve the issue or the problem. And that to me shows such a level of 
commitment and maturity, and a commitment to make self-regulation work. 
(SCI) 
One informant viewed the intention behind the ADR legislation as Government 
wishing to appear more open and collaborative with the public on the one hand, while 
at the same time moving to curtail the autonomy of the self-regulatory Colleges. 
We asked ourselves why they put this ADR in the legislation and we couldn't 
understand why, other than this particular government is into interprofessional 
collaboration and alternative processes. They're trying to be more open, and 
that is probably the motivation- "Look what we've done, we've established a 
whole new process for ADR," rather than letting the Colleges themselves 
identify when that process could work for them and work for their members. 
It's quite interesting to try to understand the motivation behind it, but it seems 
to me that it's kind of the flavour of this particular government. They're 
passing a lot of legislation and there's been this whole emphasis on 
collaboration, more open processes, and certainly they're putting their oar a 
lot more in the water with regulatory colleges - treating us more like agencies 
rather than self-regulatory bodies. So the level of accountability and 
monitoring is at a level we've never seen before. (MCI) 
For at least two informants, the ADR legislation reflected a purely political agenda. 
One saw the Government as "interfering," and with "no concept of the political effect 
they are having on the regulatory Colleges." Specifically, the Minister of the time was 
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perceived as taking a heavy hand with the regulatory Colleges to demonstrate his 
ability to "shake things up" as a way of furthering his own political career. "A lot of 
changes were driven by that particular Minister of Health ... and what has happened 
is a huge burden on the Colleges. And at the end of it, do I think public protection has 
been enhanced? I don't think it has. If you can see the public protection 
enhancement, it would have been worth doing. But I don't see that it has" (MCI). 
For the other interviewee with a strong political perspective on what gave rise to the 
ADR legislation, the Government's actions were motivated by scandals that reflected 
on the Government's own accountability and transparency. The Government's 
response was to clamp down very publicly on bodies within their control, adding 
further accountability and transparency requirements on them. In this way, this 
somewhat cynical, though not unique view held, the Government could be seen by 
the public to be taking firm action to increase accountability and transparency, while 
deflecting attention away from its own problems with public accountability. A 
number of recent scandals were mentioned in connection with this perception of how 
the ADR legislation came about. 
Every time they have a scandal in their own system that shows how woefully 
bad they are at accountability and transparency, they're going to crank it up 
for us because they control the legislation. So how you respond to criticism 
that you aren't accountable and transparent is to say, "Well, all of our 
regulatory bodies are going to be made more accountable and transparent. Or 
agencies." And that response works. The media laps it up and it's front-page 
news, and everybody goes, "Whew! That's taken care of." ... So it's sort of a 
political answer to scandal. But I believe it's also a reflection of what 
politicians believe their constituents are interested in .... There's always a 
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reason why things come to what they come to. And if you can address the 
interests that pushed the agenda, then you have a chance of controlling the 
way it plays out. (MC3) 
4.3 SECOND QUESTION SET/CLUSTER: In your opinion, how appropriate is 
the ADR legislation? 
General View of the Legislation 
Several of the College officials interviewed believed that the ADR legislation 
managed to strike a balance between flexibility and the principles of transparency and 
accountability. They commented on the need to accommodate difference, while 
ensuring public protection, principally through having the ICRC approve the 
agreement, if any, that results from an ADR process. 
What's in the RHPA now is good because it recognizes ADR and keeps ADR 
within the complaints process and clearly keeps the panel or the committee 
involved and clearly states that they have to make that final disposition and 
that means that all of the transparency provisions apply. They have found a 
way to keep the flexibility of the informal resolutions or informal ADR, but 
keeping the control of the ICRC, as I think they should. The combination of 
the new transparency provisions and what goes on the public Register, with 
the ADR provisions, I think is very much in the public interest, and very good. 
(SC5) 
Several Colleges, mostly those who thought they had participated in some way in the 
process that preceded the finalization of the legislation, viewed the legislation fairly 
positively, as the best that could have been expected or hoped for, under the 
circumstances. One stated that, while they "like[ d] the legislation," the legislation 
was not really needed. However, "there is nothing in there that is particularly 
offensive" (MC4). Another commented that the legislation was "not a big change 
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from what we were already doing," and "the way they wrote it in the legislation was 
better than we thought it would be" (SC6). Another informant offered a more 
qualified evaluation of the legislation, focusing on the legislation's perceived 
inflexibility: "I don't know that any harm has been done [with this legislation], but 
know that not as much potential good was done with this legislation as could have 
been done. The College's flexibility has been reduced significantly" (SC2). 
Similarly, the legislation was viewed somewhat negatively as "a very formal process 
with formal outcomes" (SC4). As one informant stated, "I haven't heard any of my 
colleagues saying that this is an improvement now, just because it's alternate dispute 
resolution. I think it should have been left" (SC3). 
The following three statements reflect the sentiments of several key College 
informants in emphasizing the loss of flexibility that they perceived to be a core value 
of the ADR approach: 
We lost that flexibility by putting it in legislation, and some things would 
work for us. For other Colleges, they may work differently. This way, it's 
quite rigid. Then you still have to ratify it. And there's a lot of little details 
involved that some people may say, "Oh well, why bother?" Of course, you 
have to have a policy and some kind of rules, but it should have left it for the 
Colleges to do, specific to their needs. If it's an alternate dispute resolution, it 
should not be formal: papers and signing and consents. It should just be 
spontaneous and informal. That's what we had before. The public may not 
understand how it all then plays together: "This is the list of rules and this is 
how it's going to happen." I would say, "Whoa, what is this now?" And this 
is before even going through the "formal" process. (SC3) 
We questioned why is it still called an alternative dispute resolution process 
when it's now ingrained in the legislation. It no longer seems to be 
alternative. It seems to be a concept that needed not to be ingrained in 
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legislation. That was our first question - Is this now really ADR, now that it's 
ingrained? There's nothing "alternative" about legislation! (MCI) 
Once you talk about ADR in your legislation, and you say what the 
"alternative" is, that's the end to the alternatives, isn't it? Whereas in the old 
system, when it was silent, people could go and, on consent, create whatever 
they felt was appropriate, given their mandate and their objectives, and the 
needs of the people involved. But now you can't do that. Because now, if 
you've got an alternative, the legislation's pretty clear about how that's got to 
run and the way it has to look. I just think that now that creativity is gone, and 
that's really sad, because if you're a fan of ADR, it's the creativity and the 
ability to create appropriate resolutions for the parties involved, and for the 
circumstances involved - the best possible solution. You will never be able to 
legislate that type of program because it's too individualized. So I think that's 
a sad tradeoff for I'm not sure that much more in terms of public protection or 
oversight. I think it made sense to let people know they could do it, because 
clearly some folks didn't. It's the restrictive pieces that are just too restrictive. 
(MC3) 
The view that the process had been made so restrictive and so structured that it was 
unusable (and no longer the effective, informal "alternative" that encouraged its use 
previously) was expressed by several of the College informants. The College of 
Physicians and Surgeons had made the point to HPRAC in its submission on the 
recommended changes to the Act regarding ADR. CPSO supported a definition of 
alternative dispute resolution in the legislation as "an important step forward,'' and 
supported the goals of having such legislation. "Used properly, [ADR] is more 
efficient and expeditious, cheaper, and generates more positive outcomes than the 
traditional model," including "broad system outcomes." However, CPSO viewed the 
"elaborate system" proposed by HPRAC as "unworkable." "The College's concern 
is that these goals will not be achieved by the system envisioned, which is complex 
and cumbersome. We would support a truly informal process and certainly agree that 
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in order to invoke that process, all involved should agree to participate in it' 
(LC2)."252 Another informant echoed this view, saying that the new legislated process 
was "laborious" and "complicated," and impossible to carry out without legal 
counsel's advice. "What if you make a mistake? What if something serious happened 
and it really shouldn't have gone to ADR?" 
There's going to have to be all kinds of policies around what's ADR and what 
isn't, and when can we do it. For the people who have been using it and using 
it well, it is most unfortunate. If I were them, I would be using it less. Now 
you've made it so complicated, it doesn't have the same spirit. And if you 
destroy the spirit, it's not going to work, or not as well. (C2) 
If we were to embrace this, it would require significant resources. It was never 
embraced. We told [the Government] that it wasn't going to be usable in its 
current form and they elected to do it. It's not usable. There's no 
consequence, either intended or unintended. It's simply like it doesn't exist 
for us. (LC2) 
Interestingly, however, one of the Colleges, considered by other members of the 
regulatory community as a leader in the use of ADR, stated that the right balance had 
been achieved in the legislation between formality and flexibility, which they had 
advocated for in consultations with HPRAC and the Ministry. 
We were successful in getting it left broad. There were some Colleges that 
wanted to define what the ADR process would look like and we really resisted 
that. First of all, there's a cultural element. Different professions have 
different cultures. Ours is based on standards, and not every College has 
standards. Yes, they have something you and I would recognize as a standard, 
but they may call it something else. They may call it a policy. They may call it 
a professional statement - a position. But the more you legislate, the trickier it 
gets, and the less leeway you have. There are different approaches to [ ADR ], 
252 Supra note 6 
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not what's "right" or "wrong." But we did not want to be stuck in a box. 
(LC3) 
ADR Provisions in the Act 
During the interviews, informants offered their views of different provisions of the 
ADR legislation in response to the questions regarding the appropriateness of this 
particular ADR legislation. Their comments were largely spontaneous, although 
follow-up questions were asked to probe for clarification in order to ensure 
understanding. Informants' comments on the provisions are included below, in the 
order the provisions appear in the legislation. Ranked in order of frequency and 
importance to the respondents, there is no question that the provisions giving rise to 
the greatest concern were Timely Disposal (28. (1)) Not affected by ADR (28.2); 
Confidentiality (25 .1 (2) ); and Facilitator not to participate (25 .1 (3) ). These aspects 
of the legislation elicited strong comments from the full range of College, Consultant 
and HPARB informants, as will be seen below. 
Definitions 
One of the relevant definitions in the Act is the definition of ADR, which was added 
to the Act, as follows: 
"alternative dispute resolution process" means mediation, conciliation, 
negotiation, or any other means of facilitating the resolution of issues in 
dispute; ("processus dereglement extrajudiciaire des differends") RHPA 
Schedule 2, I ( 1) 
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None of the respondents offered any comment on the range of possible ADR 
mechanisms that could be employed in the ADR process. Most informants who 
discussed the process as they saw it unfolding appeared to imagine a mediation 
process, with two parties assisted in conducting a dialogue by a neutral third party 
whom they referred to as the "mediator" or "facilitator." Since they were not asked 
how they would describe each of the processes during the interview, it is outside the 
scope of this enquiry to establish what alternatives to mediation they might envisage 
occurring. The overall concern regarding the ADR process itself was with when the 
formal process would begin to apply. , This led to significant discussion of the other 
area of definition in the legislation. 
The other relevant "definition" is not technically a definition within the legislation, 
but does suggest how a "complaint" comes to be qualified as a "complaint," to which 
the ADR legislation would apply. Some informants appeared to be relying on the 
potential for these provisions to narrow the definition of a complaint and widen the 
scope of how they might handle a matter addressed to the College by a member of the 
public regarding a member of the College. 
Panel for investigation or consideration 
25. (1) A panel shall be selected by the chair of the Inquiries, Complaints and 
Reports Committee from among the members of the Committee to investigate a 
complaint filed with the Registrar regarding the conduct or actions of a member or to 
consider a report that is made by the Registrar under clause 79 (a). 
Complaint must be recorded 
(4) A panel shall not be selected to investigate a complaint unless the complaint is in 
writing or is recorded on a tape, film, disk or other medium. 
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It became clear during the interviews that these legal provisions both restricted the 
nature of a complaint, in terms of whether it was subject to the ADR legislation, and 
offered openings to evade the formal process by allowing non-written, initial, 
informal communications and approaches to the College by members of the public to 
be classified as contacts, communications, enquiries, educational opportunities, but 
not necessarily as "complaints" as the new legislation appeared to be defining a 
complaint. First, the Act determines that a "complaint" will be something "filed with 
the Registrar," leaving open the interpretation of a) what action constitutes filing and 
limiting the said "filing" to a communication with the Registrar (and leaving the 
status less clear of a communication made to another College staff member), and 
hence b) whether the approach is a complaint or has not yet become a complaint. 
Second, the formal complaints investigation process is not triggered until and unless 
the complaint is received in a written or recorded format. This provision, according 
to many of those interviewed, left open the possibility that the ADR process as 
prescribed is not legally required to be followed until such time as the complaint is 
received in written or recorded form by the Registrar. 
We don't consider [phone enquiries] complaints. You know, a complaint has 
to be in a written or recorded format. So it's not a complaint when we get a 
phone call. It's not a complaint unless it says, "This is a complaint against so-
and-so," or if it comes in in another format. Because what I see is an enquiry. 
"I have an issue. I have a question. I don't know what to do with this. I don't 
know if it's a complaint or a concern." I perceive the difference in approach 
that lawyers take to the law. For some lawyers, it's the absolute letter of the 
law, with a rigidity and a fear that is very restrictive. Whereas I have worked 
with other lawyers who respect the law absolutely, and especially the spirit of 
the law, but appreciate that where the law is not clear, as long as you respect 
the principles behind the law, you should be able to use some of the 
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ambiguity. And sometimes that's where they actually intersect. A complaint 
is defined. And it's in recorded form, so why are you worried about a 
telephone conversation? That is not a recorded form. You're not even 
exploiting the ambiguity, you are exploiting the clarity that's there, so you 
have some flexibility. If your basic fundamental personality wants to define 
everything similar to be ADR, then you get all tied up, and that's the 
personality of some of the lawyers in this system and some of the people in 
the system and I respect that. They' re not wrong, but I tend to go down to 
fundamentals. It's about service and protection to the public. If I say, "I can't 
talk to you, it's not in writing. It's not a complaint unless it's in writing. Give 
it to me in writing," it's not a good service. Where there's ambiguity, 
ultimately you challenge it and a court of law decides it. That can be 
expensive and I think that's why some people get tied up- they don't like to 
be challenged. (SC5) 
Consent and Matters That May Be Referred to ADR 
Alternative dispute resolution with respect to a complaint 
25.1 (1) The Registrar may, with the consent of both the complainant and the 
member, refer the complainant and the member to an alternative dispute resolution 
process, 
(a) if the matter has not yet been referred to the Discipline Committee under section 
26; and (b) if the matter does not involve an allegation of sexual abuse. 
Consent 
Several informants referred to the provision with respect to the complainant and the 
member each having to consent to participate in the ADR process. One informant 
believed that it was not required to put this in the legislation, because "in ADR, you 
have to have both parties who agree, otherwise you're not going anywhere" (LC3). 
Another informant also questioned the consent provision and read into its inclusion a 
discouraging and even insulting further example of the lack of trust between the 
Government and the regulatory Colleges, if such an obvious aspect of ADR had to be 
legislated. 
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If you read this [the ADR legislation] and you knew nothing about ADR, you 
would get the impression that ADR was somehow non-consensual. Because 
why would you have to regulate it if the people involved are fully consenting 
to what it is that is going on? When you read it you think, "Weren't the 
people consenting to have it taken out of the formal process and didn't they 
always have the right to take it back to the formal process?" You get the sense 
that that wasn't happening and that was happening. So even the optics of the 
way it is written is distrustful. We as Colleges have become quite used to that 
- that it's a distrustful approach to say we need to specify this, and, what is 
unsaid, because Colleges have not been taking steps to safeguard these 
processes up till now. And I think that that's an unfair impression to leave 
with the public. (MC3) 
Another informant, however, saw the situation regarding consent quite differently. 
In the past, I think nobody ever got consent from anybody to participate in this 
process. They were getting some level of informed consent about what they 
were participating in, but it was probably very inconsistent, because it was all 
verbal, and different people would say different things, and, frankly, I suspect 
people would say whatever they felt they had to say to convince the person to 
participate. So, I think it's a good thing that the legislation has said, yes, you 
need to get consent, because I think that that results in the Colleges taking a 
more appropriate approach to ensuring that people are properly informed, and 
they understand they can back out of it, and that if they do back out of it, it's 
not going to be held against them, and anything they say is going to be 
without prejudice, and not going to be an issue for them at some point down 
the road. (Cl) 
Some informants who commented on the consent requirement in the legislation also 
addressed the protocols of the consent process, as they understood it, though it is not 
actually covered in the legislation. One concern was the order of seeking consent. A 
College informant emphasized the importance of seeking the consent of the member 
complained about first, and only after obtaining their agreement, seeking the consent 
of the complainant to participate in the ADR process. 
We made a conscious decision to go that route, in part because it takes a lot of 
effort for a complainant to file a complaint at a College, and we recognize 
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that. Often they do so because they felt victimized somehow by the registrant 
or by something that happened in relation to their care, and so we didn't want 
to victimize them twice. We didn't want to offer them ADR first, get them all 
excited about it, and then go to the registrant and the registrant says, "Uh-uh, 
I'm not touching that. I'm going to make my written submissions." Then we 
would have to go back to the complainant and say, "Sorry, technically you 
may feel victimized twice now because the registrant doesn't want to engage 
in this process with you." (MC2) 
However, the difficulties of getting consent from the complainant was delaying and 
even undermining the process in at least one College. This College had sent a 
"Consent to the ADR process" letter to an elderly complainant, and, even following 
several telephone conversations to explain the process and the need for consent, had 
not yet received the signed form. Without the signed form, this College Registrar 
believed they could not proceed with the ADR process. 
I think because it's very formalized (the letter that goes out), maybe people 
are intimidated by that. Maybe they don't understand it clearly. They might 
be skeptical or they have a fear that if they consent to this, that they're bound 
to this, and that's when I spoke to the complainant. I said, "Well, this is 
strictly voluntary and you can pull out at any time. Our letter states that, so 
really from that perspective, you don't have to see the practitioner. You don't 
have to talk to the practitioner. You can let the facilitator know that you're 
looking for a refund. If you don't like the way that it's working out, you can 
step away from the process." And she had said, "Oh, well, okay, then I'll 
consent to doing it." And I said, "Well, then you need to complete the form 
and send it in to us." I was led to believe that she understood the process, but 
for whatever reason, we still haven't received her Consent, and because this is 
a new process, we're trying to figure out how we should administer this. 
(SCI) 
Matters That May Be Referred to ADR 
The Ministry key informants to this study pointed out that, under the new ADR 
legislation, Colleges would have to be "very, very careful about the types of 
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complaints that you put through an ADR system. So that is what the legislation now 
says. Clearly, as a result of that, Colleges will have to think a bit more carefully 
about the types of cases that go through ADR." Several informants referred to the 
provision that prohibits using ADR in a case of sexual abuse, as it is defined in the 
legislation.253 There don't appear to be other prohibitions in the legislation against 
the use of ADR to resolve a complaint, though nearly all the College informants 
believed that it would be wise to exclude certain types of "serious" complaints from 
ADR, although each College official interviewed had a slightly different perception 
of what, other than sexual abuse, should be excluded, and what process should be 
followed for determining whether a particular type of complaint would be deemed 
eligible for ADR. 
The law is clear: nothing related to sexual abuse. In the past we have not 
looked at competency as for ADR. I am seeing some files where that might 
be a possibility. Not a public complaint. We're exploring the options as the 
complaints and reports come in. (SC5) 
So there's no billing fraud in our stuff. There's certainly no sexual abuse, no 
criminal behaviour. We're having a conversation right now about whether 
people that have multiple prior history can go through mediation or whether 
they can't. If it's similar fact or it's not similar fact, does that make a 
difference? Is there a recency of prior history that matters? So, all of those 
kinds of questions, we 're still sorting those through as we work through 
eligibility criteria. (MC2) 
253 Sexual abuse of a patient (3) In this Code, "sexual abuse" of a patient by a member means, (a) 
sexual intercourse or other forms of physical sexual relations between the member and the patient, (b) 
touching, of a sexual nature, of the patient by the member, or ( c) behaviour or remarks of a sexual 
nature by the member towards the patient. 1993, c. 37, s. 4. Exception (4) For the purposes of 
subsection (3), "sexual nature" does not include touching, behaviour or remarks of a clinical nature 
appropriate to the service provided. 1993, c. 37, s. 4. Health Professions Procedural Code 1.(1) The 
Code is deemed by section 4 of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 to be part of each health 
profession Act. 
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There are some criteria that are used to separate - So, for example, sexual 
abuse, a previous ADR would take that out as well, and there are a couple of 
others and I can look them up, but basically the first screen at intake of a 
complaint is, would the parties consider resolution? (LC3) 
Several of the key informants wondered out loud during the interviews about what 
might be appropriate matters for ADR, given the lack of more precise direction in the 
legislation. One area that arose consistently with different Colleges is that of refunds 
and restitution for unsatisfactory products or services. These matters are not within 
the jurisdiction of the ICRC, but informants were uncertain whether they might be 
"ADRable," and a convenient way to address these very common complaints in some 
professions. Some made the point, however, that, since the ICRC would have to 
approve the agreement,254 and since the ICRC has no jurisdiction over such matters, 
the agreement could not be approved by the Committee. Moreover, if the agreement 
were to fail in the execution, the ICRC would have no legitimate jurisdiction to 
enforce the agreement in matters outside its jurisdiction. Some informants viewed the 
open-endedness of possibilities apart from sexual abuse as an opportunity to take on 
issues that were common to their College, while other informants expressed concern 
about the ADR process opening the College to the role of a Civil or Small Claims 
Court and the attendant problems that would bring. 
254 See interview data on this provision on page 170 of this dissertation. 
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One aspect of the decision-making regarding eligibility that was addressed by key 
informants in this study was who establishes the criteria for referring a complaint to 
the ADR process and who makes the decision to refer to ADR. Some informants 
mentioned that the College ICRC members, assisted by College staff, and sometimes 
also by the College legal counsel, would determine appropriate criteria and then 
delegate the actual referrals to College staff - either the Registrar or Director/ 
Manager responsible for the complaints and discipline process. Other College senior 
staff noted that staff alone would make the decisions, that the Committee was "right 
out of it." Another approach reported was to have the committee briefly review a 
complaint and then approve its referral to ADR, if they deemed that appropriate .. 
I also think that the very serious complaints - the legislation speaks to sex 
abuse and other very serious complaints - I may be in violation of the statute, 
but I won't put to ADR. It's a staff committee that decides what goes to 
ADR, and, in my head, those matters are those that need to be fast-tracked or 
those matters that are not as serious - not sex abuse, supervised neglect or 
fraud- should really be dealt with in an alternate kind of process where the 
patient and the member, with an experienced mediator, can sit around and 
come up with a reasonable solution that both parties can participate in. (MC4) 
I think the legislation states that certain cases are exempt, which we would 
never do anyway. The committee would come up with criteria, then the 
discretion is mine as to which cases to send to ADR and then I would select a 
mediator and go from there. (SC7) 
Confidentiality 
(2) Despite this or any other Act, all communications at an alternative dispute 
resolution process and the facilitator's notes and records shall remain confidential and 
be deemed to have been made without prejudice to the parties in any proceeding. 
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This provision was described as the "black box," the "what goes on in ADR stays in 
ADR" provision by several informants, and was clearly the source of very serious 
questions and concerns. As one informant noted, there were Colleges that spoke to 
that concern during the legislative development process, citing public interest issues 
with learning of systemic or egregious conduct in the course of an ADR process, and 
not being able to use that information to take action to stop the behaviour and hold the 
member accountable. 
One of the provisions that fussed CPSO and CNO that didn't fuss me was the 
notion that what goes on in ADR stays in ADR. It's one of the reasons why 
the safety net is not to take the real serious ones, because, in the hands of a 
wily lawyer, I don't know what a member might say to keep things contained 
and excluded from other investigation. So for me the answer was to keep it 
confidential - absolutely. If it goes nowhere, we seal it. The Committee just 
gets the resolution. They don't get the whole ball of wax. But for [CPSO and 
CNO] it was an issue of, "It can't be confidential because we have a greater 
good and greater responsibility." The legislation does say that it is 
confidential. (MC4) 
One informant wondered whether there might not be "a creative way around it. I 
don't know if it is so serious as to pose a risk of harm or threat to the public, whether 
there could be an additional process so as to use the information if it is so deleterious. 
I know that in our ADR process we would get a better outcome if it were without 
prejudice" (SC5). 
Despite public interest concerns, one College accepted legal advice that "the black 
box is the black box," noting that" a lot of this is probably standard mediation 
protocol that they've just implemented, and, certainly, in some environments that 
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would make sense. But in the business of the public interest, public safety and 
healthcare, it seems probably a little too restrictive, so I'm sure there's a halfway 
balance in terms of meeting that mean and still being able to report on excessive 
things" (MC2b ). 
The Committee chair of a College ICRC recalled a session held among regulatory 
Colleges to discuss the provisions, where it was suggested that ADR could be used to 
acknowledge certain conduct, and, having it come out in ADR, would protect the 
member from subsequent prosecution for that conduct. 
There could be someone who had a lawyer who said, "You know what? Do 
ADR. This is your way to get off the hook on a lot of things that are 
potentially a risk to you." Then it could be abused and we wouldn't know the 
content of it either, because we don't see the black box. I just remember it 
from our training session with all the Colleges. People's heads were spinning 
around that and the potential for misuse, where we're facilitating people 
getting off, when that's not really the spirit of ADR. But I think everyone kind 
of came to the conclusion that if you're going to offer a process, you need a 
safeguard, and the black box is the ultimate safeguard. There's probably a 
percentage of people that would abuse that, but overall, that layer of 
protection is essential to the success of ADR. (MC2c) 
For more than one College, the risk in adopting a process with such potential for harm 
was the "deal-breaker" that had led them to avoid the ADR process altogether. The 
fact that the "black box' meant that College Committees had to take the agreement on 
faith, without supporting information was simply unacceptable. 
An agreement will be hammered out, and the Committee will rely on the fact 
that they believe a robust process has taken place. I think that's a big risk to 
the organization, and Committees will understand that risk. Certain 
Committee members will be very leery. They're going to start to ask all kinds 
of questions, and what's somebody going to say: "I'm sorry, we can't 
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disclose that?" The Committee is going to say, "Well, then, we're not 
prepared to accept this." Who knows? I think all of those things could 
happen. It's without prejudice and the member says, "Well, I was really hung 
over that day, and that's why I was rude." Now you've got suspected possible 
incapacity and you can't do anything with it. So we just decided we don't 
want to go there right now. Let some other College figure out how they're 
going to deal with that. (LC I) 
The HP ARB informant in addressing this issue reflected on the way the ADR 
legislation might be interpreted according to other aspects of the Act having to do 
with the powers and responsibilities of the ICRC and those of the HPARB. 
The ADR process is supposed to be private and the material is not supposed to 
be producible, at least the way the legislation is currently written, but 
something must be given to the ICRC in order for them to exercise their 
discretion, and there's no guidance as to what that discretion could entail. ... 
ADR is closed, but so is the complaints process closed at the College level. 
It's only when it comes to HP ARB that it's open. So all the material that is 
filed is actually confidential and, setting aside the ADR process, that's why to 
me it would seem that for the ICRC to make a decision, they need to look at 
the material that the ADR process revealed in order to exercise their 
discretion, very similar to the complaint review process. (HPARB) 
Facilitator not to participate 
(3) The person who acts as the alternative dispute resolution facilitator shall not 
participate in any proceeding concerning the same matter. 
The legislation is not that clear. It's pretty clear that who's involved in 
mediation can't be involved in investigation. That's a pretty clear message. 
(SC7) 
This provision, along with the Confidentiality and the Timely Disposal provisions 
elicited the strongest expressions of concern among the College key informants, 
whether from a large or small College. Many viewed this requirement as so costly 
and impractical that it would affect their ability to proceed with ADR at all. 
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In the smaller Colleges, the Director would be involved from intake to 
scheduling the discipline hearing. Since we are financially not able to hire 
anyone else and not able to use the Director, we would need to go outside to 
an external mediator. Costs arise from having to send it out. Larger Colleges 
have larger departments and resources. The problem is the unknown cost. 
(SC4) 
In terms of its impact on the College, the costs involved for this process 
increase substantially, because it was done internally by the College before. 
(SCI) 
Several informants questioned the point of the provision as it relates to the role of 
College staff, because, in their view, College staff members do not make the decision 
to accept or reject an agreement or to determine the outcome of a complaints process. 
That is the sole responsibility of the members of the College Inquiries, Complaints 
and Reports Committee (ICRC), comprising elected and Government-appointed 
College Council members and often other, non-elected, College-appointed 
professional members of the College. From the point of view of the principle of 
avoiding conflict of interest, these informants could not reconcile the legislated means 
with what they viewed as the purpose or ends of the provision. 
If you could have some overlap at the staff level, not at the decision-making 
level, but at the staff level (staff don't make decisions on complaints), if our 
staff resource to the ICRC could be the facilitator to the ADR, that would free 
up manpower and allow us to proceed. We wouldn't have to contract out with 
the higher expenses. (SC2) 
[The Government] must have had some reason for restricting it the way that 
they did. Maybe so that the issues would not be confused, so that whoever 
was mediating it was not involved in the investigation. For me, if I did the 
ADR, I simply facilitate the investigation, I don't make the major decisions 
about what happens, that's the Committee. I make the investigative decisions. 
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Maybe they thought that's too close. Our legal counsel advised us against it. 
(SC?) 
For most Colleges concerned about the provision, the challenge it presented was 
financial and logistical, in terms of access to human resources. Over and over, both 
larger and smaller Colleges perceived this provision as prohibitively costly. 
For many Colleges with a current complaints resolution process, this requirement was 
seen to necessitate a radical change in the way complaints resolution was handled. 
Once a staff or Committee member was involved in the ADR process, they could not 
be involved in the investigation. 
The big problem for us is, who will do the ADR process? If I do it, once it 
becomes a complaint, I cannot be involved in anything. I can't do any 
investigation. We would have to get an outside person to do the ADR and 
that's a problem for us. It's costly. It's who do we get? It complicates things. 
It's only me in the department and the coordinator. ... Every College now has 
to comply with this regardless of how big, how small, how many staff. This 
would be easier to implement if you had a ten-people department and then you 
say, "The two of you will be in charge of this, and the eight of us will ... " But 
here it's only me and the coordinator. That's it. And the receptionist, who 
could maybe get the beginning of somebody's story, but for the rest, we can't 
get any other help. (SC3) 
One informant noted that the difficulties this provision presented had been raised 
before the legislation was passed, but, in their view, the concerns expressed had been 
overlooked or ignored. 
Believe me, we really tried to get them to listen to us and said, "This is going 
to really penalize the smaller Colleges. If you 're trying to encourage this 
formally, because it's now ensconced in the legislation, you're certainly not 
facilitating it for the smaller Colleges." They didn't listen. I don't know why. 
I guess they thought there might be some sort of a conflict. HPRAC provided 
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advice to the Minister. It was presented to the Standing Committee. Nothing 
changed. We lost interest when nothing happened. (SC7) 
Other issues with this provision included how to find a qualified mediator and how to 
ensure the work was being carried out in a timely fashion, bearing in mind that the 
whole process, from intake to disposition, including any ADR and an adequate 
investigation, if required, must be accomplished within the legislated timeframe of 
150 days. 255 There was a concern that if the ADR process preceded an investigation, 
the ADR process might take significant time, and unless the mediator could tell early 
on in the process that an agreement was unlikely, it might mean having very limited 
time left within the timeframe to conduct an investigation. 
These are huge costs. Having an external mediator would be a bit of writing a 
blank cheque, because you don't know how long the complainant will drag 
this out. You need trust in the mediator that they will know when to stop, will 
know when it isn't going to work and refer it back. Any good mediator will 
know this early on - that this isn't going to reach an agreement and you cut 
your losses. (SC4) 
The alternative - to initiate the ADR process and have it run concurrently with an 
investigation - was seen to potentially prejudice the effectiveness of the ADR 
process. Informants commented on the "chilling" effect of a member's practice being 
investigated at the same time as they were expected to engage in good faith ADR 
negotiations with the assistance of a mediator/facilitator. 
255 See Timely Disposal findings at 174 of this dissertation 
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Two of the Colleges, with processes already in place and with adequate staff and 
financial resources, confirmed that the principle of separation to avoid conflicts of 
interest was valid and appropriate to be in the legislation. The second informant made 
it very clear that, despite the expense and practical challenges of what was being 
required, they viewed the benefit as justifying the cost of this provision to the College 
and its membership. 
The principle that anyone who participates in a .resolution will not be involved 
in any process that will follow as a result of the same complaint is an 
important one and we will certainly follow that. (LC3) 
We're smaller and we're very streamlined in terms of function, so we consult 
with an external mediator. They are not involved in any way in any 
discussions at the College tables. Certainly the information they get is the 
initial complaint and the contact information for the parties. They facilitate. 
They do one-to-one discussions or teleconferencing. We haven't had an in-
person session yet, although there will be a case, I'm sure, that will warrant 
that at some point. They prepare a report, after which it goes to the Committee 
with any resolution agreements, if they were obtained. We have a budget line 
for it right ·now, and our average cost is about $250 to $300 per case. So it's 
not excessive in terms of cost, and we were framing it in the sense of the 
public interest and what's beneficial for that patient at the time they filed the 
complaint. They may at the end of the [investigation] process get a written 
decision by the Committee that's written often in legalese and that might not 
address their needs for going through the process. If we can spend a little bit 
of money to assist them in walking away from their interaction with the 
member in a more positive way, and help them with their perception of the 
College and how we assisted them in coming to some closure, then that's 
probably money well spent. (MC2) 
Ratification of resolution 
(4) If the complainant and the member reach a resolution of the complaint through 
alternative dispute resolution, they shall advise the panel of the resolution, and the 
panel may, (a) cease its investigation of the complaint and adopt the proposed 
resolution; or 
(b) continue with its investigation of the complaint. 
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One of the key elements of this - something which all Colleges did - was to 
ensure that the Committee that was in charge- the statutory committee, be it 
the Complaints Committee or the ICR Committee - ratify the decision, so that 
there was the idea of it being in the public interest and maintaining the public 
interest rationale. (MHL TC) 
Actually, the whole of our self-regulatory system is all about the public 
interest. And I'm not certain where I'm seeing the overlay of the public 
interest throughout this process, other than in that discretion that has been 
accorded to the ICRC by the legislation. (HPARB) 
The role of the statutory committee in approving an ADR agreement raised some 
issues from College key informants, as well as from the Consultants and from 
HP ARB. Many viewed it as a necessary and desirable way to ensure the public 
interest would be the criterion for the approval of any facilitated agreement, and that 
there would be a measure of oversight for the ADR process and the outcomes 
achieved. 
Our ICRC has to approve the agreement. They can reject it. They do issue a 
decision as well. It's appealable to HP ARB, which is the Review Board. 
Obviously if people have worked together they're usually not going to back 
out of the decision that they've signed on to, but certainly that's available to 
them. (SC2) 
Now while the legislation says the [ICRC] panel can accept or reject [the 
ADR agreement], another principle we have here is that you want to do a bare 
minimum of investigation, because once you 're into the investigation, the 
sides get entrenched pretty quickly. And so for us, we have taken many of the 
less serious kinds of complaints and have had some very successful ADRs. 
Another principle for me is that the panel has got to make a decision. The 
legislation is not that clear about that. For me it's simple. The Committee is 
given the resolution and the Committee makes a decision on the resolution, 
and invariably there's no further action. And that is a final decision. Parties 
have 30 days to seek review from HPARB and it's a final matter. I don't want 
the Committee to deviate from its statutory responsibilities. At the CPSO there 
have been several issues with complaints being withdrawn as part of the ADR 
resolution, and what does that do to the conduct? You don't want to leave the 
regulator out of the mix. (MC4) 
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One key informant who chaired the statutory committee at one College described the 
difference between the Committee's review of cases that had been investigated and 
those that had been sent to ADR with a resolution being presented to the Committee 
for its approval in terms of the quality of Committee member experience and the cost-
benefit equation for the College. 
We looked at the cost of a mediator and thought this doesn't make any sense, 
because we can process this internally very quickly, and the majority of our 
complaints are dismissed with advice or no action. So the change that 
happened is now we get this package with tons and tons and tons of 
information [complaints investigation results], and then there's three at the 
end that are wafer-thin, and it says, "This is the outcome. Do you agree -
approve of it?" "We need your approval of it." And those are great. It's 
amazing. We still have leads. I'll take the lead and say, "This is a case about 
so and so and this and that," and usually it's sifting through all this 
[investigative reports]. Now we just say, "You know what? They sorted it 
out on their own. An apology has been issued," or whatever they've decided 
to go ahead and do. And we close those cases with smiles. We're very happy 
with it, and I don't ask how much it cost us to get to that resolution or 
anything like that, because we're not a College that is in financial hardship, 
but we are also strapped, looking at the workload that the staff has. We're 
strapped from that sense, so anything that actually takes off from that is worth 
the money. If we can manage our cases, especially the ones that seem pretty 
straightforward, through another stream that doesn't involve our committee 
until the end, then I'm a convert. I'm converted. I'm all for it now. (MC2c) 
Another College staff informant told a different story of a Committee that was very 
reluctant to give up its management of cases and knowledge of the details of each 
case. In that connection, they suggested that, since the Committees comprise 
members of the particular profession, as well as appointed public members, the 
attitude of the Committee towards accepting or supporting ADR processes might be 
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reflective of their professional culture and its tendency (as those informants perceived 
it) to be more or less controlling or laissez-faire. 
However, some informants drew attention to the potential for conflict between the 
confidentiality provision and the Committee approval provision. How could the 
Committee satisfy itself that the agreement was in the public interest if they could not 
access the information on which the agreement was reached? Would a Committee 
simply approve an agreement on trust? What if the agreement were to be taken to 
HP ARB for review, either because the terms of the agreement were not followed, or 
one or other of the parties to the agreement later claimed there had been coercion in 
the process? The fact of the agreement having been approved by the Committee 
appeared to make it automatically a decision of the Committee - and all decisions of 
the Committee are appealable to HP ARB, with HP ARB having the right to review all 
the files and information which led to the decision, under the terms of HP ARB' s 
governing legislation regarding its jurisdiction and the grounds on which its review 
can take place as well as the areas it can consider. The potential in this situation was 
described as follows: 
Certainly, we have jurisdiction for decisions of the ICRC, and I think it's 
arguable that this would be a decision, because it is discretionary in the 
legislation for the ICRC. They have the discretion to approve or not. On the 
other hand, the ADR process is supposed to be private and the material is not 
supposed to be producible, at least the way the legislation is currently written, 
but something must be given to the ICRC in order for them to exercise their 
discretion, and there's no guidance as to what that discretion could entail. ... 
So it all starts with a complaint and now you have two streams, but they all 
flow through the ICRC to make a decision and render their discretion, as they 
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do now. And the legislation indicates that when they are making a decision, 
HP ARB gets everything, the documents and materials. I'm not certain anyone 
thought of that. (HP ARB) 
Timely disposal 
28. ( 1) A panel shall dispose of a complaint within 150 days after the filing of the complaint. 
Not affected by ADR 
(2) A referral to an alternative dispute resolution process under section 25.1 does not affect 
the time requirements under this section. 
The provisions regarding the timely disposal of a complaint gave rise to lengthy and 
vehement comments about the proposed ADR process from College informants. 
Several thought the timelines were unrealistic and unmanageable and would preclude 
them using the ADR process altogether. 
If you're tying [ ADR] into the 150-day timeline, people are going to look at 
that and say, "You're going to do a crappy job at your ADR because you're 
going against the clock." That speaks to why we have not chosen as a College 
to engage in an ADR process at this point in time, because the 150-day clock 
is still ticking. (LC 1) 
Several College informants found the requirement onerous, but viewed the 
consequences of not meeting the timeframe as relatively manageable and certainly 
not threatening. Still other informants were convinced that if the College could show 
it was moving as expeditiously as possible under the circumstances of the case, there 
would be little to fear from HP ARB, the review body with powers to take over a 
complaint. 256 
256 RHPA 1991Schedule1ss28(1) to 35 
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The time concern is a real issue. Sometimes ADR can be a faster process. In 
the end, having a timeframe is good. In the end the sky doesn't fall in if you 
don't hit the 150 days, you just get pulled into a more administrative 
procedure. So I'm not going to tum the College and the investigative system 
into knots beyond normal continuous quality improvement processes, because 
the investigations have their own culture and they have to be done well and if 
you're not being fair and if you're not doing a good job, that's a greater sin 
than not meeting your time frame. You just have to accept the way it is and 
look for ways to streamline the processes. My Committee's more concerned 
about the timelines. They see that 150 days standing out there in law and their 
view of what the law says is that you must complete your file in that time. It's 
not what the laws says, but they are trying to meet the standard, because that 
is the gold standard right now. (SC5) 
Some College informants reported that they had experienced considerable difficulty 
meeting the previous 120-day timeframe to complete the investigation and could not 
imagine how adding another process would be manageable with only another 30 days 
added. Other Colleges had not had difficulty meeting the previous deadline and 
expressed some hope and confidence that their administrative processes could be 
further streamlined to accommodate the two "streams" within the expanded 
timeframe. 
For some, the "ticking clock" undermined what they considered to be one of the 
values of ADR, that the process is intended to find the best solution, not overly 
influenced by a pressing deadline. 
We 're quite willing to throw the 150 [days] by the wayside if we need to. If 
there are accountabilities, we'll write the letters to say why we're delayed. 
We always make decisions for the case rather than the timeline, and I think 
ADR is the same. We wouldn't cut comers on an investigation or purposely 
speed up our agenda so that we could meet those timelines. In the legislation, 
it's cast in stone, and we recognize that. The reality is it's important to have 
benchmarks, because if we don't, then the whole system falls apart. So it's 
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helpful for people to know what we strive to achieve. We're quite diligent 
about trying to get there, but where we can't, there's very good reasons, and 
we always tell both registrants and complainants, "You know, it's in the best 
interests of you as an individual that we go through this due process, and 
where we need to investigate, we fully investigate." Otherwise we're making 
decisions on half information, which is not right and not fair to the parties. . .. 
I certainly wouldn't cancel our ADR program out of the fear that we're going 
to miss the 150-day timeline. (MC2b) 
Several College informants were concerned with having to complete both the ADR 
and investigation of the complaint within the 150-day period, commenting on the 
problems of organizing and sequencing the two elements of complaint resolution. In 
a few Colleges, this difficulty proved an insurmountable obstacle to adopting the 
AD R process at all. 
The other piece that we didn't like was the timely disposal and the fact that 
the ADR has to work within the 150 days to process a complaint. So that was 
another reason why we decided at this point in time not to pursue it. We just 
said, forget it, because we don't have the capacity to set it up between the 
complainant and the member and get someone to mediate or facilitate the 
process - it eats up the time. It's a pretty loud clock ticking! (MCI) 
A common concern was about how long to give to the ADR process before initiating 
an investigation. One informant cautioned about having a cut-off date for the ADR, 
because, in their view, there was always a possibility that the dynamics of the ADR 
process might have changed within days of the decision to terminate the ADR. The 
comment was made, as mentioned above, that the two processes may have to proceed 
simultaneously in order to complete the case within the timeframe. This scenario, as 
noted above, was seen as potentially creating a chilling effect on the ADR 
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negotiation, as the member being investigated would be subjected to a full formal 
enquiry into his or her practice, while being expected to maintain an open attitude 
toward a potential informal resolution. 
Under the new legislation, you're supposed to be conducting both an 
investigation and ADR at the same time, and the fact that you're conducting 
an investigation undermines the ADR process. There was a lot of concern 
raised about that. It's a show of good faith where you kind of put the 
investigation on hold while you 're working to achieve a settlement. The fact 
that we have to continue to investigate irks the member and undermines ADR, 
and we're kind of struggling with that. (SCI) 
The limited timeframe that might require both the ADR and investigation to be 
conducted simultaneously was seen not only to be an ineffective way of conducting 
ADR, but also a waste of precious College resources, especially by the larger 
Colleges with significant investments in investigation systems as well as alternative 
resolution processes. 
Doing both ADR and investigation at the same time would be a terrible use of 
resources. Because our philosophy is that investigative resources are very 
expensive, specialized and rare resources, and we want to make sure we are 
applying them where there is the highest risk. So by dealing with things that 
can be dealt with in a remedial process, we are preserving these resources to 
deal with those high risks in a very timely manner. (LC3) 
Addressing the value and purpose of ADR as a complaints resolution approach, one 
key informant challenged the presumption that ADR is a faster process that will 
achieve streamlining of the complaints resolution system. 
I don't think you would meet anyone who has done ADR or is familiar with 
ADR who says it's quicker, because it's not quicker. It's high touch. It's high 
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resource. The goal is that it's a great outcome and everyone is happy with it 
and that's why you strive through the high-touch, high-resource. But it's not a 
quick process, and I think that that clock ticking - it's always been there, but 
now it's more formalized - will also have folks sitting there thinking, is it 
even worth going there? We'd have to engage an external resource. We'd 
have to manage that external resource. And we don't get a "by" in terms of 
the timing. So I don't see the system that's currently in there as particularly 
permissive and helpful to solve the problems that ADR is used to solve. 
(MC3) 
College informants' views ofHPARB's role as a judicial monitor of College 
performance within the timeframes varied considerably. A few commented that 
HP ARB had difficulty dealing with its own caseload, so was in a weak position to 
take a stand against Colleges that did not meet their complaints resolution deadline. 
Others commented that HP ARB patently didn't have the resources to take over a 
complaint from a College that had not met its deadline. 
I always think of that 150-day deadline looming. In my mind it's all very gray. 
They say that at the end of 150 days you send a letter, and you keep sending 
letters until at some point HPARB can take over. Well, HPARB readily 
admits they haven't got the resources to do that. So, in a sense, these arbitrary 
timelines are not binding, other than the fact we have to send the letter saying 
we're making efforts. (SC4) 
One informant commented, "Some Colleges think of HP ARB as the enemy, but I 
don't think they are. I think they simply have a job to do, and they're an oversight 
body. Their hands are as tied as much as anyone else's. I think HP ARB understands, 
and as far as HP ARB is concerned - I would have to go back and look - I'm not sure 
whether they recommended 150 days, or if they recommended more and that wasn't 
acceptable"( C 1). 
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One informant commented that, since both parties consent to the ADR process, they 
would be unlikely to complain to HP ARB about the length of the process they were 
participating in if it were unfolding in a reasonably productive manner. On the other 
hand, if there were a complaint by one of the parties about the length of the process, 
an adverse response by HP ARB was seen by one informant as a determinant of 
whether any of the Colleges would continue to provide ADR in response to 
complaints. 
It would take just one case of HP ARB jumping in and taking over an 
investigation for timeliness, and that will be the end of ADR everywhere. 
And that's how quickly- our world is like that. One court case and "We're 
not doing that any more," because nobody wants to spend their members' 
money defending something that's already been challenged in court and been 
found to be inappropriate. You'd be crazy to stick your neck out there once 
that's been done. So HP ARB will, I think, set the tone a bit around this clock 
ticking. (MC3) 
During the interview with HP ARB, it was a matter of some reflection and uncertainty 
as to why the Government had decided to impose the 150-day limit on the two 
processes. This reflection was linked to the Colleges' and HP ARB' s legislated duty 
to protect the public interest. 
It's also interesting that the Legislature didn't see fit to stop the investigative 
process or allow some time limits to accommodate the ADR process. The 
other thing I see is that it's very much dependent on where the complainant 
resides. So, in a smaller community with limited access to health care 
resources, both staff and facilities, perhaps that might be an element in 
determining whether or not the ADR process met the public interest, because 
HP ARB' s jurisdiction is very much about the public interest and so is the self-
regulatory system, which is why it was put in place. (HP ARB) 
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Perceptions of How the Legislation was Developed 
In the interviews, informants were asked directly, as part of the conversation about 
what gave rise to the ADR legislation, about what, if any, consultation had taken 
place in relation to drafting the legislation. There was great disparity among the 
responses. Some informants clearly recalled being part of an ongoing consultation 
process with the Ministry, with the Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council 
(HPRAC) through its report and submissions process, through discussions with the 
other regulatory Colleges in which they had participated under the auspices of the 
Federation of Health Regulatory Colleges- both before and after the legislation was 
proposed - and/or as one of those who made, or were aware of others having made, 
submissions to the Standing Committee on Social Policy hearings prior to the passage 
of the Bill in the Legislature. One informant recalled that a College colleague with 
expertise in ADR had been seconded to a Ministry team in the period between the 
first HPRAC report (Adjusting the Balance, 2001) that discussed ADR use in the 
complaints process and the second HPRAC report (New Directions, 2006), with 
revised recommendations regarding the use of ADR. Another informant recalled that 
HPRAC had solicited their input early on in the report and recommendation process: 
"HPRAC did consult, and we were very pleased, particularly in the very early days. 
They not only consulted formally, they consulted informally. They brought together 
people who had experience in using different regulatory mechanisms, in using 
legislation, and asked, 'What are the problems?' So we did have that opportunity" 
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(LC3). Another informant recalled pre-drafting consultations, characterizing them as 
"interesting discussions - CPSO, CNO and the dentists had quiet conversations with 
the Ministry people" (MC4), rather than as formal consultations involving the whole 
RHP A community. This informant felt satisfied that the final legislation reflected the 
concerns they had raised in these "quiet conversations." 
One informant commented that the original HPRAC recommendations for ADR 
legislation had proposed a "clumsy" process that raised alarms among Colleges with 
ADR systems in place and that, if implemented by Government, would "interfere 
with some of the processes we had developed that we felt were in the public interest" 
(SC6). They were relieved that their suggested revisions had been captured in the 
legislation. They observed that, while "the climate is such that consumers and 
regulators and professionals all want to have an open discussion, even when there is 
disagreement, that puts the Minister in an awkward spot if the Minister disagrees 
[with HPRAC]. And in the last [HPRAC report], the Minister and just about 
everybody else disagreed with HPRAC's recommendations" (SC6). However, this 
informant could not recall any consultations taking place other than the formal 
submissions made to HPRAC and the Standing Committee, "though that's not to say 
that there have been [some]. I don't know if there were consultations with someone 
from a regulatory body, but certainly we weren't aware of it" (SC6). 
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At the other end of the spectrum, a substantial number of informants, particularly 
those from the smaller Colleges, recounted that the first time they had become aware 
of the ADR legislation was when the Bill was presented in the Legislature for first 
reading: "The first we got wind of it was when we opened the Bill" (SC2). They 
could not recall any consultation in which they had taken part, and, interestingly, 
some concluded that if they had not been consulted, then none of the other Colleges 
had been either. Those informants expressed regret that the Colleges had not been 
consulted, especially those Colleges with a long experience of using ADR in their 
complaints resolution process. In their view, had those Colleges been consulted, the 
legislation would have been much better, specifically better reflective of the Colleges' 
real situation and capacity to accomplish what was required in the legislation. 
If the government had been serious about facilitating ADR and reaching better 
resolutions, what they could have done is gone to the Colleges and said, 
"We're thinking of formalizing an ADR process within the Code. What do 
you see as the most important elements and processes that would make this 
thing work?" Instead of- don't get me wrong- some egghead down on 
College Street or Wellesley, or wherever, that doesn't know ADR at the 
College level from a hole in the ground, sitting there, saying, "Oh yeah, this is 
what we need, yadda yadda yadda," on a very theoretical basis. So if they'd 
come to us, and said, up front, "What do you guys see as being in the public 
interest?" we would have told them and we would have given them a process 
that would have worked better for the Colleges and for the public. There was 
no consultation with the Colleges. They may have had consultation with other 
parties, but we certainly weren't involved. (SC2) 
One informant suggested that there was political pressure to get through the larger 
Health Services Improvements Act that comprised a wide number of safeguards and 
initiatives, and ADR was not of sufficient urgency or importance to warrant a 
response to the concerns raised by the regulatory community. 
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It's unfortunate that type of consultation didn't happen. And then it's time -
because there was a real push to get that omnibus legislation through quickly. 
I'm sure lots of submissions were made to Standing Committee that said, 
"Hold off on this," or "We're concerned about that," but they [the 
Government] have a majority. So at the end of the day there's only so much 
you can push, and the ADR stuff is never going to be the hill to die on. (MC3) 
However, other informants believed that what they perceived to be a lack of adequate 
consultation was not a function of the urgency of passing the omnibus legislation, but 
a typical pattern of the Government, especially in relation to the health regulatory 
Colleges. 
There has been a sense of frustration that the regulatory health professions 
haven't been equal stakeholders in a lot of the regulatory changes. Basically, 
something comes along, an issue, a situation. It prompts the need for 
legislation or amendments to legislation: There isn't a great deal of discussion 
until they're getting ready to pass it, and then that's when it comes to the 
regulator. And, quite frankly, Government - like, "Here it is and you've got 
30 days to respond." You already have a workload here, and now it's up to 
here. (SCl) 
One informant opined that a perceived lack of consultation was the result of a 
combination of Government style and lack of time to consult on a very complex piece 
of legislation. 
Consultation from people who draft the legislation? That's not how this 
Government operates. It may not be how any government operates. But it's 
certainly not how this Government operates. Their consultation is HPRAC. 
And when they get HPRAC's report, and the Colleges' responses to HPRAC's 
report, because we commented on HPRAC's report, I think that's it. Full 
stop. And whether it's because they don't have the resources to conduct the 
kind of consultation on each of these individual things - you know these bills 
are - like Bill 171 was about 17 chapters - and 8 million inches high - and for 
Colleges, that was not the hill to die on. There were a lot of other hills 
included in that legislation and that was not the hill to die on, and so you will 
not have Colleges down there with pitchforks saying "You have not consulted 
with the people and our best practices." ... There is so much more at stake in 
other areas. (MC3) 
183 
HPRAC was seen in this case as an arm's length agency that protects the Government 
from direct consultations with stakeholders, including the regulatory Colleges. 
Then Government can say, "We referred it and we got advice," and that 
advice is supposed to be fulsome, and to take into account everybody's input. 
I'm sure if you went in and read the submissions that Colleges made, AD R's 
mentioned, and those Colleges that have ADR probably said we're concerned 
about how this will affect our program. But did that lead anyone in the 
Government to say, "Before we draft any of this marvelous legislation, let's 
go talk to these people?" No. And at the end of the day, whatever the 
political will is to do whatever they will do, is what ends up happening. 
(MC3) 
The College of Physicians and Surgeons, the College of Nurses, the Royal College of 
Dental Surgeons and the College of Psychologists were cited by several key 
informants as having valuable information and ADR experience that the Government 
should or could have used in developing the legislation. While several College 
informants commented on the importance of the Government consulting with the 
community leaders in ADR, others focused almost entirely on the difference between 
what might work for those leaders and the problems the lack of consultation and 
consideration they perceived impacted the smaller Colleges, who are in the majority, 
but whose aggregate annual complaints are significantly fewer than any one of the 
larger Colleges. 
It would have been great for them to have gone to a College of Nurses and 
say, because they have evaluated that program they have fabulous information 
about that program, what pieces that program works best in. They've really 
refined it over the years and I'm sure CPSO has the same kind of information. 
So it would make sense to me to be going to those places and saying, "You've 
been doing this for 25 years, what works? What doesn't work?" But I've 
never watched legislation be drafted in that consultative way .... I think it's a 
shame that the folks at Nurses and CPSO weren't consulted. I guess I always 
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hoped in the back of my mind that someone was consulting them. But 
obviously not, or they would have got something more reflective of what their 
systems are and how they work. Because I think they do work and I think they 
have evidence to support that. (MC3) 
When this Bill was in the consultative stages, a lot of Colleges, and through 
the Federation, put forward our positions on how this would impact us. It was 
made clear to HPRAC that this was going to affect the smaller Colleges and 
we would not be able to engage in this because of the resource issue. And 
believe me, we really tried to get them to listen to us and said, "This is going 
to really penalize the smaller Colleges. If you're trying to encourage this 
formally, because it's now ensconced in the legislation, you're certainly not 
facilitating it for the smaller Colleges. Smaller Colleges don't have the 
resources." They didn't listen. I don't know why. I guess they thought there 
might be some sort of a conflict. HPRAC provided advice to the Minister. 
We presented to the Standing Committee. But nothing changed. We lost 
interest when nothing happened. (SC7) 
Mandatory or Optional 
The question was not specifically asked, but several informants pointed out that the 
legislation made the adoption of the ADR process optional for the College. "It's 
permissive. It's not mandatory" (MCI). "You can have an ADR process, but you 
don't have to have an ADR process" (SC4). "There's nice to do and need to do, and 
ADR wasn't a requirement. It wasn't a need to do" (LCl). One informant 
commented that the new legislation was "explicit." "You have to have ADR. Now 
you have to have it" (C2). It may be that this reading of the law was based on an 
understanding that the provisions of the ADR legislation were obligatory if anything 
resembling ADR was being undertaken. Whether informants viewed the provisions 
for the ADR process laid out in the legislation as something the College was 
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henceforth obliged to do could be a factor when the impact of the legislation is 
examined. At this point, it would appear that most Colleges indicated either directly, 
as noted above, or more indirectly, that the ADR process is an optional part of the 
complaints resolution process. 
One Size Fits All - Legislation versus Regulation 
One significant point emerged in the interviews regarding the Government's choice to 
embed the ADR provisions in the legislation, rather than to require the Colleges to 
develop a Regulation to cover the use of ADR. Having the ADR provisions in the 
Act, these informants observed, meant that each of the provisions would apply to 
each of the Colleges that chose to have an ADR process, assuming it is optional and 
not mandatory to have an ADR process. Each College has its own Act, in addition to 
being governed by the collective Regulated Health Professions Act. One College 
Registrar opined that the original spirit of the RHP A - its "richness" - was poorly 
understood at the Government policy level, and that the RHP A was becoming a blunt 
instrument, whereas the richness of the original reflected its ability to "accommodate 
different professions and different professional cultures" (LC3). One informant 
pointed out that delegation from one healthcare provider to another is governed by 
Regulation, rather than by the Act, because the situation regarding delegation varies 
among Colleges. Informants from the smaller Colleges, in particular, expressed 
concern about being "lumped in with" larger Colleges, with regard to compliance 
with the Act. The main concern was the perceived disparity in resources. Another 
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important concern was seen to be the practice differences among professions, which 
lead to different types of complaints. And just as significant for some is the perceived 
difference in professional cultures affecting how complaints would be perceived and 
handled. 
The reason for the ICRC legislation was because the large Colleges needed 
efficiencies, but this legislation affects us all. Our members have a more 
technical profession and less patient contact. As a smaller College (we're 
actually medium-sized), we don't have as many resources as the CNO, but we 
must meet all the same statutory obligations. The size and capacity of the 
College affects what processes we can do. (MC 1) 
Every College now has to comply with this regardless of how big, how small, 
how many staff. And it's just so much more work for us, and especially the 
small Colleges suffer, because you have to do exactly the same thing as 
everybody else, but with the same number of people and with the same 
budget, so it gets a little overwhelming. It should have been left for us to work 
out our own process suited to our own members' practices. Our cases are 
mostly exchanges or refunds. (SC3) 
Several advantages were identified to having ADR processes in College regulation, 
including having the ADR process reflect the culture of the profession, having the 
regulation vetted and passed by Government, and having a fully public and 
transparent regulation development and publication process. These points were made 
in the context of the perceived ripple effect or contagion to all the Colleges whenever 
a prominent College is the subject of media, public and/or Government attention. 
We suffer from this under the RHP A, because whenever the CPSO is on the 
front page - it's not our members who are on the front page - but we're all 
under the same system, and we all have the same issues. It may be one of 
those things that gives you pause about this kind of blanket legislation; I know 
other jurisdictions are looking at this as well as kind of a model. You have 
one process and piece of legislation rather than individual ones. Maybe we're 
not similar enough after all. Maybe small and large are different. Maybe there 
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are areas where you would say this should be prescribed under the individual 
profession Act, instead of more globally if there are particular problems. 
Other jurisdictions struggle with this: Is this blanket legislation thing 
working? Isn't there a better way to group people? BC and Alberta are going 
with this model and they're struggling with it. The UK has this model - all 
under one Act. It used to be silos - medicine, dentistry, but I think this is one 
of those problems where you might say, isn't this specific process thing better 
handled in regulation? Wouldn't it be better to say in RHPA that ADR is 
permitted but must be done in accordance with any regulation that exists, so 
then the nurses could put together a responsible piece of regulation that sets 
out their program with checks and balances. 
Regulations have the check and balance that they're vetted by Government. 
They're public. I see this blanket thing as problematic when we try to blanket 
all of our processes. There's some stuff we might want to hive off in a 
different way, allowing each group to be more creative and address their own 
particular needs, provided there's enough transparency, and regulations are 
published. 
We're still regulating fairly mainstream professions right now. We're about 
to dip our toe into regulating non-mainstream professions - TCM, 
acupuncture, homeopathy, naturopathy. What are those communities like in 
terms of the way they resolve conflict? Is this kind of structure going to work 
for them? I don't know. I would think that those communities would be more 
- here I'm making assumptions - would be more invested in alternatives -
creative alternatives, because they tend to operate outside the main box 
anyway. Does that then make regulation less attractive to groups whose 
values don't reflect this kind of rigidity? Then do groups say, "Better not to be 
regulated because look at all the little things that you can't do any more 
because you're regulated." So does it have a chilling effect on that bit as 
well? (MC3) 
Addressing the issue of having the ADR process in the legislation, one informant 
asserted that, because the provisions were already in the legislation, they couldn't "re-
invent the wheel," but they could develop policies tailored to their own College 
needs, based on the "skeleton" of the legislation. Their perspective was that while 
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their legal counsel would need to review their policies for compliance with the 
legislation, and while legal counsel might try to ensure these were compliant, there 
would be areas where legal counsel might be "100 per cent legally correct, but they 
are not able to understand - not 'understand' - but to capture some little things and 
nuances we do here" (SC3). 
In a slightly different vein, another College informant commented on the way that 
different legal interpretations of the Act and the ADR legislation would ultimately 
undermine any standardization that Government may have hoped to achieve by 
enshrining the ADR provisions in legislation, rather than some alternative that could 
reflect health professionals' practices, cultures and types of complaints. 
I think that there may be a little bit of naivete there in terms of just how 
standardized this is going to make it, because you can talk to people from any 
College and even the legal advice that they get varies from law firm to law 
firm, from lawyer to lawyer. Where some Colleges are being advised you 
have to do X, Y and Z, other Colleges are being told, "No, no, no, you can cut 
Y right out of that. Just do X and Z, forget Y. It's not necessary." I think 
whenever you're dealing with legislation, you'll always be dealing with 
different interpretations. That's why we have lawyers. That's why we have 
courts, and so, over the course of the next year, two, three, I think there's 
going to have to be some tests that are going to take place and the courts are 
going to have to rule on certain things and certain processes and say, "Yes, 
this is right" or "This isn't right," and hopefully eventually we'll get it right, 
and everybody will be doing the same thing, but that's probably going to take 
some time. ( C 1) 
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A Complaint is Not a Dispute 
The informant from HPARB raised a concern that ADR was included at all in the 
College complaints resolution process. The principal issue is that, within the 
framework of the RHP A, a complaint is not a dispute between a healthcare 
professional and his or her client. It is not a private dispute to be adjudicated by a 
court or arbitrator. The complaints process, in this view, is to allege that a breach of 
College standards has taken place. The "case," if grounds for prosecution are found 
by the ICRC through a process of investigation, is between the College and the 
member. The complainant does not have a role, other than being called, at the 
College's or member's discretion, as a witness to the breach of standards. The 
question that this informant raised had to do with the focus of the ADR process on the 
interaction between the member and the complainant and whether characterizing the 
complaints resolution process as "dispute resolution" was even appropriate. 
I think the other aspect of this process is that it's very much looked upon as a 
dispute between - or issues between the complainant and the professional 
member, the regulated member. But actually the whole system of our self-
regulatory system is all about the public interest. And I'm not certain where 
I'm seeing the overlay of the public interest throughout this process, other 
than in that discretion that has been accorded to the ICRC by the legislation. 
So I'm uncertain about how that's going to unfold. It's almost an uneasy 
relationship between the current process and then an overlay of ADR. 
(HPARB) 
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4.4 THmD QUESTION SET/CLUSTER: What impact has the ADR legislation 
had on College practices? 
Overall I think the changes around the ADR are positive. I think they were 
necessary and they've given us a framework to work by. Now we know we 
need to get consent. Now we know there's certain things we have to tell the 
parties, that they can back out of it and all that. I think that the fact that we 
have that sort of roadmap now makes it easier for the Colleges to proceed and 
makes it more consistent and everybody's approach will be more consistent 
and I think that's an important thing. I think the legislation for the most part is 
a valiant attempt to put those checks and balances in place, to create 
standardization, ... but that's probably going to take some time. (LCl) 
Are you really going to be able to regulate all these folks under the one piece 
of blanket legislation? Interesting to see. You can understand all the interests 
at the table and there are ways you can address all those interests and still 
preserve what's important for the system to work. Each profession's culture is 
so distinct. What do they respect? How do they deal with conflict? 
Complaints? Challenges? So what we have to do going forward is to try and 
find a way to work creatively with the language that exists in the statute as 
much as possible to maximize its benefit. (MC3) 
The legislation is on the books now, so if doesn't pan out the way the 
Government wanted it to pan out - as I said, I have no idea what their 
motivations were - what they're going to do is blame the Colleges. They're 
going to say, "We gave them the authority and they screwed up." That's what 
I see happening. The Government will say, "We gave you the authority and 
we thought that this authority would have achieved this particular end, and 
look at this College over here, they don't even have a program!" But why 
would I have a program that's doomed to failure? (SC2) 
The three key informant statements above illustrate the three general responses to the 
legislation among the Colleges. The first statement represents a perception of the 
ADR legislation that it is useful and workable. It is, overall, a reasonable framework 
and it will be possible, over time, to make it work in the way that individual believes 
it was intended to, to achieve consistency and clarity about general values and 
expectations - a "road map" and a "framework." 
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The second statement reflects a more skeptical view of the legislation and a concern 
that, while it may be very difficult for such diverse cultures to adapt to the 
framework, the language of the legislation offers opportunities to be creative in 
interpreting the legislation for the purpose of achieving the legislation's intended 
benefits. 
The third statement appears to represent the view that the intentions behind the 
legislation are not to be trusted and the role of the College is to defend itself against 
the perceived dangers lurking within the legislation and the potentially negative 
consequences of attempting to engage with the legislation. 
Several of the interview results recorded in the previous sections of Findings have 
reflected these attitudes, and provided some nuance, as well as some of the reasoning 
the informants provided, beyond what is expressed in these three statements. This 
section documents in greater depth specifically how the informants saw the ADR 
legislation affecting their previous practices. 
A typical pre-ADR legislation informal complaints resolution was described by 
several of the College key informants as follows: A member of the public telephones 
the College with a concern about an interaction with a member of that College. The 
College staff member answering the telephone call either refers the person to a 
colleague or continues with the call. The College staff member seeks more 
192 
information from the person about their concern. There is an exchange between the 
caller and the staff member, and at some point the College staff person makes an 
initial assessment of the seriousness of the concern. Informants emphasized that any 
hint of abuse, particularly sexual abuse, as defined in the Act, would lead the staff 
person to encourage the caller to make a complaint in written form and submit it to 
the College. Other "serious" complaints included a breach of the College's 
professional standards (or their equivalent), fraud, incompetence or the possibility of 
incapacity. The staff member would offer assistance to the caller in completing a 
written or otherwise "recorded" complaint. The complaint would then be submitted 
by College staff to the members of the College Inquiries, Complaints and Reports 
Committee for a decision regarding further action, usually commencing an 
investigation, the results of which would later be presented to the Committee to 
determine next steps, as provided for in the Act. 
Key informants described a more common situation where the concern presented by 
the caller had to do with a "miscommunication or misunderstanding." Following a 
conversation with the caller in which the caller provided some detail of the issue or 
concern, the staff person typically would suggest to the caller that, if the caller 
agreed, the College would contact the member informally and draw the caller's 
concern to their attention, suggesting either a) that the member contact the caller to 
resolve the concern informally; b) that a College staff member would act as a 
facilitator between the member and the caller to try to reach a resolution. Some 
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informants noted that, if the caller agreed to this suggestion, the College staff member 
making the call to the member would often encourage the member to seek an 
informal resolution by outlining the formal investigation process as the alternative to 
an informal agreement. This suggestion, the informants noted, was often a strong 
incentive for the member to agree to seek an informal resolution. Typical cases 
included a caller's hope for an apology and an explanation of the event in question, 
leading to their better understanding of what had occurred and what they had 
experienced, acknowledgement of their concern or grievance, an apology and/or, in 
some cases involving products or services, an offer by the member to refund money 
paid, exchange a product, or redo the service in a manner that addressed the caller's 
concerns. 
This approach was seen by many key informants to be highly effective in achieving 
an efficient and equitable service to the caller and the member, meeting the caller's 
needs in ways that a formal process did not have the jurisdiction to address, as well as 
saving the College valuable time and expense of resources. These informants 
emphasized their reliance on the definition of a complaint as a concern provided in a 
written format as giving them the scope and the authority, prior to the complaint 
being written or recorded (and filed with the Registrar), to try to reach an informal 
resolution of the caller's concern. They saw these initial calls as requests for 
iriformation, opportunities for public education, or enquiries about options, but 
certainly not, at that initial stage, "complaints." In their view, once the options in the 
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informal process were exhausted, the concern could be converted to a "complaint," 
and would be dealt with through an investigation. The whole informal process was 
characterized by several informants as a "pre-intake" process. 
As noted above, if no agreement or resolution was reached, the concern could and 
most frequently did come to the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee for 
disposition. Several Colleges with informal processes emphasized that any 
agreement or resolution resulting from the informal process conducted by College 
staff would be referred to the Committee for their information or even for their formal 
approval. Other informants either did not say they referred the resolution to the 
Committee or said they did not follow that practice, there being no legal requirement 
previously to do so. 
Several College informants expressed their willingness to comply with and work with 
the legislation as it stands. Most of those Colleges had had well-developed formal or 
informal complaints resolution processes prior to the legislation. Some had 
anticipated the actual provisions of the legislation and had taken steps prior to its 
proclamation to adapt their existing processes and protocols to be able to comply. For 
some Colleges with an informal process, the legislation did not represent a major 
change. 
I like the legislation. I didn't need it because we had a pretty good program. 
There's nothing in there that is particularly offensive .... We have an internal 
protocol that triggers ADR. We've beefed it up a little bit to say that if there's 
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a case that my staff doesn't think is eligible for ADR but the parties want to 
have it, we'll trigger it - we assume there's consent by the parties. So I don't 
think that the legislation does any harm. Does it do any good? I think that the 
principles are okay. (MC4) 
Before this legislation came into effect, we looked for opportunities to resolve 
things at various steps along the way. If things could be resolved in a way 
that addressed concerns of the consumer, of the patient or client, and were 
consistent with our public interest mandate, then we were quite happy to 
support and encourage those kinds of resolutions .... [We would] really 
encourage the two of them to sort it out, especially if it's something related to 
a misunderstanding or poor communication, But if there's a formal complaint 
or, of course, if it were an allegation of sexual abuse, ... a threat or 
intimidation or power imbalance, or if there were safety issues, ... that goes 
through the formal process, and that has been a given for a long time. But if it 
seemed to be two individuals who were willing to try to work something out 
and do that in a reasonably open and forthright manner, then one of our staff 
members might well try and mediate something. There have been a number of 
cases where that has occurred and it has been successful. Our process wasn't a 
lot different from what's in place now, except that there was negotiation 
around remediation. Now, of course, the Committee can order [remediation], 
but the major difference now is that the focus of the ADR- as it is in the 
legislation - is between the two parties - the complainant and the member, but 
still with the vetting of the outcome by the Complaints Committee. So in some 
ways, it's not that different from what we did. It's not a big change. SC6 
The new legislation is in line with what we have been doing. We had not 
formalized an ADR program or policies, but there were some reports or 
complaints that came in where our first attempt was to get for the member of 
the public what they felt they needed to resolve or emotionally deal with 
whatever was going on. And that was very limited. I expect that won't 
change .... I think it's just better public service to respond to the needs of the 
complainant and try to get out of the process what they need. Interestingly, I 
think without the ADR, there has been one view of the College complaints 
process that goes more like, "Thank you very much for your complaint. We 
will handle it from here." That's to respond, make sure the information is 
correct, but the complainant does not have standing unless they want to 
appeal. That's not very satisfying. Our process actually involves them in 
their complaint, and that can be better public service, depending on the issue 
and the public's desire to be involved. SC5 
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One College informant provided a typical scenario for how complaints were resolved 
before the legislation and how the legislation changed their previous practices. This 
description of the "before and after" scenarios was echoed with minor variations by a 
number of College informants: 
In the past, what we would have done is picked up the phone, and said [to the 
member], "Hi, I'm calling from the College. I want you to know we got a call 
from so-and-so [patient]. They're really concerned. They were at your clinic. 
They want a copy of your patient record. Are you aware of your obligations to 
help with that and give them a copy of the record?" And usually the member 
doesn't know, and so, "Yeah, okay, no problem. I will make sure they get a 
copy of that." So we would do that before. But now that it comes in on a 
piece of paper, it fits the four comers of a complaint. It is a complaint and 
then we have to officially go through this whole mediation process, and for us 
at this College, because we don't have a large staff that has mediators on site, 
it's certainly the extra contracting out for somebody to do something that we 
would have done in a phone call before. Whereas now a complaint has come 
in the door, we have to either mediate it or take it to ICRC. In many of those 
cases, it's a lot of education that we find that staff could easily do to assist the 
parties right up front. And we would still do that up until the paper comes in 
the door .... You would hate for people to go through a written process that 
takes 150 days for them to find out something you could have picked up the 
phone on day one and said "Did you know?" or "Would it have been helpful 
for you to know?" or "Can you return the record?" or whatever. (MC2b) 
We don't consider [phone enquiries] complaints. You know, a complaint has 
to be in a written or recorded format. So it's not a complaint when they get a 
phone call. It's not a complaint unless it says, "This is a complaint against so-
and-so," or if it comes in in another format. Because what I see is an enquiry. 
"I have an issue. I have a question. I don't know what to do with this. I don't 
know if it's a complaint or a concern." They might say that they want to 
complain and I say, "Well, these are your options, this is what you can do." I 
will ask, "What type of outcome, what is it you want to happen as a result of 
raising this issue?" and often what they want is not something we can give 
them, so it's still their choice whether they are then going to make a formal 
complaint or not. They haven't made a complaint. It's not in a recorded 
form. And I think that is like pre-intake, at the enquiry level. When we get a 
complaint from the public, which we don't get a lot of, actually, there are 
times when I will do more formal intake to discuss the complaint with the 
member of the public. And if I hear things like, "I just want acknowledgement 
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and an apology," you don't get that through a complaints process. Or, "I just 
want the opportunity to discuss it." So I have convened the "discussion" with 
the facilitator present. That can result in, "This has been great. This is really 
all I wanted. I'm done." So then their choices are - "Do you want this to 
proceed? Or do you want to withdraw it?" Sometimes they want to withdraw. 
Ifl had a concern about the withdrawal, that's discussed at the ICRC. There's 
still, "It's the complainant's decision to withdraw this, you have to consider 
such-and-such." So there's still an opportunity for the C.ollege to take that 
issue further where the complainant has said, "Fine I'm out of here." So it 
doesn't close anything for the College in its ability to act. (SC5) 
Several informants commented on the unwillingness of some callers to become 
involved in an informal process, despite being offered the opportunity to do so. They 
commented that some callers are simply so angry at what they perceive has occurred 
that they do not want to engage at all with the College member they are calling about 
and will only be satisfied with the member's punishment. Other callers take the 
position that it is not their role to engage with the member. In their view this is the 
role and duty of the College. 
It's a culture piece, because for a member of the public, where they've 
complained to a College, they're saying "Don't put this back on me. I sent 
you a letter." They don't say it this way, but basically the bottom line is 
"Look, I've given this matter over to you. You do what you're supposed to do 
and solve it." So this concept of empowering people to be involved in a 
process to come to a resolution is one of those things that sounds really nice, 
but is a lot of effort. (MC2a) 
In addition to clarifying the caller's expectations regarding the desired outcome, one 
College noted that the caller is also informed about the criteria by which the 
behaviour giving rise to the concern will ultimately be judged under the College's 
complaints and discipline process. 
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Our approach is standards-based, so a complainant has to be comfortable with 
having the member address the standards that were at issue in the complaint, 
and not everyone is amenable to that. I think we do a much better job at 
helping the public to understand what the ADR process can offer them and 
what it can't offer. So this is not an opportunity for restitution. There are 
certain things that the College processes cannot address. And once those are 
whittled down, our experience is that more and more members of the public 
are interested in mediation. LC3 
Some College informants explained that they had had an informal process in the past, 
but, rather than creating a formal ADR process that conformed with the legislation, 
which they perceived as expensive, rigid and time-consuming, they would look for 
creative ways to avoid having a legislatively compliant formal process, mainly by 
relying on the definition of a complaint as being in written or-recorded form. In other 
words, they would continue to provide their own version of an ADR process while 
being careful not to be caught by the legislative triggers requiring the legislated 
process. 
A third type of response to the legislation among those with informal processes in the 
past was to discontinue that process and adopt the formal ADR process, with its 
attendant costs, problems and perceived diminished efficacy. These comments are 
cited at length because they provide a detailed, yet succinct description of what turned 
out to be a fairly common pre- and post-legislation approach among the regulatory 
Colleges. 
In the past, we would explain, first of all, we do have a formal complaints 
process and what it entails, and then I would clarify it, "Well, your call is not 
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a complaint, because we have to receive it in a recorded medium. You can 
tape record it. You can videotape it. You can write it and send it in to the 
College by fax, e-mail or by mail." So we clarified - one, the nature of their 
inquiry, second, that this wasn't a complaint, and that they had this option, 
which would be, with their consent, we would speak to the practitioner to see 
if the practitioner would welcome them back to try and work out their 
differences. If they were comfortable with that, they would give me a verbal 
authorization for me to contact the practitioner. We're just facilitating the two 
parties getting back together to work out their own resolution, and, when we 
had that in place, for every ten complaints, we would get maybe two formal 
complaints out of those inquiries. So it seemed to be highly effective. 
We discontinued providing that service, with concerns that we would be 
interfering with ADR, with formal complaints. We recognized that what was 
now expected was a more formalized approach, one that was arm's-length to 
the College. So we've contracted an ADR officer, someone with an 
investigation background, with a mediation background, who has the skills to 
provide those services. And what happens is the complaint is reviewed by the 
ICRC, which then determines, based on criteria, whether it would be 
appropriate for this complaint to be resolved by ADR, as long as there's.no 
sexual abuse, only minor conduct or no conduct issues. . .. It's one thing 
speaking to someone on the phone. It's a different thing when you get a letter. 
So there's issues with regards to costs. There's issues with regards to getting 
the consent to the process. There's issues around the time involved, and 
having a sense of where thii;igs are at within the ADR process at a particular 
time for the committee to know whether they need to investigate. I think to 
some degree the process before was working, and right now it's not as 
effective, and I think partly because it's been formalized. (SCl) 
Another College was prepared to adopt the formal ADR process, albeit somewhat 
reluctantly, viewing it as significantly less flexible than the previous informal 
process. 
Because it was so informal and so easy to do, sometimes it worked. Now, 
with the new provisions, it has become more formal obviously. I think we lost 
that flexibility by putting it in legislation. In my view, it's quite rigid, and 
then still you have to ratify it and there's a lot oflittle details involved that 
some people may say, "oh, well, why bother?" I just think it doesn't have to 
be so formalized, and especially the ratification and consent and forms. 
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Because there are provisions already in the legislation, we can't re-invent the 
wheel. We can only develop a policy for our own ADR process, what would 
be tailored for our needs, but of course based on this [legislation]. We do 
understand how important ADR is because we obviously want to decrease the 
number of our complaints. Every College wants that. If we can avoid a 
complaint, it's in everybody's best interest. (SC3) 
However, towards the end of their comments on the new process, it occurred to the 
same informant that there could be ways round a perceived legal requirement to adopt 
the formal ADR process, using the legislation itself. "I guess you can probably still 
do it informally because it's not a complaint yet. ... I guess there's a window there 
for an informal- so that would be a pre -ADR. Yes, it's funny how people can 
always find a way." 
Another category of outcome is represented by the Colleges that had a busy informal 
process, "trying to facilitate a resolution to the problem, concern, complaint, usually 
by picking up the phone and talking to the member." 
There wouldn't have been the due process that has to be followed. Now 
we 're not as ready, willing and able to make that phone call to the member to 
try and sort things out. So from that perspective the legislation has in fact 
slowed our processes down and complicated them quite significantly. The 
legislation has changed our processes here in the context that we're less eager 
to try to facilitate an early resolution, than we were previously .... Given the 
uncertainty that we have currently, we don't want to be the test case on that 
and for somebody to say, "You had no right to do that and I didn't like it." We 
don't want to be the test case. We have been much more cautious and that's 
with the advice from legal counsel, "You probably shouldn't be doing that." 
So from that perspective, it's had a negative impact. ... The Committee 
reached the conclusion that, at this stage, we're not going to have an ADR 
process, because of the constraints put on the process. Had there been fewer 
constraints, or different constraints, they may have reached a different 
conclusion. (SC2) 
201 
There were several comments about the "chilling" effect of the legislation on various 
College complaints processes. "I have heard some Colleges say that they're just not 
even going to go there. Yes, it's in the RHPA, but it's more work than it's worth. 
Let's just follow the normal complaints process" (SC4). A College informant 
described their previous discretionary decisions, "with some assistance from the 
Complaints Committee," to try to resolve issues and concerns informally whenever 
possible, through "basically telephone shuttle mediation." 
I am a strong proponent of ADR. Both the member and complainant benefited 
and got what they could not have got through the complaints process [a 
refund]. I did not use the term ADR and the parties were not aware that it was 
ADR. ... In terms of transparency, nobody really knows about this. The 
Committee doesn't know. It's not a formal matter brought to their attention. 
Someone could criticize that and say, "You know you kept that in a little 
pocket there. No one knows about it, so it's not really transparent. It shouldn't 
have been done that way." (SC7) 
Since the legislation, this process had come to an end, to this informant's regret. 
I have to tell you we are now not doing ADR at ICRC, just because we don't 
have the resources here now that the legislation states that anyone involved in 
investigation can't participate in ADR or if anyone's attempted ADR, they 
can't then be involved in the investigation. So ADR has been put on the back 
burner. Now that the legislation has formalized it, we've basically done away 
with it. It's just not practical, especially for a small College like us. You just 
can't physically do it. (SC7) 
One of the medium-sized Colleges also came to the conclusion that the formality of 
the legislated process was more than their resources could absorb and so had decided 
not to have an ADR process at all. 
As a smaller College, (we're actually medium-sized), we haven't as many 
resources as CNO, but we must meet all same statutory obligations. The size 
and capacity of the College affects the processes we can do. Historically, 
we've not had a lot of complaints. At one point we had 6 to 8 per year. And 
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there's absolutely no method of setting up an ADR on how to deal with that. 
... So the ADR process was a little extreme for us. (MCI) 
Two of the larger Colleges had also decided not to adopt the ADR process, despite 
the volume of their complaints and their relatively greater resources. One had 
decided to take a "coaching" approach to the less serious complaints. 
We don't even do the informal resolution anymore. We just said, Look, we're 
not discouraging people from making complaints, but we're suggesting to 
them - we're coaching them - instead of saying "Let me do it for you," 
saying, "Maybe if you go to the member and explain to the member what your 
concern was or what your misunderstanding was, that may be an opportunity 
for the member to understand from your perspective what it was that was 
upsetting to you, and it may be just a very simple misunderstanding and the 
member may actually thank you for that feedback." So again, we're trying to 
empower them to do that, as opposed to us calling for them, because it was 
taking up so much time with limited and questionable success. (LC 1) 
The other decision was simply to stop doing any informal resolutions altogether - not 
engage in any further informal complaints resolution, and not adopt the legislated 
ADR process: "no separate ADR. Period." 
One of the reasons mentioned for not adopting the ADR process authorized in the 
legislation was the opposition of the large professional insurance companies and their 
aggressive litigators to participating in such a process. "Certainly, with the 
physicians and dentists covered by insurance for the complaints process, it doesn't 
take much for the process to be challenged" (MC4). The comment was also made 
that, while some of the College members themselves might have been open to 
participating in the ADR process, they were inhibited, if not categorically prohibited 
from doing so, by the rigid, defensive stance of their insurer. 
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If you have a multi-billion-dollar insurer who litigates everything, then that's 
very hard. Then the scare tactics are what appeal to the individual member 
who just wants to make sure that nothing bad happens to me, as opposed to 
thinking about how this could be helpful to me, but also helpful to others in 
the system. In our approach to ADR, we've tried to educate the large unions 
who use regular legal counsel. We have regular meetings with them and help 
them to understand what our processes are and what the impact might be for 
their members. We sometimes find that, in time, those people become good 
advocates for these processes because they see, first of all, that their client's 
interests will be protected, that there's a fair and transparent process, and they 
also start to see the impact and realize that I don't want my client in a second 
situation that has other ramifications when you come to the attention of the 
regulatory body repeatedly. Then it works. We're fortunate in that respect. 
[However,] you can choose your own legal counsel, and we often encounter 
people who have a different view of the world and the regulator. And that's 
hard. (LC3) 
One question that emerged in the interviews was whether the ADR process would 
allow the College to address such issues as refunds and exchanges, which were the 
principal type of concern of many of the Colleges with a focus on healthcare products 
as well as services. Some informants concluded that the ADR process could not deal 
with a matter outside the legal jurisdiction of the ICRC. In their view, the ICRC 
could not approve an agreement that addressed such a matter. Others were somewhat 
hopeful that ADR could address these issues, allowing the College to resolve the 
majority of the complaints they received. Some were prepared to go ahead and 
include such matters, but others were more cautious and awaited further interpretation 
of the scope of the ADR process to resolve College complaints. 
There's a whole possibility that our ADR program becomes a mini small 
claims court, so you're resolving [financial] issues or whatever, and we're 
talking about that. We haven't come to a decision one way or another as to 
whether that's reasonable or not, but certainly because of the financial nature 
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of the practice and the cases that we deal with, money is often the centre of 
the issue. (MC2b) 
4. 5 The Federation of Health Regulatory Colleges of Ontario 
In the course of several of the interviews with College informants, reference was 
made to the role of the Federation of Health Regulatory Colleges of Ontario 
(FHRCO). The Federation was founded in the early 1990s to deal with the issues 
following the passage, but before the proclamation of the Regulated Health 
Professions Act. There were notable sexual abuse issues at that time, especially 
linked to the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario. Over time, these 
informants noted, the FHRC had evolved to become an increasingly helpful and 
effective mechanism for information exchange among the RHP A Colleges. Several 
of the smaller Colleges expressed their gratitude to the Federation for sponsoring 
committees, subgroups and working groups - both formal and informal - to address 
common issues and share best practices in the various areas of statutory 
responsibility. A few informants referred to specific meetings that had taken place to 
·discuss ADR and the ADR legislation. The smaller Colleges identified the "leaders" 
in the regulatory community who "generously shared" their knowledge, resources and 
experience with the smaller, less experienced Colleges. 
Our College has benefited immensely by being a member of the Federation, 
because Colleges with the larger resources have stepped up and they've 
shared with smaller Colleges like ours. So I can't speak highly enough of the 
Federation and of those larger Colleges and their willingness to share. 
Otherwise it would be even more challenging than what it is now for us to 
fulfill our statutory requirements. (SCI) 
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Several informants commented on the changes taking place within the FHRC to make 
it more effective. It was noted that a committee had been formed to deal with 
legislative and policy issues and had "really done a lot of the legwork." As a further 
sign of responsiveness to evolving circumstances, one informant pointed out, "We 
[FHRC] do have an accountability working group that surprisingly was formed before 
that Bill [ 171] was introduced, but it preempted then our ability to have the dialogue 
with the Minister" (MC2). Therefore, the suggestion (inferred from the Ministry's 
comments and actions by several respondents) that the health regulatory Colleges 
needed "to be called into question, to be held up to be accountable," was especially 
disturbing to some of the College informants, because, in their view, the Colleges had 
given proof of their capacity to organize and be responsive - one example being the 
newly legislated requirement in the RHP A for interprofessional collaboration. As one 
informant countered, "I think the Federation is an excellent example of how the 
Colleges collaborated without being legislated to do it" (MCI). 
The Federation is not (and cannot legally become) a lobby group, but it was viewed 
by the Colleges as "actively engaged in legislative change - behind the scenes most 
of the time, related to all kinds of things." 
So the content of the legislation as it went through its various iterations, we 
were consulted around that. ... I think we are seen as a go-to collective. I 
think there's some challenges around various behaviours that create some of 
the Ministry use as collective discussion, but not the Ministry use as collective 
partner. I think that's a shift that we're trying to work hard on, and the 
accountability stuff. (MC2) 
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Among the changes taking place to make the Federation a more effective voice for 
the regulatory Colleges has been restructuring affecting the Board of Directors, 
"structural and functional changes," including "taking a more substantive policy 
approach" to issues. 
In the past the Federation had required unanimous agreement by all the Colleges to 
the document before making a submission (e.g., to the Minister, to HPRAC) on. 
behalf of the members of the Federation. It was mentioned that the ADR legislation 
was one such case where there was not unanimity, because "if you've only got 6 of 
the 24 [sic] Colleges who are actively engaged in some form of ADR, that's never 
going to carry the day in terms of getting a spot in the submission. Then you're just 
going to have the individual voices" (MC3). 
We had a policy within the Federation that if we didn't all agree with every 
"i" and "t" in a submission, that it couldn't be submitted as a Federation 
document. And that kind of crippled us, and [HPRAC] was of the view that 
our submissions weren't particularly interesting or useful, because there was 
nothing left to them by the time we determined what exactly were the things 
we were going to say. (SC6) 
Out of a sense of frustration with the Supervisor legislation and other areas where 
more consultation - and more respect for the Colleges - was seen to be important, the 
Colleges frequently voiced the "fond hope," as one informant described it, that the 
Federation was "moving more in the direction where I think it will gain credibility 
with the Government. And that's what we've tried to express to Government. If 
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you've got an issue, involve us in the discussion around the issue. Help us to 
understand what the issue is that you 're facing, and we can offer suggestions to 
resolve it" (SC 1 ). 
Several College informants spoke of the desire to have a more collaborative 
relationship with the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, though it was 
mentioned they could never actually be "partners," but at least the Federation 
representing the collective and collaborative representative of the regulatory Colleges 
could become 
a much more effective body in collaborating with the Ministry from the very 
early stages of policy development, because we - the Federation - found 
ourselves in a position of reacting very often in the past, rather than being 
involved at the front end to really work with Government to try and think 
about issues together and develop proposals together - proposals relating to 
professional regulation. Certainly that has been a theme of representations 
we've been making to the Ministry recently. We've met with the Deputy 
Minister and with the Minister's office as well, and put the case that we 
wanted to be more involved early on in the process ... and we've met with a 
very good reception .... We've not had meetings with the Minister per se, but 
with the policy analysts and so forth, and so we'll see how that goes. But that 
certainly is something we would very much like to do, because there's a lot of 
expertise around the table, and we would very much like to contribute to that 
process. (SC6) 
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Chapter Five 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
5.1 Introduction 
This dissertation has taken two paths towards an understanding of whether and how 
to legislate the process and practice of ADR. The initial research approach has been 
theoretical, exploring the range of scholarship to develop a framework of related 
theories that, taken together, provide a lens through which to view and understand the 
effects of new legislation on a regulatory community - what constitutes a regulatory 
community and how the individual and community values, norms, beliefs, 
assumptions, economic, social and political history and the perceived power 
dynamics within the community, as well as general influences from outside the 
community affect the bureaucratic decisions of those governed by the legislation. 
The first section identified and established connections among regulatory theories that 
might explain whether, how and why some rules are followed while others are only 
partially followed, adjusted to fit circumstances or rejected entirely. 
Responding to the call for robust empirical research into the theoretical assumptions, 
the second part of this paper reports on a case study into those regulator perceptions 
of and attitudes towards the ADR legislation enacted in the HSIA that amended the 
Schedule 2 Health Professions Procedural Code in the RHP A. The research results 
recorded so far have addressed the need for concrete empirical evidence of the 
experiences, relationships and practices in a specific regulatory community; the 
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particular forms of power and the problems the regulatory community and its 
stakeholders experience and how these structure their regulatory outlook and produce 
differences and similarities in their behaviour. This chapter compares the theories 
and the theoretical framework discussed earlier, and seeks to determine whether and 
to what extent the empirical evidence supports or challenges the theory in ways that 
enable a better understanding of the regulatory process, especially in relation to 
whether and how to legislate ADR. 
This chapter analyzes the interviews in relation to the theory regarding regulatory 
·culture, legal consciousness, administrative discretion and ADR legislation. It 
reflects on how the interview data expose the tension between law and altemative-to-
law (other than, or "non" law) and highlight the presence of and resistance to 
constitutive legalism in ways that are relevant to ADR legislation. Moreover, it 
addresses the question of whether the insights about various responses to the ADR 
legislation might be applicable to understanding the intended and unintended 
consequences of new legislation and new regulation more generally. It also discusses 
how ADR legislation in particular presents challenges that help illuminate 
individuals' attitudes to the purpose and efficacy of legislation - how law helps and 
how law hinders bureaucratic decision-making. 
In particular, because several scholars have argued that ADR, as an alternative to a 
traditional law-based approach to dispute and complaints resolution, requires only 
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very minimal or no legal constraints on its practice, an enquiry into bureaucratic 
regulators' responses to new ADR legislation provides an opportunity to observe and 
record the influence oflaw versus non-law values, beliefs and assumptions within a 
particular regulatory community and within the more general theoretical framework 
discussed in this paper that relates legalism, regulatory culture, legal consciousness 
and administrative discretion as interdependent concepts directly affecting regulator 
perceptions of and attitudes toward ADR legislation. 
Using a qualitative research methodology that encourages the fullest expression of 
informant views across a broad spectrum of respondents representing the variety of 
health profession self-regulatory College experience and conditions, the case study 
research has uncovered and exposed a fuller breadth of contingencies that influence 
regulator administrative discretion than heretofore studied and reported in relation to 
the implementation of specific legislation, and ADR legislation in particular. It 
provides unparalleled access to regulator legal consciousness regarding discretionary 
administrative decision-making and serves as a model methodology for understanding 
the regulatory process, particularly the considerations that produce, or contribute to 
the paradox of intended and unintended consequences of law-making. 
The case study research revealed several aspects of regulator perceptions and the 
influence of these perceptions and their emotional expression on administrative 
practices, including: 
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• the various regulator understandings about ADR as a process to resolve the 
complaints they receive and are responsible under the law for resolving; 
• how the ADR legislation aligns with their understanding of ADR and how it 
changes, supports, undermines or in any other way impacts their current 
practices or preferences, i.e., how they have responded to the ADR legislation 
and the reasons for their behaviour; 
• why some regulators embrace the legislation, others accept the legislation 
(though perhaps only reluctantly), some manipulate the legislation to meet 
their needs, and still others seek to resist, avoid, or subvert the legislation as it 
is written, often substituting their own preferred practices and rationales. 
Chapter Five explores whether the data validate Meidinger's five elements of 
regulatory culture - general cultural assumptions, political pressures, legal 
requirements, bureaucratic procedures and structural constraints - as the causes or 
justifications for types of discretionary decision-making in the interpretation and 
application of the legislation; which of these elements may have greater weight; and 
whether this enquiry provides a more robust understanding of the grounds for 
administrative discretion in relation to ADR legislation than more traditional 
theoretical approaches to regulatory studies, as Meidinger and others strongly 
suggest. This chapter also analyzes and discusses whether the three elements of 
Ewick and Silbey's legal consciousness theory regarding individual attitudes toward 
law and legality - conformity, contestation and resistance - help describe and explain 
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the types of response representing the effects of the regulatory culture elements on 
administrative discretion regarding whether and how legislation is adopted. 
5.2 Friedman's Theories and the Three Key Informant Question Clusters 
The Theoretical Foundations and Debates chapter opened with reference to the 
influence of Friedman on legal culture and consciousness studies, taking particular 
note of the three critical areas of socio-legal study he identifies as central to the socio-
legal field of enquiry: the social and legal forces that press in and make the law; the 
law itself (structures and rules); and the impact of law on behaviour in the outside 
world (i.e,, how the law is enacted in and affects the lives of people outside the legal 
drafting and enactment process). Friedman's three considerations about law in its 
social context were the foundation for the three main question areas posed to the key 
informants: What in your view gave rise to the ADR legislation? How appropriate is 
this particular ADR legislation in your view? What is the impact of this ADR 
legislation on your previous practices? Using these questions as the starting points 
for a discussion of the legislation with those directly involved in its development, 
interpretation and implementation led to robust commentary by the key informants, 
further enhanced by a series of probing questions by the researcher about the matters 
raised. 
The first question generated a wide-ranging discussion of the perceived origins of the 
legislation, perceived reasons for the legislation, and perceived goals and purpose of 
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the legislation. The responses reflect social, economic, political, historical and 
teleological perceptions and considerations. The first question also uncovered a range 
of understanding from certainty about the cause or origin of the legislation on the one 
hand, to uncertainty or expressed lack of knowledge about how the ADR legislation 
came about or what gave rise to it on the other. In the absence of certainty, some key 
informants chose to speculate about the forces that might have caused the legislation. 
Later in this chapter, the considerations mentioned in response to the first question 
will be analyzed as to whether and to what extent they reflect Meidinger's regulatory 
culture elements. With regard to Friedman's socio-legal approach to legal studies, it 
would appear that this question is capable of prompting and uncovering a wide 
variety of sometimes contradictory perceptions, attitudes, opinions and beliefs about 
the cause and the purpose of the legislation in question held by those in the regulatory 
community whose actions the legislation is intended to govern. 
Later in this chapter, the importance of the key informants' perceptions regarding the 
origins and purpose of the legislation will be related to Ewick and Silbey's three 
categories of responses to the law and discussed as reasons whether, why and to what 
extent the legislation might or might not be adopted by the regulatory community and 
its individual member actors. However, the empirical data reported in this 
dissertation, examined in the light of the Friedman and Ewick and Sil bey theories 
about the basis of legal culture studies and legal consciousness in response to 
perceived legal situations, reveal that the perceived origins of the law affect the legal 
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actors' attitudes towards the law and whether and how the law is implemented. The 
data also reveal that the attitudes and approach to legislative implementation are 
significantly affected by the size of College, previous experience with informal or 
alternative dispute resolution, type and culture of profession, access to resources, and 
levels of trust and frustration with the political dynamic within and impinging on the 
regulatory environment. 
The second question cluster, regarding whether the law is appropriate, uncovered 
attitudes among the key informants towards the general appropriateness of the 
legislation, as well as comments about specific provisions of the legislation. The 
question was intentionally general and neutral to allow key informants to select 
specific elements of the legislation to comment upon. The generality of the question, 
by opening the discussion to any aspect of the law that might be judged appropriate or 
inappropriate, nonetheless prompted very specific responses and reasons for the 
attitudes and values that informed them. As the discussion unfolded, subsequent 
questions generated a discussion of the various aspects the first question had 
uncovered, as the research findings demonstrate. 
In general terms, the law was viewed as positive and useful by those who had 
participated in a consultation process or who believed it either supported or at least 
did not challenge their current or previous practices. However, even among those 
with positive attitudes towards the legislation, certain provisions of the legislation 
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gave cause for concern, principally those concerned with time constraints, risks from 
the confidentiality provisions, and having to have different staff handle the ADR 
process, keeping it separate from the rest of the complaints management and 
investigation process. This neutral question, based on Friedman's focus on "the law 
itself' as the second of the three elements of socio-legal studies, also opened the 
conversation to those who had strong negative attitudes towards the ADR legislation, 
uncovering beliefs that, if adopted, the law would render a previously effective, 
informal process inflexible, rigid and too formal. 
Finally, Friedman's focus on "the impact of the law on behaviour in the outside 
world" informed the third question cluster regarding the impact of the legislation on 
College complaints resolution practices. This general question gave rise to a wide 
range of responses, from the observation of no impact at all, to the legislation 
requiring stopping informal complaints resolution altogether, with a rich variety of 
similar and alternative responses between these extremes. The question allowed the 
informants to recount their general response as well as the particulars - often in rich 
detail - of the changes to or retention of previous routines or patterns of behaviour in 
response to or in spite of the new ADR legislation. This neutral question also 
produced some very passionate responses from the informants, revealing considerable 
drama within the regulatory community and in relation to various aspects of the 
regulatory culture that provides essential information about what must be considered 
when developing and implementing legislation, particularly ADR legislation. Other 
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dimensions were uncovered in response to followup probing questions in the context 
of a robust discussion of informant perceptions and attitudes. 
Grounding the sets of research questions in Friedman's legal system and legal culture 
theory provided a clear theoretical framework for this enquiry, while maintaining 
openness to a wide range of responses among the different types of key informants -
policymaker/ legislator, regulator/bureaucrat, regulator/Council member, 
judiciary/Appeal and Review Board, as the data recorded in the last chapter amply 
demonstrate. These questions also permitted an open enquiry into the presence of the 
key elements of Meidinger' s regulatory culture as determinants of regulatory 
administration and provided an opportunity to enquire broadly into the possible 
grounds for the typical responses to law that Ewick and Silbey and others have 
documented as forming part of legal consciousness. 
5.3 Regulatory Culture and Regulatory Community 
Membership and Relationships in the RHPA Community 
The key informants spoke to their perception that the Colleges comprise a 
community, organized in relation to and by the RHP A. At the same time, there is a 
clear recognition that the members of the community are quite diverse and have 
different interests and needs according to their position within the larger regulatory, 
social, economic and political environment. Some Colleges were described as 
"mainstream," traditional healthcare providers with a long history of self-regulation 
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in the province under previous legislative frameworks, while other members of the 
RHP A community were identified as newer to self-regulation, and some, who were 
not interviewed, were preparing to enter the RHP A community, while still others are 
hopeful of being included in the future. Some members of the community are seen to 
have greater power in the wider society by virtue of their numbers (e.g., nurses with 
some 155,000 members), while others, like the physicians and surgeons, are seen to 
have power by virtue of their specialized knowledge and standing in the wider 
society. What all College members of the community appear to have in common is 
that they represent particular healthcare professions and that they are in the business 
of professional self-regulation. These two signifiers qualify all Colleges for 
membership in the RHPA community. 
However, there is a wider RHP A regulatory community, which appears to include the 
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care with a relationship of authority over the 
regulatory Colleges, as well as the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, 
with a judicial role over the College complaints and registration processes. Because 
the case study focused on the ADR legislation, it is unsurprising that the legislative 
authority would be seen by the key informants as a significant element in the 
regulatory process. Arguably, any regulatory matter within the College community 
would ultimately involve the legislative authority. They also belong in the 
community because these officials too are regulators and share that characteristic with 
the regulatory Colleges. 
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One key informant pointed out that the key officials in the MHL TC branch 
responsible for the health regulatory Colleges, including those interviewed for this 
study, had come to the provincial Government from one regulatory College in 
particular and therefore had (or should have had) experience and insights into (and 
perhaps more sympathy for?) the issues the Colleges face. On the other hand, there 
was also a perception that these Ministry policy-makers and legislators were isolated 
and divorced from the reality of the regulatory Colleges, being "eggheads" with 
limited appreciation of the concrete experiences and challenges of "street level 
bureaucrats." Another College key informant referenced their own background 
working on behalf of HPRAC at the time of the RHP A review, which they recalled 
during the interview. Therefore, to some extent the community is populated by 
officials with experience in different aspects of the RHP A regulatory process and 
individuals are well known to those colleagues with whom they may have worked in 
a different capacity. The research therefore appears to demonstrate that Meidinger's 
community figure operates on various levels that intersect in different, sometimes 
subtle and interesting ways that may not be obvious to an outsider, much as the 
regulatory culture and administrative discretion literature suggests. 
Because this study focused on matters involving the complaints process, HP ARB was 
mentioned frequently in reference to aspects of the legislation. Had the study 
addressed some other aspect of professional self-regulation, HP ARB would not 
perhaps have been mentioned at all, and so would not appear to figure as a member of 
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the RHP A community and its culture, although arguably its presence is always a 
factor within the RHP A regulatory culture. Some key informants were concerned 
about HP ARB' s judicial role and expressed fear of HP ARB' s power to call them to 
account, particularly in relation to not meeting the time limits in the legislation. 
Other key informants appeared to empathize with HP ARB' s limitations and 
countered any impression from within the community that HP ARB was the "enemy" 
of the regulatory Colleges. It was mentioned more than once that HP ARB was 
funded by the Government, unlike the regulatory Colleges, thereby being more on the 
"them" side of the "us-and them" divide that some Colleges unhappy with the role of 
Government perceived. 
HPRAC's reports were cited several times in relation to the ADR legislation, but they 
appear to be regarded by the Colleges as ancillary to MHL TC, and not as much 
separate members of the RHPA community, even in the way that MHLTC was 
perceived to be directly involved in RHP A regulatory community affairs. While 
some College respondents acknowledged and praised HPRAC's role in defining the 
issues in relation to ADR, some were dismissive of and even hostile to their work, 
seeing HPRAC as aligned with the Government in a movement to undermine the 
autonomy of the Colleges. It may be relevant to note that the HSIA, as well as 
220 
legislating the use of ADR in complaints resolution, also contained provisions to 
clarify and limit HPRAC's consultative and advisory role.257 
The value most cited as defining membership in the community is the requirement to 
serve and protect the public interest, which is explicitly required by the legislation258 
and which most informants mentioned as the fundamental duty and object of the 
Colleges. Among the Colleges, there appears to be a strong sense that this value is 
being upheld in the various ways that their processes address the public interest, 
provide public protection and provide public service. Several informants commented 
that the ADR legislation reflected MHLTC's similar commitment to the public 
interest, though some College officials thought otherwise, suggesting that the ADR 
legislation, as written, conflicted with the value of public service and the public 
interest. 
It appeared from the interviews with College officials that while some Colleges view 
the final ADR legislation positively, several were united as a group within the 
community in their frustration at the Government's approach to legislating ADR, 
viewing it as another example of the way they felt disrespected and distrusted as a 
community. Their sense of grievance and injustice, particularly among the smaller 
Colleges, especially in relation to what they considered unreasonable demands on 
257 RHP A sections 7 to I 7 
258 HPPC section 3 
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their resources, appears to act as a further determinant of common cause, enhancing a 
sense of community in a "them versus us" dynamic. At the same time, the smaller 
Colleges were often forthcoming in their acknowledgement of the larger Colleges as 
generous mentors, sympathetic to their problems and predicament and ready to take a 
leadership and facilitative role, mainly through the activities organized by the 
Federation. 
It is also possible to discern fractures among the Colleges in relation to what some 
perceived as questionable ADR practices carried out by some members of the 
community. While these may have been justified as a "survival mechanism," others 
were mentioned as part of a darker element among the members of the community, 
which caused the ADR legislation to be brought to bear on everyone, whether they 
had engaged in ADR, had not engaged in ADR (and possibly did not intend to), or 
were merely considering it. The perception that these members whose behaviour in 
relation to complaints resolution was seen to have fallen afoul of the community 
value, putting professional interest ahead of public interest ("protecting their own"), 
gave rise to comments about the problem of blanket legislation when it means that all 
may be punished for the sins of a few. 
Meidinger makes the point that the culture of regulatory communities reflects shared 
values and ideals, but accommodates dissonances, inconsistencies and illogicalities, 
deviances from the norm which reflect community members' own perceived interests 
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and routinely co-exist with common community values and purpose. Clearly, there is 
an ongoing discussion within the RHP A community about which College is doing 
this or that, but there is also, as in many communities, a principle that discussion of 
questionable or non-conforming behaviours should not be made public, so, while 
some things were hinted at during the interviews, no Colleges were singled out as 
being in serious conflict with the overall values of the community, despite some of 
their activities giving "self-regulation a bad name." Subsequent to the interviews, one 
College (whose staff was interviewed for this study) was subjected by the 
Government to an outside review for questionable practices and, following a critical 
report (by PWC Consultants), had its Council and Registrar replaced by a Supervisor 
(a retired Registrar of another College included in this study). 259 
The regulatory theory makes reference to the special role of professionals 
(consultants, lawyers) within the regulatory community as mediating certain aspects 
of the regulatory process, sometimes indistinguishable from the regulatory clients 
they serve, and sometimes seen, as the interviews reveal, as players with their own 
professional agenda and interests within the regulatory community. The key 
informants made mention of the role of legal counsel in interpreting and applying the 
legislation and the differing views of legal counsel (some more attended to than 
others, according to the informants) that determined whether and to what extent 
259 See http://www.health.gov .on. ca/en/news/bulletin/2012/hb _ 201203 26 _ l .aspx for announcement 
andhttp://www.denturists-cdo.com/site/whatsnew?nav=02 for a chronology of related events. 
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certain aspects of the legislation were adopted and put into practice. The key 
informants also mention the influence of the large insurers and the unions on the 
College complaints and discipline processes. It is perhaps hard to make an argument 
for these being members of the regulatory community in the same way as the 
Colleges, MHL TC or HP ARB, though they undoubtedly affect the complaints and 
discipline process, including, and especially ADR, sometimes quite significantly, as 
in the case of the insurers and their legal counsel for the physicians and surgeons. 
While having one regulatory framework for a disparate group of health profession 
regulatory bodies appeared frustrating and constraining to some community members, 
others saw the framework as providing a legislative structure that provided scope for 
creativity in meeting the mandate of the regulatory Colleges. The latter view was 
mainly held by the MJILTC informants and the better-funded (larger membership 
and/or higher membership fees) regulatory Colleges. It is possible that greater 
resources allowed them more options by which to benefit from the framework of the 
legislation. 
Framework Legislation 
Meidinger identifies regulatory culture as what occurs in a regulatory community. He 
asserts that the sum of the decisions and actions taken by the members of the 
regulatory community constitute regulatory culture, which determines how regulation 
is organized and carried out in specific situations. Primary regulatory groups are 
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regulatory communities rather than simply discrete bureaucratic organizations, 
because they influence each other, act with reference to one another, desire each 
other's respect, act in opposition to other community members, according to values, 
beliefs, ideas and a shared vision of the community. 
The results of the key informant interviews provide important evidence that there is 
an RHP A "regulatory community" with a "regulatory culture" that determines how 
regulation is organized and carried out, particularly in relation to the ADR legislation 
that is the subject of this study. In the first instance, the RHPA is described by 
several informants as "framework legislation" that governs many different healthcare 
professions, each one also being governed by its own Act. Several of the key 
informants drew attention to what some described as "blanket legislation" that 
required each College to meet the requirements of the RHP A, regardless of the type 
of services the profession provides, the size of the profession and (hence) College 
membership, as well as the extent of the resources available to fund the College's 
business. While some informants commented that the framework type of legislation 
allowed flexibility and a degree of autonomy and creativity in the specific application 
of the legislation, others saw the framework legislation as capturing or defining those 
governed by the legislation within a narrow interpretive and judgmental frame. What 
one College was seen to have done (or failed to do) could affect all the members of 
the regulatory community. As the former Chair of HPRAC recently commented, the 
Government responds to one "rogue regulator" - the "inadequate or inept behaviour 
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in one profession" - with consequences that impact all the regulated professions. 
Such "new oversight and interventional mechanisms apply to all the regulated 
professions in the sector.260 While there are advantages to being a member of a 
regulatory community, such as the potential to share information and to learn from 
one another, as the informants observed, there are also significant disadvantages 
when the behaviour of one member brings about negative consequences for all. 
These negative consequences can involve a (sometimes very significant) reduction in 
the very flexibility that the framework model of governing and informing community 
behaviour is intended to provide. Some informants believed the flexibility that 
accommodates individual profession and College differences had been preserved 
under the "framework" ADR legislation - they were not caught "in a box," while 
others viewed the ADR legislation as rigid and unworkable for many of the 
community's members. 
Overall, the findings from the key informant interviews appear to support the cross-
currents of competition and cooperation within the RHP A regulatory community that 
were identified in the previous studies of the community by O'Reilly, Spoel and 
James and by Gilmour et al. 
260 B. Sullivan "The Public Perspective and Confidence in Regulators," Conference slides, Council on 
Licensure, Enforcement and Regulation Annual Conference, San Francisco, September 2012 
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5.4 Meidinger's Elements of Regulatory Culture 
Meidinger views regulatory culture as the result of individual and collective 
regulatory community interaction with general cultural assumptions held by the wider 
society, political pressures from within and from outside the regulatory community, 
including the pressure to meet the needs of the larger system, legal requirements 
imposed on the regulatory community, as well as bureaucratic procedures available to 
and structural constraints experienced by the community as a whole and by its 
individual constituent ·members. Meidinger asserts that all these pressures, dynamics 
and dimensions both within and from outside the community together make 
regulatory culture and regulatory administration. The next section analyzes the 
findings in relation to the five elements Meidinger cites and discusses how they 
illuminate community members' responses to the ADR legislation. 
General Cultural Assumptions and Political Pressures 
Meidinger identified general cultural assumptions and political pressures as two of 
the five elements that constitute regulatory culture within a regulatory community and 
influence administrative regulation and discretion. Each of these is both external and 
internal to the regulatory community. The community reflects the wider social 
conventions as well as the conventions within the community itself. Black and Pratt 
describe how the attitudes and actions of members of the regulatory community are 
not taken in isolation from the wider society in which the regulatory community is 
situated, and how the decisions of "street level bureaucrats" are informed by the 
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values, ideas and beliefs that are current and may be predominant in relevant sectors 
of the larger society. 
Influence of General Cultural Assumptions on Regulatory Administration 
Constitutive Legal Environment 
Regarding the hegemony of law in society and the benefits of certainty that legislative 
authority conveys, many informants acknowledged the need to reassure the public 
and certain Colleges, as well as their legal advisors, that ADR is a legitimate process 
to be used to resolve certain complaints against health professionals. Thus it can be 
seen that, for this reason, enshrining the ADR process in law is an effective means to 
legitimize its use. However, it is also evident from the interviews that there is a 
contrary view of ADR as a flexible, spontaneous, non-law process which should not 
be shackled by legal constraints. This issue was articulated in the discussion of the 
"alternativeness" of ADR, which some College informants interpreted as being 
alternative to, apart and distinct from what they viewed as the constraints of a law-
based complaints resolution process. At the heart of this dichotomy is the tension 
between the permissive freedom that legal authority confers to use the process and the 
constraints legal authority places on how that freedom is to be exercised. Several 
informants commented on this tension, expressing appreciation for the greater clarity 
and legitimation of ADR as a process to be used, and concern about the perceived 
restrictions the law placed on the process. A few Colleges and the MHL TC 
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informants thought the right balance had been achieved between law's benefits and 
potential costs. 
The MHL TC informants noted that the College ADR processes had to be aligned 
with "civil law doctrines" and constitutional rights and protections, thus invoking the 
general legal culture as a model and influence on the ADR legislation. They also 
noted that the legal principles of confidentiality, due process and procedural fairness . 
should govern the practice of ADR in the College complaints resolution process. One 
College informant expressed frustration and a sense of insult that the Government 
seemed therefore to be implying that the Colleges did not follow these legal 
principles from the general legal culture. On the other hand, one well informed 
College informant acknowledged that in some instances Colleges were not practicing 
according to these principles, thus inciting the Government to take steps to correct 
this "problem" of deviance from the principles accepted in the general legal culture. 
Erosion of Professional Self-Regulation 
O'Reilly's study of the introduction of the RHPA in the period 1989 - 1994 records 
what she sees as the adaptation of health profession self-regulation in Ontario to 
emerging values and standards of the day. She observes the rise in the rhetoric of 
consumer rights and services and a shift to greater holistic and collaborative values. 
Among the predominating values 0 'Reilly cites as part of a new social paradigm 
taking precedence in Ontario are transparency, accountability and responsiveness to 
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consumer needs for improved service and involvement in the self-regulatory process. 
The informant who characterized the ADR legislation as the Government promoting 
an agenda of collaboration ("the flavour of the month") begrudgingly acknowledges 
the Government agenda that O'Reilly identified as opening the self-regulatory 
judicial process to greater public involvement. The MHL TC informants and others 
also confirmed the importance of making the complaints process accessible to the 
public, not simply as witnesses to the process, but as participants in the process. 
At the same time, it seems evident that, as the scholarly studies referred to suggest, 
the ADR legislation was perceived to narrow the previous ability of the Colleges to 
manage their complaints resolution process in a manner that met their needs and the 
needs of the complainants and College members. The ADR legislation may have 
been considered more favourably by more College informants had it conformed to the 
practices and suggestions the Colleges made to HPRAC and, through them, as well as 
directly, to the Government. Instead, the ADR legislation appeared to be embraced 
by the few Colleges that said they had played an active role in its design and on 
whose previously existing ADR processes the new legislation was modeled, as 
evidenced by the comments by those Colleges. For Colleges without the resources, 
or with particular issues that made it more difficult to adopt the legislation in its 
entirety, the legislation presented significant challenges that prevented its adoption, 
with various consequences. 
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Public interest 
Several informants addressed the question of whether the new ADR legislation was in 
the public interest. Various aspects of the public interest were put forward as 
justifications both for and against the ADR legislation. These can be seen as 
reflecting the various concepts of public interest within the larger society. Scholars 
have debated what exactly constitutes the public interest, and there is perhaps no clear 
and generally accepted definition of it, as it is often seen to be inflected by the values 
of particular "publics" and their interests, as the Spoel and James and Gilmour studies 
demonstrate. It is in the very nature of the public interest debate that public interest 
can be interpreted quite flexibly to bolster the arguments and agendas of those who 
use the concept to promote their cause. 261 
Those who claimed that the ADR legislation promotes the public interest saw it as 
creating consistency and standardization among the various College processes, 
providing clear expectations and guidance to those administering and participating in 
the process. They claimed that the legislation made the process more transparent to 
those participating in it. It would no longer be perceived as something occurring 
behind closed doors, skewed in favour of the professional, and less committed to 
protection of the public. 
261 See, for example, M. Feintuck, "The 'Public Interest'" in C. Scott, ed., Regulation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), who argues that the concept of"the public interest" can be defined in so many ways 
and is often used to legitimize and advance the interests of various actors in the policy and legislative 
development process. Its lack of definition makes the concept vulnerable to capture by interest groups, in a 
manner contrary to the collective values that the term seems to imply. 
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Use of ADR in the Larger Society beyond RHP A Regulatory Community 
The responses from the key informants acknowledge that the use of ADR in other 
areas of society- family, civil and labour disputes were cited- had helped to bolster 
the use of ADR means to resolve complaints in the RHPA College systems. The use 
of ADR in the wider society was viewed as a factor influencing some of the earlier 
adopters of ADR processes among the regulatory Colleges. CNO, CPSO, RCDSO 
and CPO were among those Colleges identified as having successfully imported 
alternative dispute resolution ideas, methods and practices into their own processes, 
providing examples of what appeared to be working successfully and therefore worth 
adopting more generally within the community. However, the past history of ADR 
approaches and practices in some Colleges was also cited by HPRAC in its two 
RHP A review reports as not appropriate for a regulatory College established to serve 
and protect the public interest. 
As one informant stated, the use of ADR "was undeniable," as a valid approach to 
certain kinds of dispute outside the regulatory community and as it was being used 
inside the regulatory community. One MHL TC informant noted that ADR had 
become the "watchword in the past few years." Thus the influence of events in the 
general culture about what is acceptable and appropriate influenced the early 
proponents of ADR and their practice and example (for good or not) helped advance 
the adoption of ADR more widely within the RHPA community, ultimately leading to 
the kinds of questions, problems and challenges that provoked this legislative 
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solution. As some informants commented, the ADR process in the world outside the 
RHP A community has been subject to various definitions and constraints, depending 
on the environment, leading to a growing body of common or accepted practices, 
which appeared to be the basis for some aspects and provisions of the legislation. 
However, it was also pointed out that the RHP A complaints resolution process is not 
a dispute between a patient/client and a healthcare professional, and is not similar to 
the majority of disputes in the wider community and therefore should be imported 
and used within the complaints resolution process with caution. In fact, the 
complaints resolution process may be closer to a criminal allegation, with the onus on 
the College ("state") to prosecute or to reach an agreement. If that is the case, then 
the ADR being proposed for the RHP A community may be more closely aligned with 
the community or healing circle approach to criminal matters, in terms of the role of 
the accused, the state and the court, with the community and the alleged victim 
playing a more active role in the resolution of the case. 
Consumer Service 
Being able to offer ADR in the complaints resolution process to the complainant and 
the member was frequently viewed during the interviews as an improvement in 
service to both parties. Both MHL TC and College informants emphasized this 
aspect and, in some instances, the importance of providing a service appeared to be 
aligned with the primary duty of the Colleges "to serve and protect the public 
interest." On the one hand, it was argued that being able to provide an ADR process 
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would enhance service and improve relations between the profession and its clients 
and the wider public, and would thus also improve the profession's standing in the 
eyes of the Government and the media. At the same time, the actual ADR legislation 
appeared to several College informants to undermine the perceived duty of service by 
making the process cumbersome, intimidating, complicated and difficult. They 
questioned whether the provisions improved accessibility, compared with the 
informal processes several Colleges had .developed over the years to address 
complainant needs. Several commented that the previous informal process, usually 
conducted by telephone, allowed easy resolution of most non-serious cases. It was 
pointed out in contrast, that the new legislation did not improve service to the public 
(and thus was not in the public interest). Far from making the College complaints 
process more streamlined, as the Introduction to the legislation promised, several 
informants viewed the ADR legislation as creating burdens on and obstacles to the 
Colleges' ability to provide streamlined services to complainants and to members. 
For some with existing ADR processes, ADR is already a "difficult sell" to the public 
who expect the College to take the complaint out of their hands and handle it and are 
not interested in participating in the resolution process. They did not view the ADR 
legislation as making the process any more "saleable" to complainants. They 
appeared distressed that the limitations the legislation imposed would diminish their 
options for providing an effective service to the public and impede their ability to 
fulfill their statutory duty of serving the public interest. 
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Influence of Political Pressures on Regulatory Administration 
Meidinger emphasizes the role of political pressures and their influence on the 
regulatory community and on regulatory culture, which, in turn, determines what 
occurs in administrative regulation. Several political factors were identified by 
informants as having influenced the development of the legislation. College 
informants' perception of these political factors, and their positive or negative role in 
the provenance and passage of the legislation, in turn may have influenced the 
College informants' attitudes towards interpreting the legislation and their behaviours 
in applying it. 
Some informants identified the role of the media in influencing the political climate 
and the Government's attitudes toward the self-regulatory Colleges. As mentioned 
previously, the media appetite for scandal has led in the past to publication of College 
complaints process practices that had not met public expectations of transparency, 
fairness and accountability. In the view of some informants, these media stories 
reflect on all the Colleges and also call into question the Government's own 
accountability for overseeing and enforcing public expectations for the whole self-
regulatory system. While no informant condoned unfair or shady complaints 
resolution practices, most thought that the negative media reports reflected only a few 
of the thousands of complaints cases dealt with each year and therefore unjustly 
deprecated the whole College complaints resolution system. 
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Those who commented on this aspect also linked the media reports to the 
Government's political sensitivity to being held publicly accountable. The 
Government or opposition parties' desire for (re-)election was seen to frequently 
prompt measures to address these media reports, not always in a way that reflected 
best practices in public policy development - a "knee-jerk" reaction to political 
pressures rather than a measured and thoughtful response to an issue requiring 
attention. For some College infonnants, this was perceived to be a significant factor 
in the imposition of the ADR legislation. The findings also reflect the perception that 
the Government responded to media and public criticism of its own practices 
("scandals") by taking exemplary action to control or punish bodies under their 
legislative authority. Thus the ADR legislation, in some sense, could be interpreted 
as the Government treating the Colleges as handy (and defenseless) "whipping boys" 
whose behaviour, in the Colleges' view, in no way justified this treatment. 
Another political pressure identified during the key informant interviews relates to the 
trend identified in the O'Reilly study towards greater openness and collaboration 
between Government and the public. A few respondents noted the Government's 
attention to collaboration as the "flavour of the month," and Government's desire to 
appear "trendy" to the public by appearing to encourage more public involvement in 
College processes - to empower the public within the professional self-government 
process. Legislation was also perceived as providing evidence to the public and 
media of Government action and effectiveness. The Government was perceived by 
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some informants to be "legislating like crazy," with the purpose of building a 
powerful image with the public and the media, whether the legislation was actually 
needed or not. This was interpreted by several of the College informants as 
unwelcome Government interference, as inappropriately "putting their oar in" and 
treating the self-regulatory Colleges as government agencies. Not all respondents 
commented on this aspect of the legislation, but most felt at least some distrust of the 
Government as a result of its behaviour towards the regulatory community and a few 
noted that the distrust was clearly mutual. 
The data suggest other possible political pressures that were observed by the 
regulatory community to have influenced the legislation. One that stood out was the 
observation that the personal political ambitions of the Minister of Health and Long-
Term Care at the time of the development and passage of the legislation may have 
influenced the manner and degree to which the legislation reflected a directive, rather 
than facilitative approach to legislative design. Wishing to appear a strong and 
uncompromising political figure, the Minister was perceived as ignoring the advice of 
the members of the regulatory community. Thus, the legislation in the end failed to 
reflect the concerns of the smaller Colleges about their ability to implement the 
legislated requirements and the concerns of larger Colleges about the possible perils 
of the confidentiality provision - and did not appear to add anything, as one 
informant noted, to the enhancement of public protection. 
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Influence of Bureaucratic Procedures on Regulatory Administration 
Almost no College informant suggested that the ADR legislation was a welcome 
stimulus to improve their own procedures or process. Each College appeared to have 
an existing process to deal with complaints, and, as the findings show, many of these 
were seen to be highly effective by those Colleges in dealing with the types of 
complaints that that profession and that College most commonly dealt with. The 
College informants (perhaps not unnaturally) thought that many of the problems that 
the ADR legislation was intended to resolve were those caused or experienced by 
other Colleges. A majority viewed the legislation as helping to clarify and clean up 
practices in other Colleges and thus enhancing public protection. Slightly fewer than 
a majority believed that the legislation would improve the uptake of the ADR process 
by reassuring the public and complainants of its legitimacy through having the 
process and its procedures enshrined in legislation. 
The question of the need for the standardization and consistency of the process 
among Colleges was set against the need for recognition of the various professional 
and College cultures and the bureaucratic procedures that reflected those different 
professional cultures, as well as the differing nature of the complaints. All the 
various types of College complaint resolution procedures were described as intended 
to reflect the profession's practice while meeting the values of professional self-
regulation and the need for organizational efficiency. The formal and informal 
complaints management and resolution procedures were perceived to be aligned with 
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other management processes and procedures within the College organizational 
management system. For several Colleges, the changes the legislation would require 
to the College organization appeared impossible for the very practical reason of lack 
of financial and human resources. 
As Pratt points out, capturing both the external influences and internal management 
imperatives, "enforcement officials and bureaucracy, rather than making individual 
decisions with reference to the legislation, are significantly influenced by internal 
bureaucratic values as well as by larger, mutating social values in applying their 
decision-making discretion to particular cases. "262 This view is given more detailed 
-relevance in Banks' observation regarding the difficulties the bureaucrat faces in 
dealing with regulation, noting the additional burdens it imposes of additional 
paperwork, distortions in decisions about agency and organizational priorities, limits 
to choice, additional cost impositions and reduced flexibility, thus prolonging 
decision-making, using up scarce resources and inviting the temptation to evasion as 
much as (or more than) compliance.263 Thus, additional regulation frequently leads to 
unintended consequences as the manager seeks to avoid changing procedures to 
conform to the legislation. 
While the MHL TC informants viewed the legislation as making the complaints and 
discipline process more efficient, there were several dissenting opinions among the 
262 Pratt supra note 21 
263 Banks supra note 15 at 26 
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College informants who saw the new procedures as complicating and burdensome on 
the College's organizational management and as restricting management efficiency 
within the College and with the complainant and member, thus leading to what they 
perceived or imagined would be ineffective and frustrating ADR experiences. One of 
the principal bureaucratic procedures that presented difficulties and wide variations in 
proposed or actual practices was how to decide which complaints would be referred 
to the ADR process. This was complicated by the intention by some Colleges to 
maintain a form of informal complaints process for one type of complaint while 
identifying other types of complaints for ADR. 
Influence of Structural Constraints on Regulatory Administration 
For the purpose of this analysis, structural constraints are taken to be those aspects of 
the structure of the system and the bureaucratic organization that affect its ability to 
carry out the requirements of the legislation - its capacity to put the legislation into 
effect. Such constraints might include time available, human resources, money 
available to purchase technology or services, decision-making procedures, 
communication procedures, organizational structure, physical settings. 
The findings demonstrate that, for many of the Colleges, the new ADR legislation 
presented significant structural challenges, particularly for the smaller and medium-
sized Colleges. Several commented that, because of limited financial and human 
resources, they had struggled to fulfill their RHP A statutory obligations even before 
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the new ADR legislation required them to adopt what they viewed as a costly 
procedure, in some cases requiring them to replace an informal complaints resolution 
procedure which was intended to make complaints resolution more cost efficient in 
relation to these structural constraints. 
Financial Constraints 
Lacking financial resources, several informants commented that the requirement to 
ensure separation between the person facilitating the ADR process and others 
involved in the complaint investigation and resolution process placed an impossible 
burden on the College. While some envy of larger Colleges' access to financial and 
human resources emerged, their willingness to share those resources within the 
regulatory community was recognized and appreciated. The cost of hiring a mediator 
from outside the College, and the uncertainty about how much time (and cost) the 
process would involve led some to view engaging this process as tantamount to 
writing a "blank cheque." On the other hand, one College using a mediator's services 
estimated the average cost of mediation services per case at $250 to $300. Clearly 
there exists some uncertainty and fear about cost control that affects some Colleges' 
decision to use ADR. Another financial concern was the possibility of undertaking 
two parallel processes of investigation and mediation. For some Colleges this double 
cost appeared excessive and an ineffective way of spending members' fees, where 
carrying out an investigation (perhaps preceded by some preliminary informal 
enquiries) was a more prudent, if less participative option for the parties. 
241 
Time Constraints 
Many identified the time limits imposed by the legislation as a serious constraint 
affecting their willingness to undertake the ADR process. The community role of 
HP ARB as overseeing the fulfillment of time requirements was viewed differently 
among the members of the community. Some College informants were concerned 
about the consequences of not meeting the time constraints imposed, while others 
stated their belief that any time overrun could be justified and that such a justification 
would be acceptable to HP ARB. Several comments about the time limits being 
unreasonable and a deterrent to the adoption of the ADR process appeared to reflect a 
more general view among those commenting that the Government was being 
unreasonable in imposing these conditions with the legislation requiring both the 
investigative and the ADR options to be completed within the 150-day timeframe. 
Human Resource Constraints 
While financial constraints often determine Colleges' access to human resources to 
engage in the ADR process as required by the legislation, several informants 
expressed concern about where they would find appropriate facilitators, even 
assuming they were financially able to engage them. They also queried the ability of 
complainants' to understand the process and what College support would be required 
to help a non-English speaker to participate. 
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Decision-Making Procedures 
Some Colleges described the existing or customary College complaints decision-
making process as potentially constraining their adoption of the ADR legislation. 
The respective decision-making roles of the Registrar, the Director or Manager 
responsible for managing and administering the complaints process and the 
Committee of the College with the statutory responsibility for disposing of 
complaints would, in several instances, be challenged or complicated by the 
requirements of the legislation. Interestingly, some Colleges perceived that a 
framework policy and decision-making process, approved by the College Council 
and/or the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee, would be necessary to 
guide and direct staff who would then be delegated to make ADR case selection on 
the basis of the approved policy. 
Other College senior staff took very literally the role of the Registrar to refer a case to 
ADR, insisting that the ICRC would have no direct role in deciding whether a case 
should be referred to ADR. While all noted that the ICRC had the decision-making 
role at the end, when a case had been settled, some College staff informants were 
convinced that their Committee would approve the agreed settlement without 
knowing the details, while other College staff thought the Committee would never 
decide to approve a settlement for which they were not fully aware of the 
background. The range of responses appeared to reflect different professional 
cultures, and also the degree to which Committees were active decision-makers, how 
far they appeared to trust the College staff (Registrar and/or Director of Complaints), 
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as well as the extent of the Registrar's power and control over the members of the 
statutory Committee and their willingness to follow the Registrar's direction. 
Summary of Regulatory Culture Observations 
The Findings in response to the three question sets posed appear to confirm that the 
elements of Meidinger' s regulatory culture were present and identified by the key 
informants as influencing their attitudes towards the ADR legislation and their 
decision-making considerations as to whether and how they would be inclined to 
adopt, adapt or evade the legislated requirements. The elements Meidinger identifies 
appear to have a significant effect on the legal consciousness and the administrative 
discretion of those responsible for implementing the legislation. The most frequently 
mentioned considerations related to the elements of regulatory culture were: 
• the potential costs of implementing the new procedures 
• the complexity of the new procedures in practice, thus making the process 
appear less accessible, less "user-friendly" and less "alternative" 
•the challenges to existing roles and decision-making processes within the 
organization 
•the time constraints imposed that appeared to challenge organizational 
resources and values of procedural fairness and thoroughness 
• the apparent increase in Government control over College process and 
procedures and further loss of self-regulatory autonomy 
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Positive regulatory culture elements mentioned in the findings include the recognition 
of ADR as a legitimate process and the work of the community leaders that had 
adopted and used the process successfully, the sharing of information among 
members of the community, the sense of a maturing community that is prepared to 
collaborate to achieve public policy objectives. These and other themes that emerged 
in the course of the interviews and which can be characterized as aspects of 
regulatory culture appear to have influenced the informants' legal consciousness with 
respect to the ADR legislation. 
5.5 Influence of Legal Consciousness on Administrative Discretion 
The empirical findings provide various examples of Ewick and Silbey's conformity, 
contestation and resistance attitudes towards the legislation. For example, the findings 
reveal significant differences in perception of the legislation between those College 
informants who think they were fully consulted and their views heard and included; 
those who perceive they were consulted, but their views were not heard or were 
overruled, overlooked or dismissed; those who perceive that they were not consulted 
but others were; and those who were not consulted and concluded that therefore no 
College was. 
Interestingly, those who thought (or assumed) that the important, experienced, 
leading members of the community (those they said they respect and trust) were 
appropriately consulted, concluded therefore that due diligence had been done and 
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that the outcome was the best possible for the regulatory community, and so could 
accept the ADR legislation, even if it was difficult for them to implement. Those who. 
were not consulted and didn't know about the legislation till it happened, tended to 
view the legislation as a sudden and arbitrary imposition which they must adopt or 
adapt to, while others who believed their interests were not canvassed or taken into 
consideration appeared to be more inclined to reject the legislation. 
Conformity and Compliance 
Some Colleges were prepared to adopt (or had already had procedures in place that 
reflect) the provisions of the ADR legislation. These Colleges were usually the 
models on which the ADR legislation was designed and they reported having had 
discussions with other Colleges and with the Government prior to the drafting of the 
legislation about their experience with ADR to resolve complaints. For several of the 
Colleges - large, medium-sized and small with more formalized participatory 
complaints resolution processes - the ADR legislation represented an acceptable 
development from their own procedures. With some minor adjustments to their own 
procedures, they were able to conform to or comply with the legislation. They were 
not troubled by a sense of the Government having ulterior motives towards the 
Colleges or towards self-regulation that may have skewed their attitudes against the 
Government and against adopting the legislation. They were not concerned that the 
alternativeness of ADR was being lost, as the prescribed procedures closely matched 
what they had already accepted as necessary constraints on the use of ADR within 
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their own organization and culture. They were thankful that, for the most part, they 
got what they had wanted and were prepared to comply with the legislation. 
Contestation 
Among the Colleges interviewed there were several, as the findings demonstrate, who 
viewed the ADR legislation as an opportunity for creative interpretation, not only in 
the gaps between the words, but, as one informant pointed out, in the very "clarity" of 
the legislative wording. The clarity, as well as the ambiguity of the legislative 
drafting, were seen to be starting points for a continuing legislative development 
process by which the legislation could be adapted to address and manage practical 
issues, as well as deal with values and other cultural concerns that the legislation 
raised. These informants were not necessarily troubled by Government motives or 
attitudes towards the regulatory Colleges, though some clearly were and viewed their 
prerogative to contest the legislation by freely adapting it to meet their own purposes 
and circumstances as a way of asserting their autonomy and compensating for any 
perceived loss of their own authority by the Government's asserting its power to 
dictate ADR procedures which, in their view, imposed unacceptable costs, impossible 
deadlines and/or diminished choice or status on the Colleges. 
Resistance 
Several Colleges reported that they would not be adopting the ADR legislation. 
These included Colleges with little or no previous informal complaints resolution 
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experience who viewed the prescribed ADR process and procedures as too onerous 
and even counter-productive within their own professional culture or in terms of 
relations with the public and clients. Others with significant previous informal 
complaints resolution practices had decided to discontinue them altogether in light of 
the new ADR procedural requirements and not to adopt the new procedures as too 
costly and cumbersome. From having had a process that they considered met their 
public interest and public service obligations, they moved to no process at all - other 
than investigation of complaints. · Some feared that they would not be able to carry 
out the new procedures adequately and, rather than risk running afoul of the authority 
figures (Government, HP ARB), they would not continue their previous practices or 
adopt the new procedures. Some of these suggested they would wait till other · 
Colleges had tried the new process and would adopt the procedures once they had 
been "test-driven" by other, less cautious community members. These more cautious 
members preferred that any blame for inadequate performance fall upon one of their 
colleagues rather than on themselves. 
A third category of resistant Colleges were those who had had long-term robust 
informal or more formalized complaints resolution processes and expressed 
frustration with a legislative development process that, in their view, failed to take 
their legitimate concerns into consideration. As a result of their frustrating 
consultation experience, leaving them with a sense of procedural unfairness, as well 
as such other factors as resistance to the legislated process from major stakeholders, 
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such as their members' unions or liability insurers, they dismissed the legislation out 
of hand as inappropriate and unusable. 
Some appeared to be concerned that the "one size fits all" approach to the legislation 
was insensitive to the needs of the various professional cultures and, in some cases, 
the lengthy experience of complaints resolution within certain Colleges. There were 
several comments about the bluntness of the legislative and regulatory tools the 
Government had taken to using, Government's lack of respect for the flexibility of the 
original RHP A framework concept of legislating to accommodate different 
professional cultures, Government's lack of consultation with the key regulatory 
stakeholders, and one telling comment about the "eggheads down on Wellesley," that, 
together, provide a strong sense of the values- and culture-based grounds for 
resistance and subversion of the intent of the Government ADR legislation. 
5.6 Influence of Regulatory Culture and Legal Consciousness on the 
Administration of the ADR Legislation 
Lande advocates only minimal, flexible and permissive ADR legislation to 
accomplish desired goals, principally to ensure process pluralism and to create 
legitimacy and security for the process. Beyond those goals, he accepts that rules 
may be needed to protect confidentiality, to clarify the relationship with the courts, to 
protect consumers, and to provide default options when ADR agreements do not 
address certain issues. Lande insists that rules of any kind introduce risks, since laws 
where there were none before influence the way issues are viewed, interpreted and 
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understood. The RHP A legislation would appear to reflect Lande' s guidelines and 
concerns in both the positive and negative senses. 
Despite the MHL TC officials' insistence that the legislation is minimal and flexible, 
several of the College informants' negative, even hostile reactions appear to be based 
on a resistance to the imposition of law where no law existed before. The very act of 
defining in legislation creates the "cabining" effect that Cooper refers to in the study 
of juridification of previously discretionary processes and fuels regulatory resistance, 
leading, as Lande notes, to unintended consequences, since definitions can, by 
themselves, have a major impact on the processes they seek to regulate. 
Macauley speaks to the types of reactions to ADR legislation which are represented 
in the findings, namely to ignore the "legal commands" altogether or redefine them to 
suit self-interest or "common sense." The findings suggest that ADR legislation 
appears to be as susceptible, and perhaps more so than some other forms of 
legislation, to responses of contestation and resistance, given general culturally held 
beliefs about the benefits of its informality and flexibility, which are seen to be 
undermined, as Lande suggests, by fixing and prescribing ADR procedures in law. 
However, in addition to a basic resistance to law as Edelman, Stryker, Suchman and 
Lande suggest, the findings also demonstrate that this effect is increased when the 
ADR legislation is introduced into a regulatory culture where there is considerable 
suspicion, distrust and resistance towards the legislating authority. This is further 
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influenced by the elements of regulatory culture, when the new ADR law brings 
costs, resource demands, new procedures that may conflict with previous 
organizational practices and values or with ongoing organizational priorities. 
Pou describes the "obvious tension" in ADR laws of "trying to legislate flexibility" -
a view expressed or alluded to by some of the key informants who found such 
attempts as ironic and inherently ridiculous as Pou considers them. His observation 
that informality is generally taken to be the "lifeblood of the administrative process" 
is borne out in the interview data by those key informant descriptions of the usual 
type of complaints resolution that they found to be practical and effective prior to the 
ADR legislation. At the same time, Pou acknowledges the "bureaucratic anxiety" that 
clearly existed among those unsure whether ADR was a legitimate process if it was 
not authorized directly by law. The key informants from MHL TC, as well as some 
College informants appeared to subscribe to Pou' s view that the informality of the 
ADR process works best when it occurs within a prescribed framework. Legislation 
can provide that framework and give officials who require that measure of certainty 
comfort about using the ADR processes or, in the case of Government, overseeing the 
ADR processes. 
Pou's view of the rationale justifying ADR legislation does not, however, reflect 
several other important considerations - embodied in regulatory culture and 
contributing to legal consciousness regarding the ADR legislation - that are seen in 
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the findings to have influenced regulators' decisions about whether and how to 
implement the legislation. Indeed, Pou's important list of the desirable characteristics 
of ideal ADR legislation fails to take into account much of what was revealed in the 
candid comments of bureaucrats, judiciary and government officials interviewed for 
this study regarding their interests, concerns, needs and desires and the interesting 
ways that these intersected with, challenged and compromised the practical 
application of the ADR legislation within the realities of the RHP A regulatory 
community and its constituent organizations. 
The "ideal government support" Pou identifies as being helpful to promoting ADR 
legislation is conspicuously missing from the RHP A situation, if key informant 
accounts are to be relied upon. The Government did not appear to off er leadership, 
training, financial and human resources, and long-term design and resource decisions 
that are based on solid evaluation data to support the ADR legislation. It may be that 
Pou envisions a different system upon which his suggestions are modeled and to 
which they apply, but his admittedly "ideal" suggestions for government support for 
ADR legislation seem far from the "real world" of the particular government-directed 
ADR framework and procedures that are richly reflected in the comments of the key 
informants of this study. However, in the absence of such Government incentives 
and support, which clearly were seen to be needed if the legislated ADR system were 
to work, especially for the smaller Colleges, the study informants described the 
regulatory community itself, informally and through the Federation, as providing 
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some of that support. In particular, the larger and/or more experienced Colleges were 
recognized for providing leadership and contributing their expertise, mainly through 
workshops that allowed members of the regulatory community who wished to learn 
about and discuss ADR issues to do so. 
It might be argued that Pou did not have the self-regulatory model in mind when 
suggesting how Government could support the implementation of ADR legislation. 
However, with the power to impose legislation on the self-regulatory Colleges, the 
Government was, with some justification, perceived by many of the regulatory 
Colleges to have placed very onerous expectations and requirements on Colleges 
adopting the "official" ADR process which led, to a tactical, under-the-counter or 
black market in alternative alternative dispute resolution processes or no process at 
all, as Ewick and Silbey and other legal consciousness scholars cited earlier might 
have predicted. 
Pou contrasts "cross-cutting laws that provide general authorization" with "specific 
laws building ADR into a particular agency program or decisional process." He 
favours the more general approach as averting the "fragmentation and confusion" that 
may result if ADR legislation is "balkanized." In a regulatory community such as the 
one studied here, where the constituent members are highly diverse in terms of 
culture, resources and experience, an important concern expressed was the 
unsuitability of the "one size fits all" ADR legislation approach. Several key 
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informants suggested that, apart from a general statement legitimizing the ADR 
process in the RHP A, the specifics of the process each College would adopt - as best 
suited to its culture, resources, frequency and type of complaint and focus of practice 
- could and should be described in a regulation specific to that College. Informants 
cited precedents for following that formula, including the authority to delegate 
controlled acts to other healthcare professionals. Because regulations must be 
drafted, consulted about in a public process and finally approved by the provincial 
Go.vernment as meeting the public interest duty of the College, this was perceived by 
some to be a better approach to legitimizing ADR and creating more appropriate, 
College- and profession-specific ADR procedures.· This approach would also have 
allowed some measure of autonomy and authority to the individual Colleges to design 
their own procedures, rather than having the same ADR legislation, even legislation 
modeled on the decades-long experience of other Colleges, imposed on all. That is 
not to say that, had this approach been taken, many of the College-specific ADR 
regulations would not have reflected and been modeled on the experience and 
processes of experienced Colleges with similar cultures and practices. Because the 
ADR legislation took the "broad-brush" approach, it may have aroused resistance in 
the legal consciousness of those bristling from other examples of what they perceived 
as Government authoritarianism exercised through law. 
Pou asserts that broad-based ADR legislation (statutory framework) can promote 
thoughtful, consistent policy towards agencies' use of ADR. However, as key 
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informants reported, the policy towards the agencies may be consistent, but the 
practice of the agencies may be various and inconsistent. Pou refers to the role of 
agency lawyers in the process, the professional "filters" referred to earlier. He views 
broad-based legislation as raising their awareness and giving them comfort. Several 
key informants commented on the advice of various College counsel in relation to the 
ADR legislation. It was evident that Colleges' counsel had very different 
understanding of the legislation, took very different positions and offered what 
appeared to be widely divergent advice to their College clients about whether and 
how to implement the ADR legislation. Some of this divergent legal advice may 
have related directly to the differences among the Colleges and the professions, but · 
clearly several College informants and consultants viewed the difference in advice as 
arising from the personal values and beliefs and professional style and approach of 
these lawyers. 
5. 7 Legal Gatekeepers and the Clarity and Ambiguity of the Legislation 
Several informants referred to the role of lawyers and the legal community in the 
development and the interpretation of the ADR legislation. The theoretical literature 
suggests that these professionals play a significant role in mediating between the law 
and its application in practical circumstances. The MHL TC informants were very 
clear and insistent that the ADR legislation had been carefully vetted by legal counsel 
to ensure that it conformed to all civil, administrative and constitutional law 
requirements and that the process enshrined in the legislation took into account and 
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reflected best practices in the field of ADR in the courts and other venues. These 
comments reflect the sense of comfort and assurance legal gatekeepers provide the 
legislators, that the law as designed and drafted meets the standards of legal form, 
precedent and practice. As the MHLTC informants took pains to emphasize, the new 
ADR law had been properly vetted and met current legal norms, conventions and 
standards in the wider society, as O'Reilly observed regarding the earlier RHP A 
development process. 
College key informants also offered comments about the legal gatekeepers and their 
advice to the regulatory community, which appeared to vary significantly from 
College to College and lawyer to lawyer. The RHP A regulatory community engages 
a relatively small number of experienced, specialist firms to provide advice on a very 
wide range of College matters. A number of these lawyers have particular expertise 
in the area of the College complaints and discipline processes, representing the 
College in member prosecutions and providing advice on College policy and practice 
in related areas. The College's relationship to law may be partially deduced from the 
various comments made about the approaches and advice provided by their legal 
counsel and others' legal counsel as gatekeepers, guardians and interpreters of the 
law, and their account of the impact of legal advice on College staff and committee 
behaviour. 
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Some Colleges had evidently received advice that the ADR legislation was necessary 
in order for the College to justify and defend its use of ADR in the complaints 
resolution process. Other Colleges had been reassured by legal counsel that the use 
of ADR could be justified by the residual clause in the previous RHP A that permitted 
action not inconsistent with the Act. It was also reported in the interviews that some 
Colleges had been advised by their legal counsel to stay away from ADR following 
the legislation, on the grounds of its being a costly and risky process. Those Colleges 
reported that they therefore had not adopted the ADR process as legislated, although 
the most compelling reason reported, for which the legal advice provided an 
additional justification, was the cost. For some Colleges, legal counsel's caution 
provided an external justification for non-adoption of the legislation, while the 
managerial costs and other bureaucratic complications appeared to be at least as 
important a factor influencing their decision. 264 
Legal counsel's advice appeared to be critical to several Colleges in developing an 
ADR program and in making decisions about the selection and progress of individual 
complaints cases. This may reflect an individual or cultural fear of the law as a 
threatening minefield of possible interpretations, and hence of possible mistakes and 
of "getting it wrong," as was expressed during several interviews. It appeared that 
264 One College informant noted that all he heard in his mind when he read the ADR legislation was 
"Ka-ching!" - the sound of a cash register, and made up his mind against it at that point. He was 
pleased that subsequent legal advice to the ICRC cautioning about risks provided additional support to 
his decision based on cost. 
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the ADR legislation might not be adopted simply because it would require constant 
vigilance and consultation with legal counsel to ensure that no wrong steps were 
taken. Other informants also viewed the ADR legislation and the RHP A as a field of 
possible interpretations, but relied upon their legal counsel to guide them to the most 
advantageous and practical among those interpretations, while maintaining adherence 
to the "spirit" of the law. Their legal counsel might advise them, as was explained, 
that they could carry out "X and Y" provisions of the legislation, but did not need to 
do "Z" provision. These legal counsel were perceived by their clients and others to 
be expert game strategists, able to guide their clients in creative interpretations of the 
law, while managing to keep them on the right side of compliance. Thus these 
lawyers were perceived as effective gatekeepers in upholding the law while 
exploiting its clarity and its ambiguities to assist their clients to meet their other 
managerial goals. 
It also emerged in the interviews that there might be occasions when the College 
counsel's legal advice on the ADR legislation would be sought, but then modified or 
disregarded in practice, since College legal counsel was perceived as not really in 
touch with or capable of understanding the practical realities of the College's work. 
This appears to suggest that some Colleges in the RHP A regulatory community 
trusted their own ability, upon receiving legal advice, to decide for themselves what is 
defensibly "law-abiding" behaviour, that, in their view, meets the standards set by the 
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legislation, while also accommodating the realities of managerial and professional 
practice. 
Legal counsel for members being complained about were also seen to be important 
actors in interpreting the ADR legislation to benefit their clients in their relationship 
with the professional College. Some College informants commented on how a "wily 
lawyer," acting on behalf of a member with questionable practices, might advise their 
client to disclose other inappropriate behaviour in an ADR process, so as to shield it 
from later prosecution under the terms of the Confidentiality provision. Several 
Colleges expressed concern that these lawyers could "game" the system on behalf of 
their clients, putting the College and the public at risk. Again, and for this additional 
reason, the ADR law was perceived by some as introducing potentially risky 
conditions that, "in the hands of a wily lawyer," could threaten the security and 
stability of the College and the public interest, and was therefore to be avoided or 
handled with the greatest caution and with appropriate College legal advice and 
support, or not used at all. 
From the case study there emerged three categories or types of legal gatekeepers of 
the ADR legislation: the legislators who drafted the legislation with the advice of 
their legislative counsel, in such a way as to serve the Government and the Ministry's 
various political and public interest purposes; the regulators who, with the advice of 
their respective and various legal advisors' opinions, adopted, adapted, resisted or 
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avoided the provisions of the legislation; and the College members and their legal 
counsel who might legitimately game the legislation to seek whatever benefits and to 
avoid whatever costs the legislation might provide or exact. From these observations, 
drawn from the informant interviews, there emerges a picture of a competitive and 
collaborative dynamic power struggle among the key regulatory community actors, 
enabled and mediated, assisted and abetted by their legal advisors, in support of the 
public, legislator, regulator and College member interests as embedded in and 
extractable from the provisions of the ADR legislation. The data from the key 
informant interviews clearly establish the important role legal advisors play within 
the regulatory community in defining and modifying regulatory culture, in 
influencing regulatory actors' legal consciousness and in enabling or limiting 
regulator administrative discretion, as the theory suggests. 
5.8 Pou's Ideal Terms and Conditions for ADR Legislation 
In addition to suggesting that the ADR legislation reflect an "appropriate balance 
between prescription and flexibility in employing these processes," Pou suggests that 
broad-based ADR legislation should protect sensitive communications, acquire 
neutrals' services and assure judicial oversight. The Confidentiality provision in the 
RHP A ADR legislation does seek to protect sensitive communications within the 
process, but informants expressed significant concerns about the appropriateness of 
such a provision in terms of protecting the public and the public interest, if serious 
risks were uncovered during the course of an ADR and could not be exposed. At 
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least one College declared that this condition caused them to hesitate using ADR for 
any but the most inconsequential complaints, thus losing the use of a process that was 
needed to help handle the hundreds of complaints received each year. Clearly, the 
ADR legislation as written does nothing to help in securing professionals' services 
and thus left many of the smaller or medium-sized Colleges without human resources 
to make use of the legislation. The ADR legislation does provide for judicial 
oversight, principally by the ICRC of the College who must review and approve each 
ADR agreement. However, the confidentiality provision was seen to conflict with the 
judicial oversight provision in sequestering any information on which the Committee 
could base its approval or rejection. The HP ARB, on the other hand·, was seen by its 
Chair, and by one or two of the College or Consultant informants, to have the 
authority to supersede the confidentiality provision on an appeal, in the somewhat 
unlikely circumstance that an ADR agreement approved by the Committee would be 
referred to the Appeal Board. 
Pou further comments that broad-based ADR legislation can assign responsibility 
within agencies and more broadly for ADR implementation. The Registrar is 
identified by the ADR legislation as the individual who refers a complaint to the ADR 
process and the Registrar was most frequently identified by the informants as the key 
decision-maker regarding the adoption and implementation process. The ADR 
legislation does state that "the Registrar may, with the consent of both the 
complainant and the member, refer the complainant and the member to an alternative 
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dispute resolution process," thus assigning the responsibility to initiate a specific 
ADR complaint resolution to the College Registrar. In some Colleges, however, the 
ICRC was seen to play the key political and decision-making role in deciding whether 
and how to implement the ADR legislation, and whether to refer specific complaints 
to the ADR process. A variant of that arrangement was a staff recommendation 
regarding an ADR referral to the ICRC, noting that normally (but not necessarily) the 
ICRC would follow staff advice. Some Colleges appeared to rely entirely on their 
legal counsel to advise them whether and how to implement the ADR legislation, so it 
might be said that legal counsel in those instances were given (or took) the 
responsibility to decide how the College would proceed with the legislation. 
Broad-based legislation, according to Pou, can afford a basis for legislative oversight 
of agency dispute resolution initiatives and Lande's ideal ADR legislation contains a 
provision for ongoing review and evaluation of the effectiveness of the legislation. 
MHLTC commented that there were no plans for reviewing Colleges' ADR 
initiatives. However, several infonnants expressed the fear that if the ADR process 
were not carried out as the Government intended, there would be negative 
consequences for the off ending College. Another suggested that an adverse HP ARB 
review of a College's process, particularly in terms of time taken (despite comments 
of how complicated, cumbersome and labour intensive the new process appeared to 
be), there would be a chilling effect on the Colleges and "that would be the end of 
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ADR everywhere" - that type of response to negative oversight being identified as a 
distinctive aspect of the RHP A regulatory culture. 
Pou also comments that ADR legislation can require agency personnel to focus on the 
use of ADR case-by-case, in selected settings. The prohibition on the use of ADR for 
sexual abuse cases was clearly understood by all informants and most expressed their 
reluctance to use ADR in "serious" cases, or those where there may be additional 
concerns. Most therefore confirmed that the decision to offer ADR was made case by 
case, though the categorization of appropriate cases might vary greatly among 
Colleges. One example involved the use of ADR to resolve financial issues. For 
those Colleges whose members sold healthcare products or prosthetics, the majority 
of complaints might concern faulty or otherwise unacceptable products or services. 
For some of these Colleges, an informal resolution of such complaints was routine, 
while for others it was seen to fall entirely outside the jurisdiction of the College, 
belonging instead in Small Claims Court. The ADR legislation offered no guidance 
to those Colleges regarding these dilemmas over jurisdiction. 
Pou concludes with an expression of concern that ADR legislation cannot change the 
attitudes of individuals or institutions so that they take their statutory mandates 
seriously and comply genuinely and thoughtfully, not minimally and in a self-serving 
way. Far more will be needed, he says, to achieve this level of engagement with the 
ADR legislation. While the ideal approach to and content of ADR legislation sounds 
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compelling, it is difficult to imagine how these would apply in a typical regulatory 
community such as the RHPA regulatory community. The theory regarding ADR 
legislation does not adequately acknowledge and take into account the real and 
present concerns experienced by individuals and organizations within the community, 
the power dynamics and relationships within and between organizations, the 
management and bureaucratic contingencies and the influence of cultural assumptions 
and political pressures on the organization and the community. 
The Howse study captures the attitudes, values and beliefs expressed by the members 
of a regulatory community regarding the adoption of ADR legislation for their 
complaints resolution system. The important dichotomy was between those who 
favoured legislation as providing legitimacy and authority on the one hand, and those 
who feared loss of discretionary flexibility on the other. While providing qualitative 
evidence of attitudes towards ADR legislation, since no such legislation had been 
imposed, no concrete experience of the impact of ADR legislation could be gathered 
to validate the opinions expressed. This study provides current and concrete data to 
supplement the evidence presented in the earlier study and confirms some of their 
subjects' expectations regarding the benefits and costs of ADR, while challenging 
others. 
5.9 The Alternativeness of ADR and the Power of Law 
As discussed above, legislation has the capacity to empower and facilitate and to 
restrict and control behaviour. It also has the capacity to affect attitudes that colour 
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and determine legal consciousness and, conversely, legal consciousness has the power 
to colour attitudes towards legislation. The key informant interviews show that when 
legislation is perceived to empower (e.g., by legitimizing) established behaviours, it is 
usually viewed positively and easily complied with, even when some additional 
burdens are involved. The data appear to demonstrate that when legislation is 
perceived to control or restrict established or preferred behaviours, it may be resisted 
or interpreted in such a way as to accommodate preferred behaviours wherever 
possible - by the creative use of the many loopholes and leeways that legislation 
usually provides. 
Lawmakers often enact legislation to govern and control certain behaviours where 
they perceive inadequate or inappropriate action is being taken, as the MHLTC 
informants observed in the case of some College complaints resolution processes. 
However, there are other reasons for legislation, including demonstrating power for 
strategic purposes, e.g., for personal political advancement, as a compensatory device, 
and/or to distract attention from negative perceptions of the lawmaker- these two 
being cited by some of the key informants in the case study. Where the regulated 
perceive ulterior purposes being carried out at their expense, the data in this study 
demonstrate that there is likely to be distrust and greater resistance to the legislation, 
just as the legal consciousness and regulatory culture studies suggest. 
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Trust, therefore, is an important issue in legislative compliance: demonstrated trust 
and respect by the legislator for those being regulated; and trust by the regulated in 
the motives and intentions of the legislator. The interview data contain several 
examples where trust was expressed by certain Colleges in the ability of the 
Government to address their needs, as well as by the Government in the capacity of 
the Colleges to address ADR areas of concern and generally to meet public policy 
expectations. However, trust was obviously lacking in several Colleges' perceptions 
of Government, which factor appeared to increase their tendency to avoid, resist, 
disregard or contest the legislation. The observations in the regulatory culture studies 
of safety culture, as well as in Cooper's studies oflocal government undergoing 
additional juridification of their practices, that the "good faith" of management in 
introducing new rules is a significant factor in whether the rules are followed and in 
what spirit and to what effect, appears to be borne out by many of the informant 
comments. 
Understanding the complexity of motives for developing and imposing legislation, as 
well as the complexity of considerations that influence the response is highly relevant 
to the discussion of ADR legislation in the Howse study and in Kleefeld's article, and 
relates to many of the observations by Lande and Pou about ADR legislation. The 
Howse study presents a hypothetical scenario to representatives of the regulatory 
community and seeks their responses. These responses are interesting and relevant 
insofar as they are treated as hypothetical situations. The case study developed and 
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reported here demonstrates that particular ADR legislation takes on the power and 
other social, political and economic dynamics of the community into which it is 
introduced and can only be understood and evaluated in that context. It is no longer 
an abstract process or concept whose features may be viewed as negative or positive 
in the abstract. It comes down to who will answer the telephone, how consent letters 
will be drafted and followed up, what might be said or omitted in confidential 
conversations, whether a particular complaints committee is cautious or overbearing, 
and so on. These are critical and practical contextual dimensions producing varied 
and unpredictable responses to any legislation. 
The data also suggest that both the Government and College respondents, the College 
consultants, and the HPARB informant had various personal attitudes towards ADR 
that also influenced their perceptions and their responses to the ADR legislation. 
Some perceived ADR in a very positive light and were pleased that the legislation 
endorsed its use, while others who also viewed ADR as positive and highly beneficial 
were saddened or discouraged by what they saw as the legislation's constraints on 
ADR's potential to enhance the complaints resolution experience and the 
relationships with member and public. A minority viewed ADR as a costly and time-
consuming process that, with or without legislation, is more effort than it is worth. 
Some of those intended to continue with complaints investigations only, while others 
were intent on avoiding ADR (for the various reasons given), but continuing to carry 
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on an informal resolution process that they viewed as efficient, practical and within 
their resources. 
The concept of "alternativeness" also appeared to influence informant perceptions 
and hence responses to the legislation. The MHLTC informants suggested that now 
that ADR is "a watchword" and had been accepted widely in the justice system, it 
would be appropriate to recognize it in legislation. The suggestion that, with time, 
arid with wider acceptance, some of the "alternativeness" had been sufficiently 
reduced that it would be "safe" to endorse it as an appropriate process, but with 
significant safeguards on its alternativeness to protect users (and the Government) 
from any residual risk. ADR had become a safe and acceptable enough "alternative" 
for the Government to be able to endorse it, within strict limits. On the other hand, a 
number of College informants openly regretted what they perceived as the loss of the 
"alternativeness" that ADR represented to them. For them, ADR's alternativeness 
signified possibility, creativity, something outside the usual and the normal. For 
them, ADR appeared to hold the promise of something new and hopeful, interesting 
and potentially transformative. They characterized the legislation as limiting and 
even destroying ADR's potential and the prospect of its capture and destruction 
appeared to cause them discomfort and even some distress in the telling. 
From the case study findings, it appears clear that ADR represented different values 
to different members of the regulatory community and those values influenced how 
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they saw ADR being dealt with by the legislation. Some mourned the diminishment 
or loss of ADR's potential, others were pleased that it had been recognized, others 
were resentful when it appeared to threaten managerial efficiency, while still others 
were relieved they could simply disregard a "trend" they had no or little knowledge of 
or time for. Therefore, it seems clear that the study and the development of ADR 
legislation - whether and how to legislate ADR- must take into account the legal 
actors' concepts of ADR as negative, neutral or positive. Such ADR policy 
development should consider the implications were ADR legislation to be 
implemented in specific contexts, including the practical aspects that influence how 
the legislation is interpreted and enacted, in order for the phenomenon that is ADR 
legislation to be fully explored and understood and effective solutions identified and 
agreed. The theories of regulatory culture, legal consciousness and administrative 
discretion, as described earlier, provide the policy researcher with appropriate tools to 
undertake this complex and demanding task. 
5.10 The ADR Legislation and Public Policy Goals 
Government statements at the time the legislation was introduced, which were echoed 
in the interviews with MHL TC informants, declared that the ADR legislation, along 
with some other legislative provisions, was intended to make the College complaints 
resolution process more efficient, more transparent, more accountable, more 
consistent and standardized across Colleges, and more streamlined. It appears 
evident from the interviews with the College informants that the ADR legislation 
269 
might achieve some or all of these goals in only some or a few of the situations where 
the legislation would apply. For those Colleges that simply refused to adopt the 
legislation, reasons given included their concern that, far from streamlining the 
process, it would make the process more cumbersome, costly and complicated, hence 
not worth adopting. Hence they would continue with their previous processes which 
the legislation was intended to change. 
Over and over in the interviews, concerns were raised that the requirements could not 
be met by many of the Colleges. The legislated requirements presented such a range 
of difficulties to many of the Colleges with different kinds of complaints, different 
cultures, different resources, different bureaucratic procedures, requiring various 
adjustments to the legislated ADR process or no ADR process at all, that the 
Government's expectation of consistency and standardization appeared to be 
significantly undermined. Also, from the comments of several College informants, 
the requirements in the legislation did not necessarily enhance the efficiency of the 
process within the College or as experienced by the member or the complainant. 
Duplication of resources to carry out both investigation and ADR processes within 
the designated timeframe and parallel processes that might diminish the effectiveness 
of ADR, were seen to be only two of several "inefficiencies" the legislation 
introduced into existing processes. 
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Because the ADR process as legislated presented several insurmountable obstacles to 
many of the Colleges, several of these had decided to take their informal resolution 
processes "underground," so as to preserve the option of conversations, enquiries and 
information requests that might resolve an issue at an early stage, exchanges and 
arrangements that might have been more or less transparent previously were, in the 
shadow of the ADR law, less visible and less transparent and accountable. These 
would not be dealt with by the ICRC and would mostly happen, according to 
informant accounts, under the legal "radar." In these ways, the declared public policy 
goals might be met in some instances where ADR was actually applied, but appeared 
to fail to achieve their purpose in many other situations. 
5.11 Permissiveness, Prescriptiveness and the Power of Consequences 
Much of the theory regarding whether and how to legislate ADR focused on the 
issues of prescription and permissiveness and what might be an ideal balance between 
the two, as well as rigidity and flexibility of the legislation so as to permit adaptation 
of the rules to the particular needs and interests of the stakeholders, thus preserving 
informality and creativity as important features and benefits of ADR. The informant 
responses to the ADR legislation suggest that taking advantage of the clarity as well 
as the ambiguity of rules to exercise administrative discretion allows significant 
flexibility for individual and collective interpretation of what the law permits and 
what it prohibits. Some prohibitions were very clear to the informants, but in some 
cases, these clear prohibitions (e.g., no sexual abuse cases, confidentiality of 
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mediation, facilitator not to participate, time limits not to be exceeded) led to an 
outright refusal to use the legislated process, even in complaint resolution situations 
that would not be affected by the legislation. 
Several informants commented that the consequences or penalties for creative or 
alternative interpretations of the legislation, apart from the few important 
prohibitions, were either nonexistent, or not credible. Few College respondents 
believed that, apart from the media, there were adequate monitoring mechanisms for 
ADR activity among the Colleges. HPARB was perceived not to have the resources 
(or the authority) to monitor the ADR process, apart from investigating specific 
complaints received. Whether as a result of consultation with College legal counsel, 
independent analysis, or following discussions within the regulatory community, the 
College informants' conclusion regarding the lack of penalties for not following the 
legislation also appeared to influence their decisions about how to interpret and apply 
the legislation in resolving complaints. 
Within the regulatory community, informant interviews revealed, there was an 
ongoing informal exchange of information about various College activities, including 
those that might appear questionable (or even shocking), but no official mechanism 
existed to receive, investigate or evaluate the information beyond its being regulatory 
community hearsay. Therefore, even a serious breach of the legislated prohibitions 
might escape attention or reporting, thus calling into question the power and effect of 
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the legislation beyond the administrative discretion of those interpreting and applying 
it. The theory suggests that community norms and the regulator's desire to be 
accepted or esteemed within the regulatory community could, in some instances, curb 
excessive disregard of the law. Informant comments about the expansion of the 
community to include more professions that may be different from the norm, and 
references to "turf battles" among long-term community members, suggest a 
potentially weaker influence of community norms on the individual Colleges. 
In the end, the data gathered in the case study appear to confirm that the power of 
administrative discretion, the possibilities inherent in the ambiguity of rules and the 
influences affecting the legal consciousness of the various regulators, in the absence 
of strong cultural norms to act as a restraint or deterrent, determine to a very 
significant extent whether the ADR legislation can be an effective instrument of 
Government public policy and intent. 
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Chapter Six 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
As stated in the Introduction, the subject of this study developed out of reading and 
reflecting on Lande's and Pou's approaches to the debates regarding ADR legislation 
and Meidinger' s work on regulatory culture, administrative discretion and the 
indeterminacy of rules. In working to establish a connection between those two 
aspects of and approaches to regulation, it became apparent that legal consciousness 
theory might provide a useful bridge to understanding how the theories in these two 
areas (ADR legislation and regulatory culture, administrative discretion and 
indeterminacy of rules) support and illuminate one another. With the field of Ontario 
professional self-regulation providing a recent example of ADR legislation to explore 
and test the theories, the case study idea was conceived, to be based on theoretical 
concepts, primary document research and extensive, in-depth qualitative interviews 
with members of the regulatory community. 
6.1 Conclusions from the Theoretical Research 
The theoretical research on ADR legislation reported on and discussed in the first part 
of this dissertation (Lande, Pou) suggests that there are certain rules to follow in 
developing "ideal" or effective ADR legislation that, if observed, will produce an 
ADR process that promotes and fulfills, through flexibility and freedom of choice, the 
benefits of ADR's special character as an alternative to traditional law-based dispute 
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resolution and the law-based perspective (constitutive legalism) that appears to 
dominate much Western societies' thinking about the means for resolving disputes 
and for organizing, controlling and empowering social behaviour (Menkel-Meadow, 
Edelman and Stryker, Edelman and Suchman). 
However, the theoretical research cited also postulates that no rule, however ideal or 
"clear" is unequivocal, unambiguous or determining in any absolute sense. Whether 
"clear" or ambiguous, it can be - and usually is - interpreted - narrowly or broadly -
to fit the situation, circumstances and context to which it applies, and in the process 
of applying the chosen interpretation, the rule may become distorted from its framer's 
intention, thus producing some combination of intended and unintended 
consequences (Meidinger, Banks, Ford). The circumstances, situation and/or context 
into which the law is inserted are as defined and understood through the lens of the 
interpreter's perceptions (legal consciousness) regarding the intentions (overt and 
tacit) of the law-makers, the historical and current power relationships in the 
community, and the requirements of the law itself and its potential impact on their 
conscious and unconscious interests (Friedman, Ewick and Silbey, Meidinger, 
Reiman and Oedewald, Tharaldsen and Haukelid, Black, Pratt, O'Reilly). 
Responses to any new law, therefore, are the result of a complex process of 
deliberation, much of it invisible, affected by individual interests as well as by the 
norms, conventions, history and power dynamics of the regulatory community -
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regulatory culture - and the substance and purpose of the community's activities, 
which give rise to the law and to which it is applied (Meidinger, Freeman, Black, 
Pratt). If the rule appears to align with perceived organizational and/or professional 
or personal circumstances, interests or goals, it is likely to be complied with. If it 
presents challenges or is a difficult fit with perceived circumstances, interests or 
goals, it is more likely to be contested, gamed or negotiated. If it appears to threaten 
personal, professional or organizational interests, it is more likely to be avoided, 
evaded, resisted, delayed or ignored (Meidinger, Ewick and Silbey, Cooper, Hull, 
Larsen, Marshall and Barclay). 
Whether any law, including legislation governing the use of ADR, is viewed as 
coercive and constraining or facilitative and empowering, or a complex and 
sometimes contradictory combination of these, is deeply influenced by 
administrators' perceptions of how the law affects the assortment of general and 
particular interests (values, beliefs, needs, fears, etc.) that are experienced at the level 
of the individual, the organization and of the larger, in this case, regulatory 
community (Meidinger), with its narratives of "turf battles" and of competing and 
complementary interests (O'Reilly, Spoel and James, Gilmour et al). The 
"alternative" aspect of ADR, perceived as the opposite of law, complementary to law, 
or escape/freedom from ("non") law (law's power and control), acquires and projects 
a significant additional dynamic into the discussion of ADR legislation understood 
within the context of ongoing struggles over interests and power. 
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The theoretical research described and discussed in this dissertation strongly suggests 
that ADR legislation, while subject to the dynamic that surrounds any new legislation, 
carries a special significance, by its very nature as a law about an alternative to law-
based approaches and practices. The general conclusions from the theoretical 
research findings presented in this paper, are that, in order to be truly relevant and 
useful, theoretical studies of ADR legislation should take into account the phenomena 
that surround and affect the interpretation and application of any new law; that theory 
about ADR legislation within a regulatory environment ought to pay attention and be 
sensitive to the influence of legal consciousness and regulatory culture on how ADR 
legislation is developed, interpreted and applied within the history, meaning-making 
and other cultural aspects of a regulatory community; and that the concept of 
"alternativeness" attached to ADR, carrying with it many possible meanings, is itself 
an integral dynamic that influences how ADR legislation is interpreted and applied. 
This study of ADR legislation is the first to make these necessary and important 
connections between the landmark theory regarding ADR legislation and recent 
regulatory, regulatory culture and legal consciousness theory that reveals and explains 
heretofore overlooked and under-explained aspects of ADR legislation that can 
significantly influence whether and how ADR legislation is developed, interpreted 
and applied. 
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6.2 Conclusions from the Methodological Theory 
Primary Document Research 
Preparation for both the theoretical and interview research included extensive 
document research and intense reading and analysis of primary resources, including 
Government and HPRAC reports, scores of detailed submissions to Government and 
HPRAC by a wide range of stakeholders, an extensive sequence of debates in the 
Ontario Legislative Assembly and in the Legislative Standing Committee on Social 
Policy, scores of College publications (numerous monthly newsletters and annual 
reports over a period of years for all the Colleges included in the survey, as well as 
several others not interviewed directly), College website pages describing the 
complaints resolution process to members and to the public, and published 
commentary on the legislation by legal firms specializing in RHP A regulatory 
community issues. While this primary research was necessary and invaluable in 
creating a knowledgeable and aware researcher, able to search the regulatory and 
legal consciousness theories for relevant arguments to explain, sustain or challenge 
the researcher's assumptions about the culture of the community and comments made 
by the various legal actors in the field, it may have also encouraged in the researcher 
certain premature conclusions about the culture question, "What is going on here?" 
and introduced possible biases that affected parts of the research design - including 
the interview approach and questions and the organization, coding and analysis of the 
results - for better and for worse. One conclusion that emerges from this observation 
is that further study of this subject from other theoretical perspectives, including and 
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perhaps especially non-issue-focused grounded research, could reveal and mitigate 
such biases. 
Case Study Approach and Method 
Several of the theorists cited in this paper express frustration with the lack of solid 
and detailed in-depth empirical studies to support or challenge existing theories. The 
theoretical research also revealed a growing field of legal consciousness case studies, 
including an examination of the effects of "juridification" of local government 
discretionary powers in the U.K. (Cooper). A recent Australian and New Zealand 
case study enquired hypothetically about the possible impact of ADR legislation in 
those jurisdictions' health profession self-regulatory field (Howse et al). These 
studies suggest how legal consciousness may influence regulator attitudes toward 
legislation and ADR legislation in particular. However, no comparable study existed 
to enquire and demonstrate whether and how the theory about ADR legislation - its 
development, interpretation and application - might be influenced by regulatory 
culture, legal consciousness, administrative discretion and the indeterminacy of rules. 
This gap in the research called for a case study into the impact of an actual piece of 
ADR legislation introduced into a regulatory community. The ADR legislation 
contained in the Ontario Regulated Health Professions Act revisions provided an 
opportune example. 
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The design of the case study was intended to produce evidence (if such existed) of 
legal consciousness, regulatory culture and administrative discretion in relation to the 
new ADR legislation among the key stakeholders in the RHP A community -
Government, Colleges and HP ARB (judiciary). Therefore, an issue (ADR 
legislation)-focused, in-depth, phenomenologically oriented approach (Sackmann) 
was selected, which produced robust results for analysis. The identification of the 
issue (this particular ADR legislation) allowed respondents to express themselves 
freely, in the course of which many tacit as well as overt assumptions, attitudes, 
beliefs, values (phenomena) were revealed, reflecting a rich, dynamic and complex 
combination of personal, organizational and community perceptions regarding the 
legislation, its context and its impact. In the course of the analysis it became clear 
that the issue chosen as the focus for this type of enquiry influences what aspects of 
the informant's perceptions/phenomenology are revealed (thus leaving other, perhaps 
important aspects undiscovered and unidentified). The researcher's focus on the issue 
also has the potential to give more importance (positive or negative) to it than it 
would otherwise have in the informant's mind if the researcher had not suggested it. 
With these caveats about the approach, which are generalizable to nearly all 
phenomenological studies, it is nonetheless worth noting that this case study is the 
first to enquire as deeply into the perceptions and reactions of legislators and 
regulators to actual ADR legislation and the first to seek to verify the theory 
regarding the need for ADR legislation and the range of factors that might influence 
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whether and to what extent it is adopted. Since a grounded study might have 
produced different data and avoided the possible skewing of informant perceptions 
towards the researcher's interest, giving an aura of greater importance to the ADR 
legislation and encouraging the informants to develop speculations about it where 
previously there might have been little interest, it is not possible to conclude that the 
research approach taken is necessarily the best, in terms of producing data totally 
uninflected by researcher influence. However, this might be an interesting avenue of 
future research regarding the phenomenology and perceptions of ADR legislation. 
The richness of data produced by the three sets of questions based on Friedman's 
description of legal studies suggest that the "Friedman formula" is a useful organizing 
conceptual framework and focussing tool for investigations to determine what "social 
and legal forces press in to make the law," how to understand the core provisions of 
the law in relation to its origins, and how the values, beliefs, attitudes, circumstances 
and conditions that gave rise to the law governing a regulatory community influence 
the behavioural responses to it. 
6.3 Conclusions from the Interview Data 
A careful and systematic analysis of the interview data led to the following 
conclusions about the relationships among the theories regarding ADR legislation, 
regulatory culture, legal consciousness, administrative discretion and the 
indeterminacy of rules. 
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In discussing regulatory culture, the five elements Meidinger cites served as a model 
for analyzing the dimensions of the RHP A regulatory community and the RHP A 
culture revealed in the interview data. Moreover, the data appear to demonstrate 
clearly that the relationships among the organizations and individuals responsible for 
and affected by the RHP A constitute a regulatory community as Meidinger describes 
it. Furthermore, the elements that Meidinger identifies as constituting regulatory 
culture that, in turn, constitutes regulatory administration, appeared in the findings to 
influence regulatory attitudes and behaviours. 
The data also provide evidence that legal consciousness - the ways in which legal 
actors perceive and respond to law and to the legal environment - is a significant 
determinant of how administrative discretion will be exercised in response to the 
legislation. Awareness of and participation in the legislative development 
consultation process appeared to be particularly relevant to the regulators' choice of 
how to respond to the ADR legislation. Thus the concept of procedural fairness (and 
its opposite, procedural injustice) can be seen to have influenced legal consciousness 
and thereby bureaucratic decision-making in the legitimate exercise of administrative 
discretion. The sense of not having participated in the development of a law with 
significant impact on the values (e.g., public service, efficiency, fairness, 
accountability, transparency) and bureaucratic processes (e.g., costs, benefits, staff 
and committee decision-making procedures) of the organization, or having been 
consulted but having any serious concerns and recommendations ignored, appeared to 
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influence the extent to which previous informal bureaucratic practices were continued 
or discontinued and the new system adopted, avoided, distorted or resisted. 
Administrative discretion regarding whether, to what extent and in what manner to 
implement the ADR legislation also appeared to correlate strongly with how the 
informants viewed the values and purpose of ADR, based on their understanding of 
ADR as a process distinct from and alternative to law and as an efficient way of 
handling complaints of a "non-serious" nature that provided an appropriate level of 
public service while protecting the public interest. 
The set of questions and the subsequent conversation regarding the appropriateness of 
the law provoked discussion of the nature of ADR and whether it is appropriate to 
legislate ADR, what aspects should be legislated and what left to the discretion of the 
particular organization, allowing it to accommodate its particular needs within a 
flexible legislative framework. The legislation was seen to confer necessary authority 
and legitimacy on an alternative process, much as the ADR law theorists assert to be a 
legitimate purpose for legislating minimal ADR legislation, while at the same time 
sacrificing at least some of AD R's flexibility and creativity in favour of the certainty 
and consistency that law, through its coercive and social-cultural power, may provide. 
The tension between the "alternativeness" of ADR and the prescriptiveness of law 
was reflected in some regulators' intention to maintain the previous informal system 
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as a somewhat hidden, "backroom" alternative to the formal ADR process and its 
constraints, thus seeking to escape the "cage" or "gaze" of the law. Discretionary 
decision-making therefore appeared to the bureaucratic decision-makers to be a 
legitimate way to extend the policy- and law-making process to adapt "the law on the 
books" to the practical sphere of the regulatory organization, its culture and its 
resources, and also possibly a way of expressing community and individual power 
beyond the reach of the law. Such practice of discretionary law-making can be 
observed in this case study to have produced both intended and unintended 
consequences, because the law, while seemingly precise, contains just enough leeway 
and loopholes, as the theorists cited earlier predicted, and as the Government officials 
openly admitted, that the regulator has some latitude to interpret and adapt it in situ, 
as so many of those interviewed had already done or intended to do. The data thus 
support the theory and provide numerous examples of how "street-level bureaucrats" 
have exercised or intend to exercise their discretionary power, prerogative and 
authority to "manage" - optimizing or minimizing - the impact of the law in their 
regulatory domain. 
In introducing the Health System Improvements Act 2007 in the Legislature, the 
Minister identified several specific goals that the new complaints resolution 
provisions, including ADR, were intended to achieve: 
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1. Streamline the complaints process, addressing the concerns of patients and 
citizens frustrated by the lack of transparency or the slowness of the 
complaints process; 
2. Standardize the complaints process; 
3. Create very clear timelines and expectations about the appropriate response; 
4. Create circumstances that will, in a very deliberate way, enhance the 
transparency with which these matters are addressed. 
The interview data demonstrate, therefore allowing us to conclude, that the legislation 
is only partially effective in achieving its purpose. In many of the situations 
described, the process does not appear to have been streamlined. It appears to have 
been complicated or done away with in several of the Colleges. It does not appear to 
be standardized across Colleges, with informal processes persisting in many 
situations, and a wide variety of interpretations as to what types of complaints can be 
included, how and when to, as well who should, obtain consent, when and how the 
Committee should be involved, and so on. The timelines turn out to be less clear than 
the legislation leads us to expect and the levels of transparency are highly varied 
among processes. The theory outlined in this paper provides several very plausible 
reasons why the ADR legislation fails or only partially succeeds in meeting the public 
policy goals, and while many of these outcomes might have been anticipated from 
knowledge of the theory, the case study provides concrete evidence both of the 
specific behaviours and of many of the motivations behind them. 
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Have well-established bureaucratic practices subverted the achievement of those 
goals? On the basis of the interview data, it can be concluded that, at a minimum, 
bureaucratic needs, interests, resources and habits have influenced the extent to which 
the legislation has been adopted, adapted, resisted or ignored. The data also reveal 
that other, less tangible influences may determine the extent of cooperation with or 
resistance to the ADR legislation. I believe we can fairly conclude from this study 
that, through the evidence presented of conscious and unconscious meaning-making, 
community norms and conventions and bureaucratic interests, ADR has been 
construed as both a conceptual ideal and a useful instrument of bureaucratic 
efficiency and effectiveness at one end of the spectrum, and as a symbol and tool of 
interfering and intrusive Government power at the other. 
On the basis of the findings of this study, interpreted through the lens of the theory 
presented, future ADR legislation drafting would benefit from greater emphasis on 
enquiring into and understanding the motives for the legislation, from the perspective 
of all the major stakeholders. Good faith intentions and trust among the parties appear 
to be two important factors in the development of legislation that influence outcomes. 
Cynicism regarding motives for the legislation appears to be one serious impediment 
(among others) to successful achievement of legislative goals. In-depth study and 
open discussion of the issues and interests within the regulatory community that 
influence regulatory culture would perhaps be desirable in order to build more 
conscious awareness of the issues at stake and enable more meaningful legislative 
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consultations in the early stages, thus avoiding at least some of the negative 
unintended consequences. These discussions would benefit particularly those 
smaller players who proportionately may have more at stake in terms of resources 
required to implement the legislation. Procedural fairness appears to be an important 
value in how those discussions are organized and carried out. 
The data from this study make an important contribution to the growing body of 
empirical evidence that reveals the wide range of power dynamics within the 
regulatory bureaucracy that influences legal consciousness and regulatory 
administrative discretion. However, very little such evidence is currently available to 
inform the development of ADR legislation. Since ADR use is growing in many 
settings, including regulatory communities of many types and in various domains, it 
can be confidently argued, on the basis of this study, that a greater understanding of 
the factors and issues at play in the regulatory environment is critical to ensuring 
more effective ADR legislative development processes that lead to more appropriate, 
more manageable and/or more predictable outcomes for those involved with 
administering and participating in the ADR process and for those with a stake in the 
value of ADR as a concept and as a useful instrument for complaints and dispute 
resolution. 
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6.4 Further Research 
Further research is required to test this research method in other areas where ADR 
legislation has been proposed or enacted. It would also be important to return to the 
sample regulatory community studied in this case to find out whether and how the 
challenges identified at the time of the interviews have been met and overcome and 
whether any new challenges or obstacles have been found in the process of applying 
the legislation over time. As noted above, a comparative case study might apply the 
method, but take a more grounded approach to data-gathering, thereby reducing the 
bias the researcher's interest in ADR legislation might introduce into the study, and 
report on any difference in the results. 
6.5 Final Thoughts 
Various categories of legislation have their own unique dynamics that affect how they 
are perceived. ADR legislation is especially interesting because it deals with and 
tests the boundaries between law and alternatives-to-law and offers a unique 
opportunity to explore how people, in this case regulators, perceive law and non-law 
or alternatives-to-law. ADR legislation raises provocative questions about whether 
and how law can or should be applied to non-law or alternatives-to-law. At the heart 
of these questions there is a paradox, a certain tension and irony surrounding attempts 
to "legislate flexibility" that Pou describes as "inherently ridiculous," and that 
constitutes part of the provocation and the interest in exploring whether and how 
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those exposed to ADR legislation, or the possibility of it in their field of 
responsibility, recognize and deal with this tension and paradox. 
This study has explored these provocative questions as they have been discussed in 
the theoretical literature about ADR legislation and legalism. Having found a gap in 
the scholarship addressing ADR legislation that left much of the whether, why and 
how to legislate ADR processes unexamined and hence poorly understood, this study 
has focused on developing a theoretical framework for exploring ADR legislation in 
the regulatory field in order to expose and better understand what dynamics affect the 
development of and responses to ADR legislation. 
Regulatory theory research yielded a promising approach to and process for analyzing 
legislative development and the outcomes of legislation - an analytical framework 
that combines three well-researched theoretical fields - thus creating a new analytical 
tool that can be applied to understanding ADR legislation and perhaps a useful 
approach to the broader field of regulation. By developing a set of three core fields of 
questions from Friedman's socio-legal theory to elicit responses that can be grouped 
into one of Ewick and Silbey's three legal consciousness categories that in the 
regulatory sphere are manifested in acts of administrative discretion, the results can 
then be analyzed by applying the five elements ofMeidinger's regulatory culture to 
yield possible causal connections and the possibility of more effective solutions to 
regulatory and ADR process issues. The study then applied this formula or method to 
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a specific case study of ADR legislation in the regulatory field to test the method's 
validity and efficacy. 
Therefore, while this study draws inspiration from and builds on previous studies and 
theories of ADR legislation, it goes well beyond those studies, particularly recent 
research into the use and appropriateness of ADR legislation in the self-regulatory 
model, by introducing and applying current theory about and empirical research into 
regulatory culture, legal consciousness and administrative discretion. It answers the 
need for real-world data about how regulators think, feel and act with respect to 
legislation that affects the exercise of their statutory obligations and may challenge 
their regulatory authority and sense of autonomy. It also provides a research model 
or framework for future regulatory research and, in this example of the framework in 
use, provides unparalleled insights into the significant considerations that influence 
and may ultimately determine whether, why and how ADR legislation - and perhaps 
any new legislation - is adopted, contested or resisted in the regulatory field. 
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APPENDIX A 
COMPREHENSIVE METHODOLOGY 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODS 
A. l Document Research 
In addition to consulting the relevant legislation, a number of critical documents 
informed the design of the dissertation and of the case study. Principal among these 
were the Health Professions Legislative Review report, Striking A New Balance: a 
Blueprint for the Regulation of Ontario's Health Professions 1989 (Toronto: Queen's 
Printer); and the consultative documents and reports of the Health Professions 
Regulatory Advisory Council, Weighing the Balance 1999; Adjusting the Balance: A 
Review of the Regulated Health Professions Act 200 I; Regulation of Health 
Professions in Ontario: New Directions 2006. 
The HPRAC consultative process elicited a significant number of responses from 
stakeholders of the regulated health profession system. A search was made to obtain 
as many of these representations from the health regulatory Colleges and from 
interested stakeholders, such as patients' rights organizations, that addressed the 
discussion of ADR use in the College complaints and discipline processes. Some 
sixty documents were searched and read to understand the issues associated with the 
ADR process at different points in the time before and after the introduction of Bill 
171, the Health System Improvements Act 2007, which contained the ADR legislation 
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in the form that is discussed in this paper. The primary document research process 
began in 2007, after the Act was introduced and before it was proclaimed and 
continued throughout the dissertation research. 
In addition, a search was made of the Debates in the Ontario Legislative Assembly at 
the time the legislation was introduced and at subsequent readings. Stakeholder 
representations to the Legislature Standing Committee on Social Policy were 
reviewed for references to the ADR legislation and any concerns raised by the 
Colleges regarding the provisions at that time. Many written submissions to the 
Committee were available on College websites and these too were consulted for 
references to the ADR legislation and any concerns raised about it. 
Extensive research was also conducted into the College websites and their 
descriptions of their complaints process, with special attention to descriptions of 
informal or formal resolution processes, both prior to and after the legislation was 
proclaimed. Those web pages were retained in pdf format for the purposes of noting 
changes following the proclamation of the legislation. In addition to the College 
descriptions of the complaints processes, many College newsletters and annual 
reports archived on the websites were consulted for articles describing the new ADR 
legislation and its impact on the College processes. These included the period from 
approximately 2006 (before the legislation) to 2011 (after the legislation). 
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Grey Areas, a newsletter published by law firm Steinecke, Maciura and LeBlanc, 
Barristers & Solicitors, and archived on the company's website, was consulted for 
analysis and advice it provided, mainly to the RHP A regulatory community, 
regarding ADR processes and Bill 171, published over the period 2001 - present. 
Intensive research and careful reading of the Government, HPRAC, College and other 
stakeholder documents during the initial period of investigation provided a rich 
background narrative comprising many voices and perspectives regarding the issues 
to be addressed in the dissertation and provided initial direction for the theoretical 
research undertaken in the second phase of the research, leading to the development 
of the case study. 
The recent report by Justice Patrick Lesage on his enquiry into the complaints and 
discipline process of the Ontario College of Teachers (2012) was also reviewed in 
detail, as it makes substantial reference to the revised RHP A complaints and 
discipline processes as a useful resource to address the perceived problems that gave 
rise to his appointment by the College of Teachers in response to media criticism. 
A.2 Case Study - Initial Approach 
In order to test the theory regarding ADR legislation, and the connections between 
legal consciousness, regulatory culture and administrative discretion that might help 
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to elucidate and explain regulatory responses to it, it seemed useful to design and 
conduct a case study to gain empirical evidence from those directly involved in the 
field of regulation. Being aware of the recent ADR legislation in the revised RHP A, 
the first step in planning the project was informal consultation with three experts 
close to the potential field of study. These individuals confirmed my initial belief that 
a case study could be developed and were helpful in suggesting sampling criteria that 
might ensure adequate representation, as well as suggesting individuals to approach. 
Design of the Case Study 
The theoretical framework and the document search influenced the case study design. 
The theory strongly suggested an exploration of informants' conscious and 
unconscious attitudes toward the legislation, what gave rise to it and how it would 
influence their practices. Much of the literature on discretion emphasizes the 
influence of community on individual perceptions, values, beliefs, motivations and 
behaviours. It was important, therefore, to find a research approach that could elicit 
and capture as much of the tacit as well as the acknowledged sources of beliefs and 
behaviours as possible. 
A number of possible approaches were considered, including survey questionnaires; 
structured interviews with a series of questions relating to the ADR legislation and 
regulator practices; in-depth, unstructured interviews with key informants; and in-
depth, semi-structured interviews with key informants or a combination of 
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questionnaires and interviews. Issues of representative sampling, how to frame the 
research to potential informants (how much to suggest to them without influencing 
their responses) and how to record the data were among the key issues identified and 
considered. 
Investigations by Reiman and Oedewald,265 Sackmann,266 Sommer and Sommer,267 
and Ewick and Silbe/68 that directly address and discuss the challenges of exploring 
phenomenological elements of the subjects' legal consciousness and the influence of 
the community, were carefully reviewed in the light of the regulatory culture and 
administrative discretion scholarship. After considerable deliberation, it was decided 
that this study would rely on a combination of investigative methods that have been 
shown to yield robust results when examining administrative decision-making and 
cultural phenomena in the regulatory field. 
In-depth, issue-focused, phenomenologically oriented interviews 
Sackmann' s research into various types of culture studies suggests that the most 
fruitful investigations of culture rely on a combination of inductive and deductive 
265 Reiman & Oedewald 2002 supra note 1 7 
266 Sackmann supra note 233 
267 B. Sommer & R. Sommer, A Practical Guide to Behavioral Research Tools and Techniques 4th Ed. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) 
268 See particularly the discussion of legal consciousness methodology in Ewick & Silbey 1998 supra note 
2lat251 
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qualitative research, principally in-depth semi-structured or unstructured interviews 
with key informants that are issue-focused. 
In-depth interviews are used to uncover culturally based values, cultural 
beliefs, or knowledge structures .... [S]uch an in-depth interview may be 
called ethnographic, clinical or phenomenological. The common denominator 
is that researchers do not introduce cultural issues from the outside or from 
their own cultural reference groups. Instead, by using broad and open-ended 
questions, by trying to use the insider's language, and bracketing their own 
assumptions, the interviewers entice the interviewees to unravel aspects of 
their everyday life in their particular cultural setting.269 
A semi-structured in-depth interview intended to uncover unconscious cultural 
beliefs, values, understandings or assumptions can sometimes frustrate or fail its 
research purpose by its lack of direction or focus. Therefore, Sack:mann goes on to 
argue that 
"[a ]n issue focus enables both the surfacing of the tacit components of culture, 
and comparisons across individuals and research settings. . .. The [issue] 
should have the quality of a projective device - that is, provide a specific 
context but leave enough latitude for interpretation .... The tacit components 
of culture become apparent in the specific interpretations attributed by 
respondents .... [A]n issue focus enables comparisons, because it introduces a 
specific context that forces respondents to draw on the same stock of 
knowledge. It channels the attention of respondents to the same cultural 
aspects within a given organization and reveals their framework about this 
issue .... The issue serves as a projective device, leaving latitude for different 
interpretations." 270 
Sackmann favours combining the issue focus, that surfaces cultural understandings in 
relation to a specific circumstance, with a phenomenological orientation that focuses 
"on insiders' perspectives, their everyday theories of organizational life, and what 
269 Sackmann supra note 233 at 301 (italics in original; references omitted) 
270 Ibid at 304 
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they consider relevant in that particular setting. ,mi The combination of an issue 
focus and phenomenological orientation invites and promotes open and in-depth 
exploration of the informants' awareness and understanding through the lens of a 
specific issue with which they have reasonable familiarity. As the informants discuss 
the issue, Sackmann asserts, the phenomenology of the culture is revealed and any 
researcher bias is significantly reduced. The issue, as "projective device" (in this 
case, the ADR legislation), allows "respondents to reflect on taken-for-granted 
aspects of their work life. It [is] sufficiently ambiguous and thought-provoking to 
surface subconscious beliefs and at the same time non-threatening, because 
respondents ... answer freely and openly. "272 
Reiman and Oedewald assert that the phenomenon under study, such as ADR 
legislation, can only be understood in the context of the culture from "which it is 
difficult or impossible to separate the phenomenon itself."273 Their research into 
regulatory culture confirms other cultural researchers' findings that questionnaires are 
inadequate means to uncover embedded cultural understandings. Their comparative 
research among regulatory culture research methodologies validates and extends the 
cultural research methodology outcomes earlier reported by Sackmann. 
271 Ibid at 305 
272 Ibid at 310 
273 Reiman & Oedewald 2002 supra note 17 at 8 
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Timing of the Interviews 
The interviews were scheduled to take place in the latter part of 2009 and early 2010. 
By that time, the ADR legislation had been discussed in connection with the 2006 
HPRAC report and advice to the Minister of Health and Long-Term care on RHPA 
revisions. A period of comment had occurred prior to the introduction of the 
legislation in the Legislative Assembly later that year. Early in 2007 the legislation 
had been debated and submissions heard at the Legislative Standing Committee on 
Social Policy, and passed in June 2007. The proclamation date of the legislation was 
June 7, 2009. Therefore, the legislation had been known for fully two years prior to 
the interviews, a period during which preparations could be made to implement the 
legislation at the time of its proclamation. Just before interviews were scheduled to 
take place, the Government introduced, on May 11, 2009, new legislation to amend 
the RHP A,274 giving the Government power to appoint a Supervisor to take over the 
management of an RHP A College, replacing the elected and appointed Council 
members and the Registrar in directing all College affairs. This development 
appeared to shock and perplex many in the RHP A community and it was frequently 
ref erred to in the interviews that were held while the Standing Committee on Social 
Policy was conducting hearings on the Bill during late 2009. It is likely that this 
274 Bill 179, Regulated Health Professions Statute Law Amendment Act SO 2009 c 26 
www.ontla.on.ca/bills/bills-files/39 _Parliament/Sessionl/b l 79ra.pdf at 8. For a summary of the 
Colleges' concerns, see Ontario Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on social policy, "Bill 179, 
Regulated Health Professions Statute Law Amendment Act, 2009" in Official Report of Debates 
(Hansard), No SP-34 (September 29, 2009) at 1500 
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surprising tum of events had an impact on the way at least some of the College 
informants in particular viewed the Government's motives towards the Colleges and 
their attitudes towards collaborative policy-making and self-regulation. Thus their 
view of the ADR legislation during the period of the interviews was, to some extent, 
and in some cases, coloured by this event. However, the currency of this issue also 
helped to highlight and make more vivid existing dynamics within the regulatory 
community that might not otherwise have been as immediately accessible. In other 
words, this development helped to define the cultural landscape in ways that were 
useful to this study. 
Case Study Sample 
The key informants were selected so as to obtain a diverse array of College and other 
key stakeholder perspectives from those most directly involved or associated with the 
policy development and practical implementation of the ADR legislation. Therefore, 
it made sense to include representatives of the Ministry of Health and Long-Term 
Care (appointed administrative officials), the Health Professions Regulatory Advisory 
Council (appointed advisory and consultative officials), the Health Professions 
Appeal and Review Board (appointed judicial officials), and representatives of the 
professional regulatory bodies (Colleges), including large, medium and smaller 
Colleges, Colleges where the professions provide services funded by the provincial 
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public health insurance program (OHIP) and those whose services are funded 
privately, by individual clients or by their private insurers.275 
From the Colleges, input was sought from the Registrars (chief administrative/ 
executive officers with overall regulatory and statutory as well as management 
responsibility under the new legislation for determining complaints cases suitable for 
ADR), senior College staff responsible for the administration of the complaints 
resolution process, elected College Council members responsible for judicial 
decisions regarding complaints resolution, consultants to the College complaints 
resolution processes, including ADR experts and legal counsel. This selection was 
made to ensure broad input to the study as well as to explore and validate, as far as 
possible, Meidinger's concept of a regulatory community whose interactions 
constitute a regulatory culture that influences individual responses to regulatory 
change. 
Among those approached, only the two HPRAC officials declined to be interviewed -
one because he was in retirement, and the other for want of time. It would perhaps 
have provided a more complete (and more complex?) view of the regulatory 
community had these perspectives been included, but it is doubtful that their absence 
invalidates the relevance or the usefulness of the findings. 
275 See Appendix A: Methodology - Exhibit 1: Health Regulatory Colleges in Ontario 
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In the end, interviews took place with 24 individuals, 276 17 of whom were College 
officials (comprising 11 College Registrars, 5 Directors of Complaints and 1 
Complaints Committee Chair). Two senior officials of the Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care were interviewed, as well as the Chair of the Health Professions 
Appeal and Review Board, 2 College legal counsel and 2 consultants in the field, both 
of whom had long-time, in-depth experience working with the complaints process 
within the RHP A regulatory system and experience of providing complaints 
resolution support to Colleges other than those interviewed directly. The College 
key informants were selected to provide a representative sample of conditions and 
experience. Fourteen of the total 21 Colleges (sixty percent) were included, 
comprising 7 representatives of the smaller Colleges {up to 4,000 members), 4 of the 
medium-sized (4,000 to 8,000 members) and each of the 3 largest (more than 8,000 
members) Colleges. A sizable majority of the 21 Colleges have fewer than 4,000 
members. 
The study comprises Colleges that had well developed, structured ADR processes, 
more informal processes and no process, prior to the ADR legislation. Further criteria 
for selecting Colleges and interviewees were the type of healthcare the College 
members provided, specifically whether the care was direct, hands-on client 
interactions, technical services with little or no client interaction, and/or provision of 
276 See Appendix A: Methodology - Exhibit 2: Key Informants Interviewed 
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products, including prosthetics or other assistive devices, or a combination of those 
services. A final criterion was whether the services provided were publicly or 
privately funded. The sample selected attempted to ensure as much inclusiveness as 
possible of the potentially significant variables that might influence a) the types of 
complaints received and b) the perceptions of the appropriateness of the ADR 
legislation and the administrative responses to it. 
Approach to Key Informants 
An informal approach was made to the informants identified, explaining in general 
terms the purpose of the study and inviting them to participate. 277 Based on their 
response, contact was made by email or by telephone to schedule the interview. No 
conversations about the subject of the interview took place prior to the interview 
itself. 278 Attached to the email scheduling the meeting was an Ethics Letter279 setting 
out the university's policy regarding ethical research on human subjects. The letter 
also described the form of the interview as a discussion or conversation and the time 
period requested between 45 minutes and one hour. The letter also set out how the 
interview would be recorded - through traditional note-taking and by voice recording. 
It also set out the policy for safeguarding informant information and the schedule for 
destruction of notes. 
277 See Appendix A: Methodology - Exhibit 3 - Original Contact Email 
278 See Appendix A: Methodology - Exhibit 4: Email Scheduling Meeting 
279 See Appendix A: Methodology - Exhibit 5: Ethics Letter 
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The letter introduced some topics that the informant could consider prior to the 
interview, however there was no expectation of this being a formal question and 
answer survey. The suggested areas for discussion can be found in the Ethics Letter, 
copies of which they would be asked to sign at the interview, including an option to 
have their comments attributed to them directly in the dissertation or not. All but one 
informant opted to be quoted according to the terms laid out in the letter. However, 
in light of the depth and candidness of the conversations, and in order to protect 
individuals while ensuring that all the relevant issues could be heard, it was decided 
not to identify sources by name in reporting the findings of the study. 
Bias 
As a researcher, my presence within the regulatory culture asking questions about the 
ADR legislation no doubt inflected the discussion. The fact that research was being 
undertaken into the subject area gave it a prominence, albeit briefly, that it might not 
otherwise have had for the informants. Therefore, simply drawing attention to the 
subject in some sense can distort its importance. Also the fact that it was a faculty of 
law student, as opposed to a sociology or political science or health administration 
student, might reasonably be supposed to have conditioned to some extent the way 
the informants viewed, prepared for and responded to the interviews. 
The articulation of these themes in advance of the interview was intended to provide a 
focus for the informant, but, it must be said, mentioning specific themes also had a 
303 
potential to influence the informants' attitudes towards the researcher and toward 
what information they might imagine the researcher to be seeking (problem of social 
desirability). The risk would be that some would try to provide what they thought the 
researcher was looking for, while others might take an oppositional stance, while 
others still might be uninfluenced one way or another by the themes mentioned. It 
was decided to risk mentioning the themes in advance and then to take any possible 
influence that decision might have caused into account during the analysis and 
reporting of the responses. 
Data Collection: Key Informant Interviews 
Meetings with the Ministry officials took place in a meeting room at the Ministry 
offices in downtown Toronto. HPARB and College key informants were interviewed 
in their respective offices throughout the Greater Toronto area. Consultants and legal 
counsel were interviewed either in their offices (one of which was outside Toronto) or 
in convenient public places that afforded privacy and confidentiality. 
The informants signed the Ethics Letter prior to the start of the interview and the 
length of time available was established at generally one hour. The purpose of the 
interview was again briefly explained and permission to record the interview was 
requested and in every case was granted. In three cases, two people attended the 
interview. Having been notified of this in advance, two letters were brought for 
signature. In the case of these three interviews, the conversation at times during the 
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interview became a dialogue between the informants, with the researcher in the role 
of interested observer of animated exchanges in which important issues were debated 
by two knowledgeable professionals. This format was beneficial in revealing and 
demonstrating, in even a small way, the content and the dynamics of the discourse 
that takes place within the organization and within the regulatory community. 
The interviews focused on three core subject areas: What do you think gave rise to 
the ADR legislation? In your opinion, how appropriate is the actual ADR legislation? 
What impact has the ADR legislation had on College practices? This basic interview 
protocol, designed principally for College key informants and their consultants/ 
advisors, was modified slightly to reflect the different perspectives of the officials of 
the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care and the Health Professions Appeal and 
Review Board. 
Interviews lasted approximately one hour. Only a few were briefer and most were 
longer. The discussions within each stage of the interview process were lively and 
intense, and included many probing, follow-up questions by the researcher for 
clarification and further explanatory information. At times the sequence of core 
question sets were varied when the informant(s) included information addressing a 
subsequent area of enquiry in their initial responses. The interview then flowed in the 
direction the informants led, thus providing precious insight into their perceptions and 
the inner logic of their responses. An opportunity was found later in the interview to 
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return to any interview area that had been "skipped" as a result of the informant's free 
flow of ideas. 
Conclusion and Acknowledgement of Key Informant Interviews 
The interviews concluded with a summary of how the information would be handled 
and with a request for permission to follow up with additional questions for 
clarification, if that appeared necessary. All informants agreed to that request, 
although no further follow up occurred. Shortly after the interview, an 
acknowledgement email was sent to each informant, thanking them and 
acknowledging the time and information they had contributed to the research.280 
Data Analysis 
All the key informant interviews were voice-recorded and the recordings were 
professionally transcribed. The transcripts were reviewed many times and the 
substance of the interviews was analyzed according to principles of deductive coding 
based on the previous theoretical and document research. The interview results (the 
verbal and conceptual content of the respective interview transcripts) were analyzed 
and clustered by similarity of major concepts and themes mentioned, with respect to 
perceptions of how the ADR legislation came about, how appropriate the ADR 
provisions appear to be and what impact the ADR legislation has or will have had on 
College practices that were being fo1lowed prior to the legislation. Further interaction 
280 See Appendix A: Methodology- Exhibit 6: Sample Acknowledgement Email 
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with the data, and deductive analysis of the comments with respect to concepts that 
emerged from the interviews themselves, led to additional, finer categorization of the 
responses according to additional major and minor themes that emerged, supporting a 
more detailed analysis and subsequent reporting of the data. 
As a result of the deductive coding process, some twenty-four hours of remarkably 
candid reflections were condensed into some fifty pages describing the constellation 
of issues that, taken together, embody and represent the informants' perceptions of 
the various regulatory culture dimensions within their legal consciousness that govern 
their administrative discretionary decision-making, as revealed in their attitudes 
toward the ADR legislation. Through attention to these narratives, it is possible to 
gain a sense of the community and the individuals that comprise it and to hear the 
tensions and the challenges expressed in their own words. From more than twenty 
hours of conversation, observations have been selected that appear most relevant and 
important to the subject matter of this study and useful to understanding the 
individual decision-makers and the community and culture in which they live and 
work. 
Because the data reported are individual perceptions formed from a variety of 
influences and reflecting the informant's conscious or unconscious interests and ideas 
about what may be appropriate or beneficial for them to reveal/say to the researcher 
in the context of the interview and the overall research project, this dissertation makes 
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no claim that the perceptions recorded, reported and which form the foundation for 
the data analysis, discussion and research conclusions are "facts," or in any sense 
objectively "true." The informant perceptions are phenomena of subjective truth or 
reality regarding how they perceive themselves, their work and the community that 
they voluntarily reported as the context for their administrative choices. The 
possibility that the specific nature and choice of perceptions reported by the 
informants may have been intended to influence the researcher's perceptions, 
reporting of results and the outcome of the research is, in itself, a phenomenon worth 
noting. Other scholars accessing this rich resource of material would perhaps focus on 
different aspects of the material presented, interpret the comments differently, make 
different observations and draw different conclusions from those presented in this 
dissertation. 
In reporting these results, the source is indicated by a code that reflects the College 
size (SC, MC, LC) and a number that has been assigned to that College within that 
size-type. The comments here are reported verbatim, except for minor "cleansing" of 
the very common urns, abs, and "you knows." Some minor editing for clarity is 
indicated by square brackets [ ] and breaks ( ... ) in the quoted text. 
Following the example of other legal consciousness case studies (e.g., Ewick and 
Silbey, Cooper), the Findings sections include robust selected narratives that convey a 
real sense of the individuals, their perceptions and perspectives. Ewick and Silbey's 
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reports on the legal consciousness of their subjects is the model for reporting the 
views expressed by the key informants in this study. By providing more than the 
most condensed snippets from the interviews, this report allows the reader to enter 
more fully into the culture the informants inhabit and glimpse the values, 
understandings, beliefs and meanings that inform the informants' thinking and 
behaviour about their work, their responsibilities, the power dynamic and socio-legal 
framework they perceive as governing their work and the impact of the ADR 
legislation within that cultural context. I believe that the chosen methodology has 
produced robust results that offer unparalleled insights into the administrative 
discretion process within the RHP A regulatory culture, thus promoting a more 
grounded and nuanced understanding of the consequences of legislative initiatives in 
the regulatory sphere, particularly with regard to ADR. 
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APPENDIX A :METHODOLOGY - Exhibit 1: Health Regulatory Colleges in 
Ontario (those interviewed indicated by boldface & X) 
SC - Small College; MC - Medium-Sized College; LC - Large College 
College of Audiologists and Speech-Language Pathologists of Ontario (MC) 
College of Chiropodists of Ontario (SC) 
College of Chiropractors of Ontario (SC) X 
College of Dental Hygienists of Ontario (LC) 
Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario (MC) X 
College of Dental Technologists of Ontario (SC) 
College of Denturists of Ontario (SC) X 
College of Dietitians of Ontario (MC) X 
College of Massage Therapists of Ontario (LC) 
College of Medical Laboratory Technologists of Ontario (MC) X 
College of Medical Radiation Technologists of Ontario (MC) X 
College of Midwives of Ontario (SC) 
College of Nurses of Ontario (LC) X 
College of Occupational Therapists of Ontario (MC) 
College of Opticians of Ontario (SC) X 
College of Optometrists of Ontario (SC) X 
Ontario College of Pharmacists (LC) X 
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (LC) X 
College of Physiotherapists of Ontario (MC) X 
College of Psychologists of Ontario (SC) X 
College of Respiratory Therapists of Ontario (SC) X 
Colleges Transitioning towards Proclamation in 2013 or 2014 (not interviewed) 
College of Homeopaths of Ontario 
College of Kinesiologists of Ontario 
College of Naturopaths of Ontario 
College of Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and Acupuncturists of Ontario 
College of Registered Psychotherapists of Ontario 
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APPENDIX A METHODOLOGY - Exhibit 2: Key Informants Interviewed 
(titles at time of interview) 
Anita Ashton, Director, Professional Conduct, College of Physiotherapists of Ontario 
Mary Bayliss, Manager of Policy and Investigations, College of Respiratory 
Therapists of Ontario 
Dean Benard, Benard + Associates, Mediation and Investigation Consultant to RHP A 
Colleges 
Tim Blakley, Manager (Acting), Legislative and Special Projects Unit, Health 
Professions Regulatory Policy and Programs Branch, Ministry of Health and Long-
Term Care 
Anne L. Coghlan, Executive Director & CEO, College of Nurses of Ontario 
Jill Dougherty, Lawyer, Weirfoulds LLP, Legal Counsel to RHPA Colleges 
Irwin Fefergrad, Registrar, Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario 
Maryan Gemus, Manager of Investigations and Resolutions. College of Pharmacists 
of Ontario 
Rocco Gerace, Registrar, College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario 
Mary Lou Gignac, Registrar, College of Dieticians of Ontario 
Linda Gough, Registrar, College of Medical Radiation Technologists of Ontario 
Mina Kavanagh, Director of Professional Programs, College of Opticians of Ontario 
David Lamb, Senior Policy Analyst, Legislative and Special Projects Unit, Health 
Professions Regulatory Policy and Programs Branch, Ministry of Health and Long-
Term Care 
Linda Lamoureux, Chair, Health Professions Appeal and Review Board 
Tina Langlois, Complaints & Discipline Case Manager, College of Medical 
Laboratory Technologists of Ontario 
Kristina Mulak, Manager, Inquiries, Complaints, Reports, College of Chiropractors of 
Ontario 
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Cliff Muzylowsky, Registrar, College of Denturists of Ontario 
Christine Robinson, Registrar, College of Respiratory Therapists of Ontario 
Jan Robinson, Registrar & Chief Executive Officer, College of Physiotherapists of 
Ontario 
Peter Ruttan, Chair, Inquiries, Complaints, Reports Committee, College of 
Physiotherapists of Ontario 
Sharon Saberton (former Registrar, CMRTO), Sharon Saberton Consulting 
Debbie S. Tarshis, Partner, Weirfoulds LLP, Legal Counsel to RHPA Colleges 
Murray Tumour, Registrar, College of Optometrists of Ontario 
Catherine Yarrow, Registrar & Executive Director, College of Psychologists of 
Ontario 
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APPENDIX A METHODOLOGY- Exhibit 3 - Original Contact Email 
Date: 
From: Christine Forsyth 
To:xxxxxxx@xxxxxxxx 
Subject: Interview Request 
Dear [person's name], 
I am a third-year Ph.D. student at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 
completing research for my thesis on the reasons for and effects of the ADR 
(alternative dispute resolution) provisions in Bill 171, the Health System 
Improvements Act, 2007, proclaimed on June 4, 2009. As a mature student, I come 
to this research with a professional background in ADR and in the regulation of the 
health professions in Ontario. 
I am working with Professor Paul Emond, an expert in ADR, Professor Joan Gilmour, 
an expert in Ontario health law and regulation, and Professor Liora Salter, an expert 
in public policy, governance and regulation, and have benefited from their 
suggestions regarding critical issues to be addressed. I am writing to you to request a 
brief interview at your convenience (hopefully some time in September or early 
October), to discuss whether and how the new ADR provisions might affect the 
College of XXXXXX's current and future complaints process and practices. I 
anticipate the interview will take between forty-five minutes and one hour, depending 
on your schedule. If you agree (and I hope you will), our conversation will be 
governed by the university's guidelines regarding ethical research, which you will 
have an opportunity to review. 
I will follow up this request with a phone call to your office in the week of :XX:XX. 
In the meantime, please do not hesitate to contact Paul Emond (pemond@emp.ca) for 
a reference, or me directly if you have any questions. My email address is :XXXXX 
and my phone number is 416 XXX :XXXX. I very much look forward to a favourable 
response and to speaking with you soon. 
Sincerely, 
Christine Forsyth 
Direct Line: XXX XXX :XXXX 
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APPENDIX A METHODOLOGY - Exhibit 4: Email Scheduling Meeting 
Good morning, XXXX, 
I want to thank you again for agreeing to meet with me on Monday September 14 at 
10 am at your office to discuss the ADR provisions in the Health System 
Improvements Act. 
As I mentioned, according to research protocols, I have prepared a letter covering 
research ethics, which I will bring with me on Monday for your signature. A copy is 
attached for your review in advance. It also contains a list of subject areas that I hope 
we might discuss. I do not expect you to prepare much for our conversation, but 
would very much value your views and opinions on these and related issues 
according to your current awareness of them. I am also attaching a summary of the 
ADR provisions in the Act and hope that both those items will be of assistance for our 
discussion. Please let me know if you have any comments or questions prior to our 
meeting. 
I very much look forward to seeing you on Monday morning and hope you have a 
pleasant weekend. 
Best regards, 
Christine 
Direct Line: XXX XXX XXXX 
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APPENDIX A METHODOLOGY- Exhibit 5: Ethics Letter 
[My Address] 
[Date] 
[Key Informant's Name] 
Registrar & Executive Director 
College of XXXXXXXX of Ontario 
[College Address] 
Dear [name], 
I am writing to thank you and to confirm our meeting on Wednesday, September 30 
at 2:00 pm regarding the doctoral research I am conducting on the new alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) provisions in the Health Professions Procedural Code. I am 
working with Professors Paul Emond, Joan Gilmour and Liora Salter of Osgoode Hall 
Law School. The research I am undertaking has been reviewed and approved by the 
York University Human Participants Review Subcommittee for compliance with 
York's Senate ethics policy. 
My understanding is that you are involved in the application of the new legislative 
provisions in your capacity as Registrar and Executive Director of the College of 
XXXXX of Ontario. Your perspective on the issues related to the ADR provisions 
would be very valuable to me. I anticipate taking approximately no more than forty-
five to sixty minutes of your time. 
Some aspects of the ADR legislation I would appreciate your input and observations 
on are: 
•What impact (intended or unintended) the ADR legislation has/will have on the 
College and its processes, on regulating the professions and on protecting the public 
interest 
•What impact other aspects of the new ADR legislation (e.g., new time limits on the 
complaints resolution process) will have on the College's adoption of all or aspects of 
the ADR provisions 
• What College actions, in your view, the ADR legislation requires, permits, or 
prohibits 
• How the ADR legislation impacts the principles of transparency, accountability, 
fairness, efficiency, consistency, timeliness and clear public/member expectations 
•Why and how this ADR legislation came about and whose interests it serves 
• Who, in your view, benefits from these ADR provisions, who may be adversely 
affected and how the use or non-use of ADR in the complaints resolution process may 
alter stakeholder relationships 
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Our meeting would be more like a consultation or discussion than a formal interview. 
My intention is to use the notes from our discussion in my thesis. Theses are 
published, but not widely circulated. As well, I may later wish to publish an 
academic article that relies upon our discussion. 
Needless to say, you are under no obligation to meet with me or to answer any one of 
my questions, and you may call the session to a close at any time. Normally I take 
notes and use a small voice recorder to assist my note-taking. I would be pleased to 
speak with you on a not-for-attribution basis or, if you prefer, to attribute comments 
you make, or ideas we have discussed to you. However, if I do wish to quote you by 
name or in any way that could be attributed to you, I undertake to provide you with a 
copy of the intended quotation. You will have the opportunity to review and clarify 
any comment that will be associated with your name. 
At any time you have the right to withdraw and/or stop participating in the interview 
and, should you withdraw, all data collected as a result of your participation will be 
destroyed by shredding and will be disposed of commercially. The notes and 
recording from our discussion will be kept in my safekeeping for a period of at least 
two years. I will treat the notes as confidential to the limits allowed by law, as is 
York's policy. I shall shred and dispose of all notes from our conversations at the end 
of the two-year period. 
Neither the topics we will discuss, nor any writing I will do afterwards is intended to 
be a "report card" on any person or organization, and I do not anticipate your 
providing me with information that might be considered confidential or "off the 
record." 
I look forward to meeting you next week. Please do not hesitate to be in touch with 
me if you have any questions or concerns. I can be reached at [my phone number] or 
at [my email address]. 
As I have mentioned, York University has a policy on research ethics. You will find 
this at http://www.yorku.ca/grads/policies/ethics.htm. You are also welcome to 
contact York's Office of Research Ethics if you have any questions or concerns (309 
York Lanes, 4700 Keele St., Toronto ON Canada M3J 1P3 telephone 416 736 5055) 
www .research.yorku.ca 
At the interview I will ask you to sign and date my copy of this letter to ensure that 
you have given me your informed consent. 
Yours sincerely, 
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Christine Forsyth 
Ph.D. Candidate 
I consent to have this discussion 
With attribution 
Without attribution 
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APPENDIX A METHODOLOGY- Exhibit 6: Sample Acknowledgement Email 
Dear [Key Informant's Name], 
Thank you so much for meeting with me yesterday and for sharing your thoughts and 
experience about the impact of the new ADR legislation on the College, how the 
legislation evolved and your reflections on the larger context of professional self-
regulation. I really enjoyed our conversation and came away with new insights and a 
much richer understanding of the situation as it is playing out in the "real world" of 
College processes, as well as inspiration regarding some new lines of enquiry. Thank 
you too for suggesting that I meet with XX.XX to gain the perspectives of a 
knowledgeable, seasoned staff ADR practitioner. I look forward to hearing from 
XX.XX about arranging such a meeting. 
I will certainly check with you if I wish to use any identified quotes and I will be very 
happy to share the contents of my dissertation with you and with members of the 
Federation or others you suggest when it is finalized. 
In the meantime, my most sincere thanks for sharing your insights and experiences so 
generously with me. 
Kindest regards, 
Christine 
Direct Line: XXX XXX XX.XX 
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APPENDIXC 
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution 
CNO College of Nurses of Ontario 
CPO College of Psychologists of Ontario 
CPSO College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario 
FHRCO Federation of Health Regulatory Colleges of Ontario 
HP ARB Health Professions Appeal and Review Board 
HPPC Health Professions Procedural Code (Schedule 2 of RHPA) 
HPRAC Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council 
HSIA Health System Improvements Act, S.O. 2007, c. 10- Bill 171 
ICRC Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee 
MHLTC Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care 
RCDSO Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario 
RHPA Regulated Health Professions Act, S.O. 1991, c.18 
SPPA Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 
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